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Editorial
In this special edition of philosophy @ LISBON journal, the topic 
to be analyzed will be Philosophy and Architecture. It is a theme sel-
dom analyzed on Aesthetics, but it deserves our best attention taking 
into account the importance of architecture in our lives. So it is a won-
derful way to resume the publication of this journal. Soon, we will have 
a regular issue of the magazine, as well as a special edition on Schelling.
Application for new articles should be sent to the following  e-mail 
philosophyatlisbon@letras.ulisboa.pt by the end of December.
Lisbon, 7th November 2016
Carlos João Correia
Foreword
Philosophy & Architecture
Architecture is one of the most antique achievements of human 
civilizations. Daily we experience it and we found ourselves surrounded 
by buildings that decisively influence the way we live. Still, most of the 
times, this familiarity could become uncannily problematic if it beco-
mes a kind of invisibility and indifference.
As practice, architecture rises specific questions on authorship, 
ethics, social and political implications, aesthetic values, hermeneutics 
and multidisciplinary intersections. Several attempts throughout the 
ages tried to emancipate architecture from the other artistic disciplines 
and to claim an autonomous field for it. It is however arguable whether 
architecture should have an artistic status or if it is to be considered wi-
thin the context of a beaux-arts system. This year, a new iconic building 
designed by Amanda Levete was inaugurated in Lisbon: named MAAT 
—Museum of Art, Architecture and Technology—, its own description 
is symptomatic of an ontological thesis now deep-rooted, which claims 
architecture’s full autonomy from the arts.
Foreword8
Admitting the particularities of an architectural thought and if we 
consider it within a philosophical perspective, one may understand its 
manifold implications and comprehend — perhaps in an excessively 
Neoplatonist-based framework—, not only the idea of an object, but 
also all the encompassed idea of a worldview, or even the challenging 
connections between space and thought.
The papers presented in this thematic issue offer —each own in 
its own way— approaches that come from both philosophy and archi-
tecture. Our goal is to refresh the debate on questions such as how 
these two areas of study can work together and profit from mutual ap-
proaches. It is our conviction that it is possible to discuss architecture’s 
idiosyncrasies within a philosophical point of view, especially when fo-
cusing its contemporary relevance. The same applies to certain philo-
sophical systems whose highly architectural character has been poorly 
underscored. 
One year ago a very thought-provoking debate took place in Lis-
bon. Tomás N. Castro and Maribel Mendes Sobreira would like to 
thank those who participated in the Philosophy & Architecture Interna-
tional Postgraduate Conference (Lisbon, 4—6th November 2015): the key-
note speakers (Filipa Afonso, Inês Moreira, Luís Santiago Baptista and 
Carlos Jacques), the scientific committee, the moderators, the authors 
of more than 40 papers presented, and the institutions that held the 
venues (Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa and Museu 
Colecção Berardo). Preliminary versions of the papers here published 
were firstly discussed at the conference’s sessions. The Editors would 
also thank the directive board of the journal philosophy@LISBON and 
the Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa for their effortless 
reception of this idea and warm support.
Lisbon, 7th November 2016
Filipa Afonso
Tomás N. Castro
Maribel Mendes Sobreira
© Maribel Mendes Sobreira
philosophy@LISBON, 5, 11-23. Lisboa: CFUL.
Playing in Space;
Profaning Architectural Practice
Carlos Jacques
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Al Akhawayn University
Av. Hassan II
Ifrane 53000
Morocco
c.jacques@aui.ma
Abstract
There are no intrinsically radical ways of moulding architectural space. But once it is 
understood that space is made through social relations, that it is as a social practice, 
what emerges is the need to imagine spatial practices, in urbanism, architecture, or 
whatever, beyond their subservience to regimes of oppressive power. What then might, 
for example, a radical architectural practice look like? Without any pretence to propos-
ing norms, and in consonance with the idea that human spaces are created, a liberating 
architecture cannot consequently be reduced to any fixed aesthetic and/or function-
ally defined form. It must rather be conceived of as a practice that creates spatial forms 
open to the multiplication of desires, and not their domestication.
Inspired by the occupation movements of city squares in early 2011, this reflection is an 
invitation to question, to reject, functionalist orderings of architectural space. It is an 
apology for an architecture of excess, of the monstrous; an architecture that allies itself 
with overflowing energies, wild experimentation, iconoclastic irreverence. To profane 
architectural practice is to render it anarchic.
Keywords
Space; occupation; anarchism
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... it is pointless trying to decide whether Zenobia is to be classified among 
happy cities or among the unhappy.  It makes no sense to divide cities into 
these two species, but rather into another two: those that through the years 
and the changes continue to give their form to desires, and those in which 
desires erase the city or are erased by it.
Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities
1.
This reflection on architecture was animated by the eruption of occupa-
tions of city streets and squares in early 2011, movements in which the 
anonymous many appropriated “public” spaces for purposes no longer 
permitted or imagined. Each occupation exploded the narratives and his-
tories of technocratically administered well-being; each profaned spaces 
moulded by the sanctities of power and the flows of wealth; each was the 
uncaused and unpredicted creation of a “myriad of new possibilities”.1 Wi-
thout any political party affiliation, without any hegemonic organization, 
without known leaders, the movements arose as pure events of shared self-
-making, where the location, the place of the event opens to all humanity 
(“This plaza has no borders”, could be read amid the eruption of texts that 
decorated Madrid’s Puerta del Sol under occupation by the 15th of May 
movement)2; a place where “all speech is listened to, all propositions are 
examined, all difficulties are treated for what they are.”3 Like a child who 
turns reality into a play thing, a toy, rendering it thereby susceptible to mul-
tiple uses limited only by dreams and freedoms, oblivious to what should 
and should not be done except as its imagination dictates, the occupation 
of cityscapes redefined them as open and horizontal, without closed func-
tions.  Squares became spaces of festival, carnival, disclosing dimensions 
of constructed space forgotten or repressed, and opening thresholds onto 
new spatial possibilities. The city, its urban plans and architectural forms, 
was freed, however momentarily, for unprogrammed uses, for radical desi-
res. The striated landscapes of urban space were transgressed; the almost 
sacral nature of city ordinances, regulations, urban authorities, functional 
division of spaces, city toponymy, monuments, buildings, streets and squa-
res and so much more became toys in a proliferation of spatialities that 
testified to a profaning of the urbe by ways of life, bearers of new ways of 
making space.
This reflection then is written amid a sea of resonances, of occupa-
tions become cradles for radically democratic, assembly based, autono-
1.  Badiou, February 18, 2011. 
2.  15-M Al Sol.
3.  Badiou, February 18, 2011.
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mous self-determination, of appropriated abandoned city lots greened for 
play and food, of factories and rural lands reborn for sustainable life, of 
resistance to eviction and the taking of policed unused housing for shelter 
and dignity, of the acts of appropriation of food from commercial cen-
tres of over-abundance and the waste of excess, of the self-organisation 
of social services before the retreat of the State, of the creation of okupied 
social centres, spaces of conviviality, solidarity and resistance: all of these 
created spaces and so many others in our “time of riots”4 push us towards 
the question, among others, of how we can conceive of architectural and 
urban space not as confining and satisfying presumed needs (an ambition 
coincident with regimes of power), but as liberating desires, as “means of 
testing a thousand ways of modifying life.”5
Man must stop making and manipulating, and instead allow architecture to 
happen.
William Katavolos
2.
It is not uncommon, in efforts to circumscribe modern architecture, to 
speak of it in terms of form and/or function.  In rupture with past archi-
tecture, the modern would be styled after machines, stripped bare of orna-
mentation, and organised rationally in a functional distribution of spaces. 
Yet however useful classifications and definitions of this kind may be, they 
carry with them the risk of passing over the differences and tensions, the 
heterogeneity, of the architecture designed and built under its name. And 
critical positions and practices within modernism are in parallel weakened, 
for they are often reduced to simple proposals of alternative forms and 
functions; an aesthetic posturing that offers little resistance to functional 
imperatives.
If a unity there is in modern architecture, it lies elsewhere. And by 
analogy with Immanuel Kant’s answer to the question “What is enlighten-
ment?”, namely, “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”, 
with “immaturity” understood as “the inability to use one’s own unders-
tanding without the guidance of another”,6 one might say of modern ar-
chitecture that it is the self-consciousness and autonomous design of built 
space, freed from the burden of past architectural forms, canons and non-
-architectural demands. Architecture thereby freed from presumed extra-
4.  Badiou, 2011: 14.
5.  Chtcheglov, 2009: 36. 
6.  Kant, 1991.  
neous and secondary exigencies, becomes then, and conceives of itself as, 
an art exclusively concerned with space. “Have the courage to use your 
own understanding!”, Kant’s motto for the enlightenment, becomes, in its 
architectural guise, “Have the courage to freely shape space, as space, for 
yourself!” Yet Kant’s autonomous thought, a thought for thought’s sake, 
would come to grief on an unthought at its very heart, that of the under-
lying contingencies necessary to thought, but that are at the same time 
unsusceptible to illumination. As “the locus of an empirico-transcendental 
doublet”,7 to employ Michel Foucault’s terminology, the thinking subject 
that is modern man “is that paradoxical figure in which the empirical con-
tents of knowledge necessarily release, of themselves, the conditions that 
have made them possible.”8 Enveloped in folds of realities which render 
thought possible, in our being, life and language, thought cannot in turn 
unveil what lies beneath itself without further pushing back the shadows 
of its existence. The “immediate and sovereign transparency of a cogito” 
breaks upon the shoals of its own, yet inevitable, non-knowledge.9 “I think”, 
but “I am not” only what I think. “Man has not been able to describe hi-
mself as a configuration in the episteme without thought at the same time 
discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very 
warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in whi-
ch it is embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely, yet in which it 
is also caught.”10 This Other of thought, this “unavoidable duality”, is both 
exterior to it and indispensible.11 And like some promised land of primiti-
ve wholeness, to which return or future reconciliation is possible, modern 
self-knowledge will assume the undertaking of bringing its Other as close 
as possible to itself. The “whole of modern thought is imbued with the ne-
cessity of thinking the unthought.”12 An ethical imperative thus affirms it-
self within thought, the demand for the “elucidation of what is silent”, “the 
illumination of the element of darkness that cuts man off from himself.”13 
This is no ethics of moral norms or standards, a morality thought for pure 
souls; it is rather an ethics that calls for “a certain mode of action.”14 More 
fundamentally, “modern thought is advancing toward that region where 
man’s Other must become the Same as himself.”15 The central question 
7.  Foucault, 1973:  322.
8.  Ibid.
9.  Ibid.
10.  Ibid., 326.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid., 327.
13.  Ibid., 328.
14.  Ibid.
15.  Ibid.
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of modern thought, and it remains our question, is how this “sameness” is 
to be thought, without naivety or the repetition of sterile aporias? Or more 
radically, how can we think beyond it if the aporias are inevitable? How can 
we think past the thinking subject, beyond man?16
Modern architecture, defined as the “mastery of space”, to cite Walter 
Gropius, will replicate the same doublet of modern thought analysed by 
Foucault.17 Aspiring to a pure, absolute dominion of space, its ambition 
could only end in purposelessness, severed as it would be from the condi-
tions of its possibility. An architecture that seeks sovereignty of space throu-
gh space, a mastery of infinite space, as Hans Hollein once celebrated it, 
was still the mastery of man over space.18 If architecture is “not the satisfac-
tion of the needs of the mediocre”, if it “is not an environment for the petty 
happiness of the masses”, if a “building is itself”, it nevertheless cannot es-
cape the finitude of its arkhe, its ruler or master builder.19 The arkhi-tecton, 
and all that envelops her/his creativity, is architecture’s Other; the space of 
her/his mastery remains the space that she/he moulds, the space conceived 
as fit for dwelling, a space to inhabit, from the Latin, habitare, the frequen-
tative of habere, to have, to hold, to possess. Hollein’s absolute architecture 
would thus amount to a refusal of possession, the exclusion of inhabiting, 
and consequently, against programmed intentions, the dissolution of ar-
chitecture in infinite space.  If architectural form need not follow func-
tion, in Hollein’s words, form remains finite as the idiom of our being in 
the world.20 Erich Mendelsohm expressed the problematic, the doublet, of 
modern architecture, and implicitly the ethics of this architecture’s “mode 
of action” succinctly: “The finiteness of mechanics plus the infiniteness 
of life.”21 The “finiteness” here is human power extended by machines, 
daunting yet limited before the infiniteness of life and its inexhaustible 
spatiality. The mature autonomy of modern architecture is thus bound by, 
consciously and/or unconsciously, the gesture of giving forms to human 
possibility. And its passion for radical autonomy will find its contours in an 
ethics of trying to contain and give expression to that same autonomy in the 
guise of what is properly human; the Other of architectural practice upon 
which its autonomy will necessarily be sacrificed in the aporia of endeavou-
ring to model man’s truth, when it is man’s being-in-the-world that enfolds 
the art of giving form to space.
If modern architecture’s self-consciousness teems with essentialising 
discourses, it is because of the ethics which sustains it. Architecture is va-
16.  Ibid., 342.
17.  Gropius, 1965: 24.
18.  Hollein, Pichler/Hollein, 1971: 182. 
19.  Ibid., 181, 182.
20.  Ibid., 182.
21.  Mendelsohn/Hoetger , 1971: 106.
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riously called upon to create “the true form of things”,22 to give shape to an 
“absolute nucleus”,23 to be an “organic entity”,24 susceptible to become part 
of “man’s flesh and blood”,25 a “second skin”, a “bodily organ”.26 It is asked 
to organise life, to create order through laws and fixed principles,27 which 
could then serve as the basis for the elaboration of elemental and uni-
versal forms and functions,28 summarised in the first De Stijl manifesto as 
the struggle for “an international unity in life, art and culture.”29 However 
diverse the language used, the desire for unity between human being and 
free spatial form is the constant ethical leitmotif, and equally the source of 
the fragility, if not the impossibility, of architecture’s modernity.
The militant and trenchant prose of Le Corbusier’s writing on archi-
tecture may serve as a paradigm for architecture’s strivings and it’s unthou-
ght. Le Corbusier defined architecture as a pure art, a tekhne, of “the mas-
terful, correct, and significant play of volumes brought together in light” 
while simultaneously placing the house at its centre.30 The latter was to be 
conceived as responding to natural human functions intuitively aspired to 
by all.31 Le Corbusier’s house was “the ordinary and common house for 
normal and common men.” It should be rooted in the human: “the human 
scale, the typical need, the typical function, the typical emotion.” No mere 
arbitrarily assembled shelter, the new architecture was to design and build 
houses on the foundation of the common organism of “men”, an orga-
nism said to possess identical functions and needs, and a natural element 
of the biological family.32 Without such a ground, architecture could only 
fail to be an art; it would be reduced to arbitrary construction, incapable of 
properly housing man, contributing thereby to frustration, alienation and, 
reading Le Corbusier’s Toward an Architecture, to revolution. But then men, 
and it is men that Le Corbusier speaks of, become the darkness that haunts 
the “volumes brought together in light”. The mastery of space is held fast 
by the weight of assumptions regarding what human beings are. The art is 
tarnished by such corporeal needs as eating, sleeping and evacuating. And 
for the art to remain art then, our physical condition must itself be puri-
22.  Van de Velde, 1971: 13.
23.  Poelzig, 1971: 16. 
24.  Lloyd Wright, 1971: 25.  
25.  Graeff, 1971: 71.
26.  Häring, 1971: 126.
27.  De Stijl, 1971: 66; Van Doesburg and van Esteren, 1971: 67.
28.  Muthesius/Van de Velde, 1971: 28; Van Doesburg, 1971: 78.
29.  De Stijl, 1971: 39. 
30.  Le Corbusier, 2007: 102.
31.  Ibid., 83.
32.  Ibid., 84.
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fied to absolute functions reproducible spatially in the shaping of houses 
and cities. What human being though can be reduced to absolute func-
tions? The absurdity of the pretension was perhaps best expressed by Adolf 
Loos, who before the phenomenon of erotic toilet graffiti, could find no-
thing more to say than that it was a sign of criminality and degeneracy. The 
toilet’s function is to piss and shit in, and should the human insist on any 
other kind of parallel activity, in this instance “artistic”, this could only be 
seen as symptomatic of moral and cultural degeneracy. In Loos’ words, a 
“country’s culture can be assessed by the extent to which its lavatory walls 
are smeared.”33 The purity of architecture then was to be had in the purifi-
cation of humans. This in turn however condemned modern architecture 
to increasing forms of functional reductionism. The heroic art would be-
come the maidservant of inescapably fragile bodies.
The failure of the vision of modern architecture, Le Corbusier’s and 
others’, is perhaps nowhere more manifest than in the programmatic decla-
rations of the different Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) 
gatherings beginning in 1928, with the Charter of Athens of 1933 standing 
as their final testament. In the Charter, the city’s destiny, and the house as 
its basic social cell, is affirmed to be the satisfaction of “the primordial bio-
logical and psychological needs of their inhabitants.”34 The frustration of these 
ambitions however was evident in the stated need to continually refine 
design, so as to be able to contain the human essence fully through ratio-
nal planning and building. Only then could the crisis “raging in all the big 
cities and spreading its effects throughout the country” be vanquished.35 
Yet what if the “crisis” was but the sign of the impossibility of architecture’s 
ethics of confinement, of the ideal of unity between human need and or-
dered space? And what if this impossibility was not due to the difficulty of 
the labour, whose final end is but delayed, but rather to the mutual depen-
dence of the act of ordering space and need and that both emerge toge-
ther against agencies that can never be fully mastered? In a CIAM inspired 
meeting in 1957, under the name of “groupe d’études d’architecture mobile” 
(GEAM) in Paris, after the dissolution of the CIAM, the statement produ-
ced and published in 1960 affirmed that existing “construction and those 
still being put up today are too rigid and difficult to adapt to life as it is 
lived.”36 What the statement however testified to, contrary to the intentions 
of its authors, was not the inadequacy of design, planning or construction, 
but to architecture’s creativity as the expression of human life, life that 
cannot itself be captured by that creativity. The reign of order from which 
33.  Loos, 1971: 13.
34.  CIAM, 1971: 143, 137.
35.  Ibid., 137.
36.  GEAM, 1971: 167.
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well-being is born, following Le Corbusier,37 ends in enforced functional 
forms sustained finally by political and economic power. And before this 
reality, the GEAM could only impotently propose variable and interchan-
geable constructions, alterable and interchangeable functions of spatial 
units, and the ability of inhabitants “to adopt their dwellings themselves to 
the needs of the moment.”38 The ethics of early modern architecture was 
thus domesticated through the administration of spatial integration and 
adaptation; what remained of “man” could now be managed by the civil 
servants of urbanism.
... the provisional, the free realm of ludic activity ... is the lone field of true 
life, though it be constrained fraudulently by taboos claiming to be eternal.
Guy Debord
3.
The writer Georges Perec once tried to map in an unequivocal, sequen-
tial and nycthemeral manner the functions of the different rooms of an 
apartment.39 It was an exercise in absurdity, but it served to demonstrate 
that however precise an architect’s ideas may be regarding the particular 
function of each room in an apartment, that rooms were in the end more 
or less alike: that “they’re never anything more than a sort of cube, or let’s 
say rectangular parallelepiped.”40 In sum, Perec reminds us, “a room is a 
fairly malleable space”,41 and that therefore it is not difficult to imagine 
the rooms of an apartment depending on completely different functional 
relations, for example, on functional relations that find their place between 
rooms, or an apartment “whose layout was based on the functioning of the 
senses” (we could then speak of a gustatorium, an auditory, a smellery, a 
feeler, and the like), or a division based on “heptadian rhythms”, where 
each room would be used exclusively on a single day of the week.42 Functio-
nality is not thereby abandoned in these experiments, but what the satire 
seeks to make evident is that whatever function apartment rooms possess, 
37.  Le Corbusier, 2007: 122.
38.  GEAM, 1971: 167.
39.  The map begins as follows: 07.00, The mother gets up and goes to get breakfast in the KITCH-
EN; 07.15, The child gets up and goes into the BATHROOM; 07.30, The father gets up and goes 
into the BATHROOM; 07.45, The father and the child have their breakfast in the  KITCHEN; 
08.00, The child takes his coat from the  ENTRANCE-HALL, and it continues in the same vein 
until 22.00, The father and the mother go to bed in their BEDROOM. Perec, 1999: 28-30.
40.  Ibid., 28.
41.  Ibid.
42.  Ibid., 31-2.
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it is not one fixed by a correspondence between a human need and a dis-
tinctive space. Indeed, the space is malleable, as we are, and how we live, 
make, space is very much a matter that is underdetermined.
More interestingly philosophically and architecturally still, following 
Perec’s reflections on the plasticity of space, is his consideration of the 
possibility of a “useless room, absolutely and intentionally useless”, “a func-
tionless space” that “would serve for nothing, relate to nothing.”43 Perec 
admits that it was impossible for him to follow this idea through; even lan-
guage failed in “describing this nothing”.44 “How does one think of no-
thing? How to think of nothing without automatically putting something 
round that nothing, so turning it into a hole, into which one will hasten 
to put something, an activity, a function, a destiny, a gaze, a need, a lack, 
a surplus ...?”45 The effort is nevertheless described as not without value, 
because it “seemed to produce something that might be a statute of the 
inhabitable.”46
But what then if Perec’s “a-functional space”, the hole that appears 
as we surround it with purpose, points to the empty space, the void, which 
the doublet of modern knowledge struggles to fill through complete self-
-knowledge or that modern architecture attempts to complete through the 
coincidence of form and need? What if the ethical task for both were to 
be instead to keep this space open, as an openness; to conceive then, in 
the case of architecture, of this space without purpose as that which hol-
ds open possibilities of spatial forms and the inhabiting of forms? Perec’s 
room without purpose would then reveal another dimension of inhabiting, 
a dimension which escapes the word’s family ties with having and possessing. 
If all designed space is haunted by purposelessness, then our possession of 
such spaces must always be incomplete; they may be used, but never mas-
tered or owned, as something will always escape our grasp. The imposition 
of function on space reveals our power, a power to hold and enframe. But 
that is only made possible by the original absence of function. It is because 
space enfolds within itself no purpose, that it can be shaped for endless 
number of purposes. In place then of seeking to fill all space with utility, 
Perec’s “statute of the inhabitable” would be an inhabiting beyond fixed 
functionality, severed from a submission to purpose, and therefore open to 
a functionless being in space. Structure and form do not thereby evanesce, 
but rather take on the nature of a threshold: a temporary form given life 
through a function that holds within itself the possibility of other functions 
in other spaces. Built space is thus conceived of as a threshold for desires. 
As regards architecture, it would then cease to “be understood as the endea-
43.  Ibid., 33.
44.  Ibid.
45.  Ibid.
46.  Ibid., 35.
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vour to harmonise ... the environment with man”,47 as in Futurist proclamations, 
or as the construction of the “‘art-edifice’ of Man”, in the language of the 
Bauhaus.48 In other words, the architect must cease to aspire to be the 
master/archon of built space for what are presumed to be pre-given, proper 
human needs. The latter do not exist, except as determined by regimes 
power, of which architectural practice has been more often than not an 
instrument.
This is not a call for an architecture of resistance or liberation, howe-
ver this has been imagined in the past. As Michel Foucault put the matter 
simply once, “I don’t believe that it ever belongs to the structure of things 
to guarantee the exercise of freedom.”49 “Freedom is a practice”, a way 
of being in the world; whatever guarantee it commands is in the practice 
itself. And what perhaps characterises it above all else is the refusal of con-
ceptual or practical closure to an end, which amounts to the sealing over 
of our openness to the world. Extended to architecture and architectural 
practice, this becomes the rejection of any pretence to formal and functio-
nal finality in the design and construction of space. Spaces are instead to 
be played with, something that assumes the profanation of spaces, of their 
shaping and uses.
The onetime Situationist Constant, speaking of his city New Babylon, 
described it as a possible architectural and urban space in which utility 
would be obsolete. The “city of New Babylon will no longer be centred on 
utility, but on the game. It will not be outlined as a utilitarian society in 
the style of today, but as a ludic society.”50 If we take Constant’s utopia as 
more than a design, a plan, as he himself did, and see it rather for what it 
is, a spatial metaphor for free ways of being, then what he put forward was 
the sketch of a life in which all human spatial forms are profaned. Giorgio 
Agamben teaches us that to play and to profane are one and the same: they 
are the restitution of things to our free use, divorced from any practical 
means-ends logic.51 They do not overthrow distinctions, but rather de-acti-
vate them, disabling their moral hold upon us. In playing with designed and 
built space then, to profane architecture, is to render impotent the ethical 
conceit of seeking to bind architectural form with human desire in a kind 
of sacral-artistic unity. As the architect Bruno Taut once wrote, “Down with 
everything serious!”52
47.  Sant’Elia and Marinetti, 1971: 38.
48.  Schlemmer, 1971: 70.
49.  Foucault, 2001 : 1094-5.
50.  Constant, 2014: 167. 
51.  Agamben, 2005: 95. 
52.  Taut, 1971: 57.
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No inhibitions should be placed upon the individual’s desire to build! 
Everyone ought to be able and compelled to build, so that he bears respon-
sibility for the four walls within which he lives. ... A stop must finally be put 
to the situation in which people move into their living quarters like hens and 
rabbits into their coops.
Hundertwasser
4.
The proliferation of occupations of urban spaces in our time have freed 
desires and refashioned subjectivities in a manner that has not been a cry 
for novel and adequate representations, more consonant with demands 
and needs. It has rather given birth to an anti-representational politics that 
puts into question the hegemony of hegemony in all domains of human 
creativity.  (“¡Que no! ¡que no! ¡que no nos representan!” was the perhaps 
the central slogan of Spain’s 15M). With regard to cityscapes and built 
spaces, the movements have loosened and smoothed spaces, allowing for 
shifts across thresholds of formerly controlled territories and identities. In 
parallel, they have shown less concern with securing and defending spatial 
heterotopias of dissidence than with undermining the borders which mar-
ginalise and exclude heterotopias from controlled spaces.
“Power lives on our incapacity to live; it maintains infinitely multiplied 
splits and separations at the same time that it plans almost as it likes allowa-
ble encounters.”53 The words are Théo Frey’s, writing for the Internationale 
situationiste. If architecture’s role in such power is modest, it is nevertheless 
present in the ordering of spatial separations. That role loses all creative le-
gitimacy once it is made manifest that it rested upon the illusory possibility 
of containing human being ethically within formal and functional spatial 
orders. With the illusion unmasked, it remains for the builders, for all of 
those who can build, to keep open the spaces of collective self-creation of 
spatialities and subjectivities.
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Abstract
This paper departs from a seminal text by Michel Foucault — “What is an Author?” 
(1969) — in order to question some of the idiosyncrasies of being an architect, particu-
larly within the contemporary Portuguese realm. By transposing some of the concepts 
and ideas of Foucault’s essay into current architectonic debates, we aim to reflect on 
the “architect-function” through an analysis of Manuel Graça Dias’s work. For Foucault, 
the question of “What is an Author?” (extrapolated in this paper’s argument as the 
correlating question, What is an Architect?) is fundamentally linked both to the func-
tion of the author’s name —  that performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, 
assuring a classificatory function — and also to the question of what constitutes a “work” 
(oeuvre) — If an individual were not an author, could we say that what he wrote, said, left behind 
in his papers, or what has been collected of his remarks, could be called a “work”? In the case 
of Manuel Graça Dias, an architect divided between multiple forms of discourse pro-
duction (construction, drawing, writing, teaching, film, television, radio, etc) who also 
nourishes a peculiar appreciation for forms of “architecture without architects”, one 
could inquire: How can Manuel Graça Dias architectonic practice be delimited, when it 
is scattered through a plurality of selves? What ultimately constitutes his “work”? Finally, 
what defines him as an Architect?
Keywords
Architecture; philosophy; visual culture; media
Alexandra Areia28
This paper is consequence of a PhD research, which focuses specifically on 
broadcasting and audiovisual production about architecture, in Portugal. 
One of the most fundamental case-studies of this research is the audiovi-
sual production of the Portuguese architect Manuel Graça Dias. Born in 
Lisbon in 1953, Manuel Graça Dias shares his architectural practice with 
Egas José Vieira in the office “Contemporânea”and he is also a teacher, 
writer, editor and filmmaker, and has developed several programs for ra-
dio and television. Quite peculiarly, he is also a regular Instagrammer. In 
terms of audiovisual production alone, Manuel Graça Dias has explored 
the medium through a wide array of formats – from the television program 
to cinema, video and digital film – and he has also been involved in the 
backstage of several feature films as the designer of decor and props. But 
the intention of this paper is not to focus solely on his link to audiovisual 
production, it is rather concerned with engaging in a global analysis of how 
all these multiple forms of discourse production have influenced the cons-
truction, and even the definition, of Manuel Graça Dias’ own architectural 
practice. However, for reasons of limitation of space, we will be analyzing 
just two different facets of Dias’ production, which can function as points 
of contrast. The first example is one of Manuel Graça Dias’s recent in-
cursions in cinema, as a director – realized in the formal and scientific 
context of academia, this film is as then undoubtedly linked to a “juridical 
and institutional system”. The second example is Dias’ regular Instagram 
activity – the highly personal and spontaneous nature of which introduces 
the question of whether it should be even considered “work”. Taking into 
consideration these two activities, this paper mainly aims to question: Can 
all Manuel Graça Dias’s incursions in different media be considered as for-
ms of architectonic production? How can we define, or delimit, his body 
of work as an architect? And, finally, departing from Manuel Graça Dias’ 
singular case, how do we then define what an “architect” is, or even, how 
do we define what is “architecture”?
To attempt to respond to some of these questions, this paper will re-
sort to some of Michel Foucault’s writings, and it is within Foucault’s own 
notion of the “freedom of the reader” that we felt somehow at ease to 
freely apply and adapt his ideas. If thinking is needed, it is not as Foucault but 
with Foucault — claims José Bragança de Miranda and António Fernando 
Cascais in “The Lesson of Foucault”, the preface of the Portuguese edition 
of “What is an Author?” (2012, 27) — It is a way to fight what he [Foucault] 
called the ‘monarchy of the author’ — always a limitation of the freedom of the reader 
to depart from the intention and meaning targeted by the author, who, in his ‘emi-
nent sovereignty’ (sic) presents himself as the law of the entire reading. The final 
aim behind this free exploration of Foucault’s texts and reflections is solely 
to generate thought and hopefully initiate a structured understanding of 
how to approach the entirety of Manuel Graça Dias’s body of work, which 
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is fundamental to the future development of the PhD research of which 
this paper forms a part.
What is an Architect?
“What is an Author?” — “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?” — was a communication 
Michel Foucault presented in 1969 at Société Française de Philosophie (for 
the purpose of this paper, two different English translations have been 
used: the first from 1977 [Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon] and 
the second from 1998 [Robert Hurley and others]. For Foucault, this essay 
emerged from a gap he detected within his previous “Les mots et les Chooses”, 
admitting that in that work he had focused more on the “hidden discursive 
fabrics” of the text, and not so much on the works and the writers them-
selves.  “What is an Author?” also seems to have emerged as a reaction to a 
1967 text of Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author”, wherein Barthes 
criticized the “God-like” figure of the author in classical literature and criti-
cism, condemning both for never paying any attention to the reader — for 
it, the writer is the only person in literature. For Barthes, in order to “give wri-
ting its future” there could only be one radical solution: the birth of the reader 
must be at the cost of the death of the Author. (Barthes 1977, 148) Even though 
Foucault, in his essay, does not entirely contradict Barthes manifesto, he 
definitely seems interested in pushing the debate further by questioning 
the author figure in its relation with the text: I am not certain that the conse-
quences derived from the disappearance or death of the author have been fully explo-
red or that the importance of this event has been appreciated. (Foucault 1977, 117) 
Within this paper’s objective, which foremost aims to question the figure of 
the author in architecture, is it possible then to establish a kind of parallel 
between the philosophical debates of the late sixties in France — where, as 
Barthes and Foucault diagnosed in their essays, a major shift in literature 
was occurring — and the current Portuguese architectonic scene? Could 
a similar shift also have taken place in our architecture? If so, could the 
architectonic production of Manuel Graça Dias somehow embody this fun-
damental shift?
To begin with, Manuel Graça Dias’ practice of architecture surely nee-
ds to be interpreted in a different light than that of the more “traditional” 
definition of an architect, a notion which remains very much rooted in 
the Portuguese status quo that still largely considers the function of an ar-
chitect to be solely linked to building and construction. The recent eco-
nomic crisis however, which has led to a severe stagnation of construction 
activity, might have led to the emergence and acceptance of new forms of 
practicing architecture, especially those connected to cultural production. 
In this regard, Manuel Graça Dias’ career is absolutely remarkable and 
prescient: since its very beginning, almost four decades ago, his architec-
tonic practice was already punctuated by the different forms of cultural 
production that only now are beginning to be more widely associated with 
the discipline. It is precisely these kinds of “alternative” forms of architec-
tonic production that this paper is keen to analyze in order to question the 
very essence of being an architect. Foucault said that if we wish to know the 
writer in our day, it will be through the singularity of his absence. (Foucault 1977, 
117) Our approach is also to attempt to “know the architect in our day” 
by the “singularity of his absence”, using the case of Manuel Graça Dias to 
understand what it means to practice architecture at the very fringes of the 
disciple, at a place where the architect almost “disappears” and one can be 
left to wonder if what is being produced can even be considered “Architec-
ture” —We should reexamine the empty space left by the author’s disappearance; we 
should attentively observe, along its gaps and fault lines, its new demarcations, and 
the reapportionment of his void; we should await the fluid functions released by this 
disappearance. (Foucault 1977, 121)
Manuel Graça Dias and Cinema
Manuel Graça Dias always cultivated a close relationship with cinema, ever 
since his time as a student of architecture. Immediately after the Portu-
guese revolution of 25th of April 1974, the school of architecture was shut 
down due to profound convulsions started by students that demanded 
drastic changes and actualizations to the programme and way in which 
architecture was being overall taught at the school. During that time, Ma-
nuel Graça Dias enrolled to study cinema. Years after, he would work on 
some cinematographic productions, namely on the film of António-Pedro 
Vasconcelos,“O Lugar do Morto” (1984), where he was responsible for the 
creation of all interior environments – controlling the arrangement of all 
objects within the spaces of the scenes and even designing the style of clo-
thes that the female protagonist was to wear in the film.  
More recently, Manuel Graça Dias directed two short films, which 
were produced within the context of an academic project he was integra-
ted within as one of the main researchers. The project was suggestively 
titled  “Silent Rupture” since it was envisioned to explore the intersections 
between Portuguese architecture and cinema during the dictatorship, 
more specifically in the period between 1960-1974 (this project was based 
at the Architecture School of Oporto University in 2010-13). The first film, 
“A Encomenda”, is a film about a project of architect Raul Hestnes Ferreira, 
a single house in Albarraque that the architect built for his own father, 
the poet José Gomes Ferreira, in 1959-61 [Figure 1]. However, even in this 
film about an acknowledged architectural project by a well-known author, 
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Manuel Graça Dias “contaminates” the discrete authorship of the house 
by emphasising the outside world and the anonymous “architecture” (“ar-
chitecture without architects”) surrounding the territory of this special 
and delicate house. In addition to these more personal points of view, fo-
regrounding Graça Dias’ own fascination with informal architecture, the 
director “contaminates” both the film and Hestnes Ferreira’s house yet 
further, through a particular scene in which Manuel Graça Dias himself 
appears in the film as another character, as a postman passes on the street 
with his bicycle, and introduces Dias with a very short biography: Good mor-
ning my friend Manuel Graça Dias, born on the 11th of April of 1953. [Figure 2].
Figure 1: A Encomenda; Film by Manuel Graça Dias, 2012
Figure 2: A Encomenda; Film by Manuel Graça Dias, 2012
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Throughout Manuel Graças Dias’s work we always feel his subtle pre-
sence through these little “contaminations”, which function almost like a 
signature. For Foucault, the function of the author’s name proffers, (…) 
more than an indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is the equivalent 
of a description. (Foucault 1998, 209). A name, in fact, also implies a “classi-
ficatory function”: Such a name permits one to group together a certain number of 
texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others. In addition, 
it establishes a relationship among the texts. (Foucault 1998, 210) In the case 
of Manuel Graça Dias this recognition might also apply, as a form of orga-
nizing and classifying the wide diversity of his production. No matter the 
form or format which Manuel Graça Dias decides to work and express him-
self within, if he signs it and associates his name to it, then, as an unargua-
bly acknowledged architect (several times recognized by the institutions 
that officially sustain the discipline of architecture in Portugal), it should 
be with some degree of safety that anyone can classify whatever he does as 
“architectonic production” — The author’s name serves to characterize a certain 
mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse has an author’s name, that 
one can say ‘this was written by so-and-so’ or ‘so-and-so is its author’ shows that this 
discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something 
that is immediately consumed. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received 
in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status. (Fou-
cault 1998, 211)
What is Architecture? 
Following Foucault’s line of thought in “What is an author?”, there are 
two fundamental notions that could be substituted for the notion of the 
author in the case of his “disappearance”, but that he feels end up blocking 
it instead. The first is the notion of “work” [ouevre] and the second is that 
of “writing” [écriture]. 
As Foucault puts it, this question of the “disappearance of the author” 
is not as immediate as at first it could seem. It is not sufficient to leave the 
“author” and just focus on the “work”, because, he says, “work” and the 
unity this term implies can be just as problematic as the individuality of the 
author himself: If we wish to publish the complete works of Nietzsche, for example, 
where do we draw the line? Certainly, everything must be published, but can we agree 
on what ‘everything’ is? We will include everything that Nietzsche himself published, 
along with the drafts of his works, his plans for aphorisms, his marginal notations 
and corrections. But what if, in a notebook filled with aphorisms, we find a reference, 
a reminder of an appointment, an address, or a laundry bill, should this be included 
in his works? Why not? (Foucault 1977, 118) 
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Regarding the notion of “writing” [écriture], which Foucault recogni-
zes might be even more complex than that of “work”, how can the status 
of a certain text be defined if there is no reference to an “author”, if it has 
no signature, if it is, by chance or accident, anonymous? There are plenty 
of discourses all around us, Foucault says in “The Order of Discourse”, 
which circulate without having their meaning or efficacy necessarily asso-
ciated with an author: everyday remarks, which are effaced immediately; decrees or 
contracts which requires signatories but no author; technical instructions which are 
transmitted anonymously. (Foucault 1981, 58) But there are domains in whi-
ch anonymity is not tolerable and the literary domain is definitely one of 
them — as is architecture, we risk to add, at least in rapport to the notion 
of the discipline that is widely conceived today — If by accident or design a 
text was presented anonymously, every effort was made to locate its author. Literary 
anonymity was of interest only as a puzzle to be solved as, in our day, literary works 
are totally dominated by the sovereignty of the author. (Foucault 1977, 126) 
Manuel Graça Dias and Instagram
The act of regularly posting images on Instagram might not be immediately 
comparable to the “laundry bill” mentioned above that Foucault suggested 
as a potential component of Nietzsche’s full body of work, but it is, in fact, 
a similarly intimate artifact — a personal and spontaneous activity that it 
feels almost voyeuristic to peek into, despite being published to the pu-
blic within the form of social media. Nevertheless, these images, which he 
regularly collects from his everyday life, have the potential of rendering 
an interesting, though slightly skewed, viewpoint of Manuel Graça Dias’s 
“work”, introducing some degree of novelty into the analysis of his more 
“canonical” architectonic production. In fact, these images somehow seem 
to encapsulate a hint of his authorial essence and intuition, which can be 
quite useful when attempting to grasp the unity and coherence that links 
the entirety of his work. 
On Instagram, Manuel Graça Dias organizes his photographs through 
different categories that are grouped around #hashtags like: #iseefaces, whe-
re he photographs suggestions of faces in buildings, objects, etc [Figure 3]; 
#onedooraday, which consists of a never ending collection of images of this 
fundamental architectonic element [Figure 4]; #cityistherealmuseum, which 
are basically photographs of objects scattered through the city that are ge-
nerally considered “trash”; “#signs”, following his fascinations for words or 
any other written element in the city; #gostomodernismo (I like modernism) 
— where Manuel Graça Dias takes pictures of different modernist buil-
dings that he admires, with an almost childlike approach: “I like this”, “I 
don’t like that” (by the way, he also has a series called “I don’t like Português 
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suave” – a style of Portuguese architecture from the 1950s-60s); and, finally, 
in the middle of all these random images, he also captures his own archi-
tecture (which he shares with Egas José Vieira, #gracadiasegasvieira), always 
with the same relaxed and uncompromising posture as the other images.
 
Figure 3: #iseefaces; Instagram of Manuel Graça Dias, 2015
Figure 4: #onedooraday; Instagram of Manuel Graça Dias, 2015
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The question of whether these Instagram images might be conside-
red, and therefore potentially analyzed and scientifically studied, as Ma-
nuel Graça Dias “work”, can probably only be answered by its author, that 
is, Manuel Graça Dias himself — The author provide the basis for explaining 
not only the presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, 
distortions, and diverse modifications. (Foucault 1998, 214-215) Is it then the 
author (architect) that ultimately holds the power to legitimize, or not, his 
own “work”, his own (architectonic) production? Should it then be Ma-
nuel Graça Dias himself who ultimately decides which aspects of his own 
multiple and diverse production — these materialisations of his “multiple 
selves” — are in fact, or not, Architecture?
The “architect-function” (Final Considerations)
According to Foucault, the function of the author plays a vital role in the 
review of all literary works, as it serves to characterize the mode of exis-
tence and circulation of certain discourses within a society. However, the 
“author-function” does not generate itself spontaneously by the attribution 
of a certain discourse to an individual, it is in fact the result of a complex 
operation that constructs a rational entity called an author. But even this 
authorial entity is not always constructed in the same way, it varies accor-
ding to period or type, as the philosopher-author is not constructed in 
the same way as the poet. Still, in the face of all these variables, Foucault 
admits there are some constants that have ruled the construction of the 
“author-function” throughout the ages, which in his essay he limits to four 
characteristic traits:
1) it is linked to a juridical and institutional system. On this point, it 
could be interesting to also bring to the debate the notion of “dis-
cipline”, which is a very strong and foundational subject within the 
architectonic universe, and an idea Foucault sees mainly as a “princi-
ple of control over the production of discourse”: Within its own limits, 
each discipline recognizes true and false propositions; but it pushes back a 
whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins. (Foucault 1981, 60-61); 
2) it does not affect all discourses in the same way
3) it is not spontaneously attributed but results instead of complex ope-
rations; and finally
4) it does not simply refer to a “real individual” but it can give rise to 
a simultaneity of “several selves”, several “subjects-positions”. (Fou-
cault 1998, 214)
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But more than an end in itself, Foucault’s notion of “author-function” 
introduces the possibility of a method — a method for the construction 
of a “typology of discourse”:  Perhaps the time has come to study not only the 
expressive value and formal transformations of discourse, but its mode of existence: 
the modifications and variations, within any culture of modes of circulation, valori-
zation, attribution and appropriation. (Foucault 1977, 137) 
The questions proposed by this paper were not objectively answered 
and will probably always remain in a fairly open state, but the introduction 
of the “author-function” notion into the architectonic debate — the “ar-
chitect-function” — opens the possibility for a more systematic process of 
analysis of the work of architects like Manuel Graças Dias, who has dedica-
ted a large amount of his practice precisely to the development of multiple 
forms of discourse production and communication: to talk, write, teach 
and broadcast Architecture, and ultimately even design it.
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Abstract
Based on the assumption that in the 1990s certain figures and institutions conducted 
the rise of Gilles Deleuze in US-American architecture, the paper examines the ac-
tions and intentions of John Rajchman as one intercessor for a working together of 
architecture and philosophy. It is necessary to find out why he is interested in folded ar-
chitecture and how he wants to use architecture for his philosophical work. To answer 
these questions the paper addresses the introduction of Deleuze into the US-American 
academic discourse in the 1970s and the shift in reception from predominant political 
and social issues to art and architecture related topics in the 1980s. This is followed by 
further investigations of Rajchman’s actions in the scope of the Anyone Corporation 
and the implementation of a ‘Deleuze-after-Derrida’ narrative in the 1990s. Of interest 
are especially Rajchman’s contributions to discussions about ‘folding’ in architecture 
and his relation to Peter Eisenman. Finally via a close reading of Rajchman’s essays, it 
is argued that he intends an enhancement of philosophy through a “new” folded and 
flexible architecture, as if both disciplines working together the rigid architectonic of 
our thinking might lighten up and thereby philosophical working and writing can ac-
quire “new” forms.
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In an interview with Simone Brott, the US-American philosopher John 
Rajchman explains his contribution to the intensive connection of archi-
tecture and Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy in the 1990s: “I was really interes-
ted in Deleuze as a philosopher and also as an interesting way of doing 
philosophy in an academic context and so I wanted to extract for my own 
purposes a model and architecture happened to provide an opportunity to 
do this“1. Rajchman emphasises that he belongs to the field of philosophy. 
Meanwhile he contributes with articles to almost all the major architectural 
publications about the concept of ‘folding’, where Deleuze’s The Fold gets 
translated into the realm of architecture. Therefore Rajchman appears 
to be a kind of facilitator accelerating the relationship between US-Ame-
rican architecture and French philosophy. He himself draws the line to 
Deleuze’s term ‘intercesseurs’2. It gets often translated as ‘mediators’ and 
is used to define figures, events and mobile connections producing diffe-
rent resonances of Deleuze’s work.3 In this regard Brott states, that the 
“affiliation between Deleuze and architecture arose neither by his direct 
interest in architecture nor by architecture’s immediate affection for him”, 
but it evolved through mediators, as she formulates it: a “cult-assemblage 
of various characters who pursued their own activities around Deleuze”4. 
The ‘mediator’ Rajchman explains that architecture serves him to obtain a 
model for his very own purpose, which is doing philosophy in an academic 
context similar to the way Deleuze is doing it. But what does it mean then, 
that architecture provides an opportunity to extract a model for his philo-
sophical work? How is he in fact using architecture?
Semiotext(e) and Zone
Before looking at Rajchman’s interest in folded architecture, one has 
to go back to the 1970s and the introduction of Deleuze and Félix Guatta-
ri into the US-American academic discourse. It is at Columbia University, 
where in 1973 the collective Semiotext(e) is founded by Sylvère Lotringer, 
who is associate professor in the French Department and hired to teach se-
miotics.5 From the initial semiotics reading group, where Rajchman, being 
a graduate student in Philosophy, takes part, the cultural/theoretical jour-
1.  Rajchman 2003, 3.
2.  Ibid., 2. See Deleuze 1985.
3.  Besides Rajchman other theoreticians like Elizabeth Grosz, Anthony Vidler, Sanford Kwinter, 
Brian Massumi and Manuel De Landa are as well presented as the “major secondary commenta-
tors [on Deleuze] operating at the threshold of the architectural discipline” Frichot and Loo 
2013, 6.
4.  Brott 2011, 16.
5.  Schwarz and Balsamo 1996, 206.
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nal Semiotext(e) emerged with Lotringer as general editor and Rajchman 
as secretary. The first three issues appear in 1974 and 1975 “devoted to 
‘traditional’ semiotic texts and commentary”6. Then the journals content 
shifts from semiotics to introducing French radical thought, for instance in 
1977 the 6th issue is entirely devoted to Deleuze and Guattari’s L’Anti-Œdi-
pe: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie. From the beginning, Semiotext(e) is concei-
ved as “an intervention into cultural politics, not merely as an academic 
exercise in theoretical reproduction”7. In November 1975 they organise 
the legendary schizo-culture colloquium at Columbia University. Lotrin-
ger and Rajchman give the introduction together, followed by presenta-
tions from Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Guattari and Deleuze, 
who then become regular contributors of Semiotext(e). Retrospectively it is 
summarized as a fusion of “the radical writing of key figures of post-1968 
French philosophy with the chaotic creativity of an emerging New York 
downtown art scene”8. Semiotext(e) serves Rajchman to publish some of 
his first critical articles, mainly on Foucault, Lacan, Nietzsche and Deleu-
ze.9 Around 1980, the collective disperses and Lotringer starts the Foreign 
Agents series, a succession of little black books from French theorists such 
as Deleuze and Guattari, whose On the Line appears as the second book in 
1983 and Nomodology. The War Machine gets distributed in 1986. With this 
series Semiotext(e) – and Rajchman as being an active member – publi-
shes some of the earliest English translations of Deleuze and Guattari, that 
is why Schwarz and Balsamo call Semiotext(e) “an agent of infection”10 – 
infecting the US-American audience with French theory. In an interview 
Lotringer says that they “were intercessors in the sense that there were no 
texts [of Deleuze] available in English […] we were intercessors because 
we just allowed something to happen”11.
The End of the 1980s marks a turning point in the reception of De-
leuze in the United States: from a radical, interdisciplinary ethos as well as 
an interest in questions of subjectivity towards the situation that Deleuze 
is being directly taught in architectural schools by theorists, such as San-
ford Kwinter.12 He and other seminar students of Lotringer, namely Michel 
Feher, Jonathan Crary and Hal Foster, form the younger generation and 
possess a stronger affinity to art, architecture or space and the techno-
6.  Ibid., 207.
7.  Ibid., 208.
8.  Artistsspace Web Page.
9.  See “Semiotics, Epistemology and Materialism.” Semiotext(e) 1 (1974): 11-28. “Analysis in Power: 
A Few Foucauldian Theses.” Semiotext(e) 6 (1977): 45-58. And “Nietzsche, Foucault and the Anar-
chism of Power.” Semiotext(e) 7 (1978): 96-107.
10.  Schwarz and Balsamo 1996, 218.
11.  Lotringer 2013, 256. 
12.  Brott 2011, 26.
-scientific dimension of Deleuze.13 Together they create the magazine Zone 
with its first issue “The Contemporary City” appearing in 1986 and with 
essays from Paul Virilio, Christopher Alexander, Manuel De Landa and of 
course Deleuze and Guattari.14 The back of the issue features statements 
about the city by architects and architectural theorists such as Kenneth 
Frampton, Peter Eisenman, Daniel Libeskind and Rem Koolhaas. Accor-
ding to Kwinter the most architectural dimension of Zone is not the topic of 
the city and the contribution of architects, but the materiality of the book 
itself and its graphic design produced by Bruce Mau. The academic publi-
cations become a design object. This “increasing aestheticization of the 
text within the New York publishing scene around Deleuze” is also rema-
rkable in the development of Semiotext(e)’s graphic design.15 To this effect 
the 15th issue Semiotext(e): Architecture, edited in 1992 by architect Hrazten 
Zeitlian, displays a highly layered, complex and high-contrast photocopy 
graphic design, about which Lotringer tells in an interview, that “he didn’t 
like the graphics, which he found to be too polished, ‘too architectural’”16. 
Zone is for Lotringer the “antithesis of Semiotext(e)”, because “it was rich, 
beautiful, and full of money”17. Kwinter explains the increasing reception 
of Deleuze by the field of architecture combined with an emphasis on the 
importance of graphic design in the following way: “But it was only by chan-
ce. I wasn’t in architecture. I was interested in it, but I was doing literature, 
linguistics, philosophy, art; and it was an architect [Christian Hubert] that 
came and asked me the question [about Deleuze and Postmodernism], 
and it played an amazing role. The American reception was essentially dri-
ven by architects”.18 Surprisingly the issue Semiotext(e): Architecture does not 
get the same attention as the future architectural publications on Deleuze 
will get – especially the ones produced in the scope of the Anyone Corpo-
ration. 
Anyone Corporation and ANY
One day, according to Rajchman, the architect Eisenman calls and 
invites him to the Anyone conference, organised by the Anyone Corpora-
tion, which was founded in 1990 by Eisenman, Cynthia Davidson, Arata Iso-
13.  Rajchman 2003, 1.
14.  Rajchman tells about his contribution to Zone: “I was editor of zone for a day, they [Kwinter, 
Crary and Feher] say, because I went to the initial meeting, but since I’d already done Semiotext(e) 
I thought it would be more interesting for them to do it rather than me.” Ibid.
15.  Brott 2011, 33, Annot. 43.
16.  Ibid., 26.
17.  Lotringer 2013, 256.
18.  Brott 2011, 24-25.
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zaki, and Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió with the overall aim “to advance the 
knowledge and understanding of architecture and its relationships to the 
general culture” at the dawn of the Third Millennium.19 Rajchman explains 
his reaction as follows: “So I said it sounded really interesting but I didn’t 
know much about architecture. He led me to believe that was no problem 
at all. […] so since I was working on this Deleuze project and reading 
this material I said to myself Deleuze could have a really interesting im-
pact in these debates in architecture [...] Eisenman finally had a problem 
with Derrida, they found in Deleuze something interesting, and this, in my 
point of view, is how the two things came together”20. As said, Rajchman’s 
involvement in the actions of the Anyone Corporation seems to start with 
an invitation and the following thought that introducing Deleuze to the 
field of architecture could have an interesting impact on architectural de-
bates. In this regard, the paper “On Not Being Any One”, which Rajchman 
gives in the occasion of the first Any-conference in May 1991, reads as an 
introduction into Deleuze’s philosophy. He is above all addressing two key 
texts of Deleuze, which possess a strong connection to questions of space 
and to spatial figures. On the one hand there is the concept of striated 
and smooth space in Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie 2 from 1980, on the other hand Deleuze’s Le Pli on folding 
and baroque architecture from 1988. At the end of his paper Rajchman 
alludes to Eisenman’s architecture, admitting that he never saw a building 
by him, but he perceives in his drawings and writings a process of libera-
ting architecture from the delimiting rational, striated spaces of traditional 
architectural plan – a process he calls “becoming-Eisenman” as an ana-
logue of Deleuze and Guattaris’s becoming-animal/woman/minority etc. 
But then Rajchman speaks of a “disheartening element” in Eisenman’s wri-
tings, when the architect “imagines a great metaphysical agon or struggle 
between philosophy with a capital P and architecture with a capital A, the 
one having to resist the incursions or the advances of the other”21. Instead, 
Rajchman claims for an encounter of philosophy and architecture, where 
they together create a “temporary space in which the question of what is 
new in architecture and what is new in thought combine or compose with 
one another in an unexpected configuration or opening that no longer 
belongs to anyone”22. So his intention is the opening up of both disciplines 
to work together without fighting for a hierarchical position within this 
relation.
Rajchman contributes to almost all the other Any-conferences in the 
19.  Anyone Corporation Web Page.
20.  Rajchman 2003, 3.
21.  Rajchman 1991a, 110.
22.  Ibid., 110.
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following years referring mainly to Foucault and Deleuze.23 Besides the 
conferences, Rajchman is part of the editorial board of ANY, the magazine 
of the Anyone corporation with Davidson as general editor.24 In 1993 the 
first issue “Writing in Architecture” appears and one year later Greg Lynn 
and Rajchman edit together the 5th issue on “Lightness”, in which Rajch-
man wants “to try out a concept like lightness in architecture”25, a concept 
which is derived from Deleuze and Guattari and which shall rescue archi-
tecture from the traditional burden-support space.26 Lightness points to 
the imagination of a freer and more experimental sort of space, different 
from the classical one, which is defined by gravity. With the help of Deleu-
zian concepts, Rajchman envisions architecture freed from grid frames, 
structure, typology or any kind of ideology. In the same issue, a translation 
of the chapter “Mystère D’Ariane selon Nietzsche” from Deleuze’s Critique 
et clinique and an article by Bernard Cache are published. Deleuze refers in 
Le Pli to a manuscript with the title L’ameublement du territoire, written by his 
student Cache but not yet published, and replaces the notion of a static ob-
ject with Cache’s term ‘objectile’ for a function, which contains virtually an 
infinite number of objects. Deleuze writes about Cache’s work: “Inspired 
by geography, architecture, and the decorative arts, in my view this book 
seems essential for any theory of the fold”27. It is Rajchman, who – reacting 
to the big interest of Deleuze in the United States – asks Cache for the still 
unpublished manuscript. Then it gets translated and distributed in 1995 
under the title Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories as the first book 
of the Writing Architecture series, which the Anyone corporation uses to 
spread mostly theoretical essays on architecture. Retrospectively Rajchman 
says, that without him taking care, the manuscript wouldn’t have been pu-
blished and Cache would have had nothing to do with the connection of 
Deleuze and US-American architecture.28 
Karen Burns writes in regard to the influence of the Anyone Cor-
poration in the “Deleuze-after-Derrida” narrative in architectural history, 
that the “rise of Deleuze [in architecture] was not a natural phenomenon, 
23.  See “On Not Being Any One.” Anyone (1991). “Anywhere and Nowhere.”Anywhere (1992). 
“Manyways.” Anyway (1993). “The Place of Architecture in Philosophy.” Anyplace (1994). “Some 
Senses of ‘Ground’.” Anybody (1996). “A New Pragmatism?” Anyhow (1997). “Time Out.” Anytime 
(1998). No contributions to Anywise (1995), Anymore (1999) and Anything (2000).
24.  Other members of the editorial board are Tadao Ando, Jennifer Bloomer, Brian Boigon, 
Henry Cobb, Charles Gwathmey, Rem Koolhaas, Sanford Kwinter, Greg Lynn and Mark C. Taylor. 
Later Silvia Kolbowski, R. E. Somol and Sylvia Lavin join. See imprint of ANY. 
25.  Rajchman 1994, 7.
26.  Ibid., 6.
27.  Deleuze 1993, 144, Annot. 3.
28.  Rajchman 2003, 6.
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but an institutionally structured one”.29 The conferences and publications 
from the Anyone Corporation in the 1990s provided a critical setting for 
architectural debate around Deleuze, which was in the beginning domi-
nated by the concept of the fold. Rajchman’s contributions to discussions 
about ‘folding’ in architecture and his relation to Eisenman will now be of 
interest.
Unfolding Frankfurt and “Folding in Architecture”
Considering Deleuze’s books on art related topics, like Francis Bacon. 
Logique de la sensation, L’image-mouvement. Cinéma 1 and L’image-temps. Ciné-
ma 2, the book Le Pli. Leibniz et le baroque has a special position and not only 
because there Deleuze says a few things about architecture. According to 
Rajchman his concept of baroque architecture is “so strange that though it 
was like that... you could actually try to do things that aren’t already deter-
mined by Deleuze himself”30. Apparently this wasn’t the case for Deleuze’s 
books on painting and cinema: “Initially it wasn’t so much that Deleuze 
was good at architecture or that there was some connection between the 
two but that architecture appeared as its own development in which they 
could absorb Deleuze in their own interesting way whereas the Cinema 
and Art History worlds couldn’t do that because they were more literary”31. 
So Rajchman perceives the realm of architecture as an occasion, in which 
one can relate to the philosophical model of Deleuze in an experimental 
way, something that Deleuze would appreciate. Rajchman tells the story, 
that when Deleuze publishes Le Pli he writes about the new book and sends 
the review to him. The answer he receives is: “this is very funny, because 
in reaction to this book there’s two groups that I never expected to res-
pond: surfers and architects”32. In his opinion Deleuze is surprised as well 
as interested at this phenomenon that is emerging mostly among English 
speaking people and much less in France itself. And Rajchman is one of 
these people, who foster the Deleuze architecture connection by speaking 
in architectural schools and contributing to architectural publications. 
In 1991 Eisenman publishes Unfolding Frankfurt, a book, in which he 
presents his master plan for the Rebstockpark in Frankfurt/Germany. At 
Eisenman’s invitation Rajchman contributes the article “Perplications: On 
the Space and Time of Rebstockpark”, which he calls “the literature on 
folding architecture”33. Here Rajchman defines the relation between Le 
29.  Burns 2013, 28.
30.  Rajchman 2003, 3.
31.  Ibid., 3.
32.  Ibid., 2.
33.  Ibid., 4.
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Pli and Eisenman’s project as a reciprocal “intensive reading”, to be un-
derstood as an experimental encounter, where unnoticed “complicities” 
between both are released while both remain divergent and singular.34 So 
not only Eisenman’s architecture is an intensive reading of Le Pli, also Le 
Pli is an intensive reading of the Rebstockpark project. Again a hierarchy 
between both disciplines is rejected. Philosophy and Architecture fold into 
one another, they encounter, capture and dislocate each other, without 
one being the original and the other the adaption – that is what Rajchman 
imagines.35  For him Eisenman uses the fold firstly as “the central formal 
technique employed in the generation of the design” – seen in the obvious 
folding process of the site – and secondly as “the central Idea or Question 
of the project”, questioning the overarching totalities of the traditional 
view on architecture.36 Because the architect uncovers multiplicities, “an 
imperceptible disparation in what presents itself as a perceptual totality”37. 
Rajchman introduces Eisenman as a player, who throws questions into the 
field of architecture, and equalizes him to the “true players”, which are 
Deleuze, Nietzsche, Mallarmé etc. These true players don’t play according 
to pre-existent rules, rather “the [playing] table itself bursts open and be-
comes part of a larger, more complex game that always includes the possi-
bility of new rules”38. 
Rajchman also contributes with the article “Out of the Fold” to the 
most famous publication on the concept of ‘folding’ in the architectural 
discourse, the Architectural Design profile “Folding in Architecture” edited 
by Lynn. After introducing some main concepts of Deleuze, especially the 
notion of an ‘affective’ space, he asks: “The modernist ‘machines for living’ 
sought to express a clean efficient space for the new mechanical body; but 
who will invent a way to express the affective space for this other multi-
plicitous one?”39 Thus Rajchman assigns to architecture the task to create 
the so-called “affective space”, in which the subject cannot understand and 
interpret a discernible logic but experiences the space through the body. 
And the architect Eisenman now provides this “architectural expression” 
– the architectural equivalent to Deleuze’s philosophy, that is why Rajch-
man writes: “As Deleuze invents a new philosophy of the informe, or an 
informel art of thinking, so Eisenman invents an architecture of the infor-
me, or an informel way of building and designing”40. So invited initially by 
34.  Rajchman 1991c, 22.
35.  Ibid., 24.
36.  Ibid., 21.
37.  Ibid., 36.
38.  Ibid., 70.
39.  Rajchman 1993, 63.
40.  Rajchman 1991c, 22.
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Eisenman, quickly Rajchman becomes the most ambitions intercessor of 
‘folding’ in architecture. 
Constructions
After having reconstructed Rajchman’s several contributions and its 
role in introducing and spreading Deleuzian concepts among architects, 
now the question is what is his interest in bringing Deleuze and Architectu-
re together. To answer this, I recommend a close reading of Constructions, 
an assemblage of essays by Rajchman, published in 1998 in the Anyone 
Corporation’s Writing Architecture series, and of The Deleuze Connection 
from 2000. In Constructions he starts with asking: “What if the architectonic 
in Kant were not an overarching system but something that has itself to 
be constructed anew, in each case, in relation to fresh problems – some-
thing looser, more flexible, less complete, more irregular, a free plan in 
which things hang together without yet being held in place?”41 Here the 
task is to overcome the Kantian architectonic, to recognize it only as a 
temporary construction, from which we have to free ourselves in order to 
reach “a free plan, in which to move, invent concepts, unfold a drama”42. 
For Rajchman ‘to think’ is synonymous with ‘to construct’, so he calls the 
philosopher a constructor and every work is, in reference to Deleuze, a 
montage, an ‘agencement’ (a layout of room), that is why “making a phi-
losophy would become a matter of architecture”.43 Philosophy’s plan of 
construction shouldn’t be predetermined by given rules, as it is the case 
with the Kantian architectonic, rather it has to be always built anew. Ra-
jchman thinks, that for once the architectonic of thinking is loosened up, 
the main philosophical questions – how to construct a work and how to 
construct a life – will acquire new shapes.44 Important here is the notion 
of the architectonic of thinking and its relation to both architecture and 
philosophy. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues, that philosophy has 
an inner schema, called architectonic, which is based on the distinction be-
tween sensibility and understanding and which is complete and necessary. 
This architectonic is now regarded to be too rigid and can be compared to 
the traditional notion of architecture as a grounded and static object, also 
something that Rajchman wants to overcome. This means, that because 
the architectonic is shaping philosophical thinking, he believes that exac-
tly this sort of architectonic needs to get changed, so that philosophy can 
change too. This means further, that because the architectonic is based on 
41.  Rajchman 1998, 1.
42.  Ibid., 2.
43.  Ibid., p. 2-3. 
44.  Ibid., p. 2.
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the traditional concept of architecture, this concept needs to get changed 
as well. And here, I would argue, lies Rajchman’s interest in the realm of 
architecture. 
In the much earlier book Philosophical Events. Essays of the ‘80s, where 
the last chapter is titled “What’s New in Architecture?”, Rajchman explains 
the notion of space in the theories of Foucault, Derrida and at the end De-
leuze, in order to claim for “an architecture of the event”.45 Already here 
he asks, “what an ‘invention of the other’ possessing the ‘singular structure 
of an event’ would mean for architecture, and for the architectural alle-
gory of thought, and therefore of invention in thought”46. So again the way 
of doing architecture is connected to the structure of the thought, concei-
ved by an architectural allegory, and thereby to the possibility to create so-
mething unexpected in philosophy. Rajchman continues: “for a long and 
powerful tradition of thought which we still ‘inhabit’, to construct a habi-
tation, a way of living, has meant to construct a space in conformity with a 
plan, an ideal, a model, essence, or nature, that would be independent of 
it […] The task of inhabiting the uninhabitable is to conceive of another 
relation of our being-together in a space and a time than this one”47. 
So the rigid and predetermining Kantian architectonic needs to get 
abandoned by rethinking architecture and its notions of ground, gravi-
ty and ideal plan. The Cartesian notion of space, a homogenous gridded 
space, in which everything is ordered within the three dimensional coor-
dinate system, is regarded as not being able to explain social space, which 
envelops in-between-spaces possessing “distances and proximities of ano-
ther, nonquantifiable sort”48. Here the concept of the fold, introducing a 
heterogeneous, complex and every changing notion of space, serves as an 
alternative. It gets connected to the organisation of the city, for instance 
Rajchman writes that for once the architectonic is loosened up, then philo-
sophy “would become free, impermanent constructions superimposed on 
one another like strata in a city”49. The city is seen as free and vital to the 
degree that it allows for the movement of free thought.50 Deleuze introdu-
ces the “brain-city” as one “filled with voids and interstices, always changing 
45.  Rajchman 1991b, 156. The book cover is interesting because underneath the alignment of 
the philosophers Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, Lyotard and Rorty an image of an ar-
chitectural plan is displayed, showing probably housing units in rather organic shapes. Here the 
connection of philosophy and architecture is materially inscribed in the layout of the book’s two-
dimensional space. 
46.  Ibid. References are from Derrida. 
47.  Ibid., 157-158.
48.  Rajchman 2000, 100.
49.  Rajchman 1998, 2.
50.  Rajchman 2000, 41.
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and leaking, defined by tacit or indeterminate rules”51. Like the city the 
new kind of philosophical construction should be “a montage of overlap-
ping and necessarily unfinished ‘remarks’ and ‘investigations’”52. Conse-
quently architects as well as the philosophers have to work with informal 
plans and diagrams, so through experimentation, rather than through a 
plan or program as sort of ideology. The plan of construction must “always 
be unformed, indeterminate, loose enough that other figurations, other 
confabulations may yet happen”53. 
For Rajchman the problem emerges in the course of realisation, be-
cause the question is “how to introduce this anorganized or complex space 
into building – in other words how to create a free, operative space in 
construction not preset by any overarching organization or given through 
combination among existing elements”54. Since this is not yet designed, 
Rajchman commissions seven architects to design a ‘virtual house’ – pu-
blished in the 20th ANY issue “The virtual House”55 – a house, “which, 
through its plan, space, construction, and intelligence, generates the most 
new connections, the one so arranged or disposed as to permit the greatest 
power for unforeseen relations”56.  
In fact Rajchman imagines that a “freer” architecture would lead to 
a “freer” architectonic of thinking and thus to a way of doing philosophy, 
through which unexpected inventions can emerge. In order to see this 
happen, he as a philosopher commissions architects to design buildings, 
which, as he supposes, shall be connected to philosophy, more precisely 
to concepts of Deleuze. So it goes from philosophy to architecture, back 
to philosophy and so forth? How, then, does Rajchman conceive the rela-
tionship between architecture and philosophy?
Working together
At the end of Constructions Rajchman asks: “And what if then happe-
ned that constructions in architecture and philosophy discovered provi-
sional points of contact and alliance, as though together speaking a new 
and foreign idiom no longer belonging to the recognized languages of 
51.  Rajchman 1998, 6.
52.  Ibid.
53.  Ibid., 7.
54.  Ibid., 105. 
55.  The ANY issue “The Virtual House” from 1997 is based on the commissioning of seven archi-
tects to design a virtual house, among them Eisenman, and on the discussion of those houses at 
a seminar in Berlin. 
56.  Rajchman 1998, 115.
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either?”57 He imagines a working together of philosophy and architecture 
without rivalry or identification, without one dictating the rules and the 
other applying them. Instead they together create “a zone of new connec-
tions”, which lead to “the formulation of new problems, the invention of 
new concepts”.58 Referring to Deleuze and Guattari’s expression, accor-
ding to which “Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it”59, 
Rajchman explains that philosophy not only presupposes nonphilosophi-
cal understanding, but is also addressed to it.60 Therefore he is stressing 
the importance of “translations in arts or sciences”61 by saying, that “to 
do philosophy is thus to fabricate concepts in resonance and interference 
with the arts, past as well as present”62. The image of philosophy as a me-
tadiscipline that sets the rules for the others has to be abandoned. In a 
similar way Deleuze says, that philosophy should be practiced like an ‘art 
brut’, which has “its own raw material that allows it to enter into more fun-
damental external relations with these other disciplines”63. In this regard 
Rajchman states, that “philosophy is impoverished when reduced to being 
merely about the arts, reflecting on their forms of judgment; for it has a 
much more vital role to play together with them, linking up with them 
in odd places, interfering and intersecting, with them through ‘encoun-
ters’ prior to settled judgments”64. So philosophy should not become a new 
theory, prior to art and which art is applying then, rather it serves as an 
‘interceder’: inciting creation or thinking in other nonphilosophical disci-
plines, so that together speaking something “new” emerges.65 
Coming back to the initial quote, architecture seems to serve as the 
nonphilosophical discipline, which philosophy is presupposing in order to 
obtain a much more vital role. Rajchman thus believes in an enhancement 
of philosophy through the realm of architecture, as if by working together 
architecture overcomes the traditional burden of the Cartesian space and 
the notion of gravity, then they might change together the architectonic 
of our thinking and thereby philosophical working and writing. With this 
in mind, we eventually see that the story of architecture and philosophy 
connected via sharing the topic of ‘folding’ during the 1990s is not neces-
sarily the one of architects appropriating Deleuze’s philosophy for formal 
57.  Ibid., 9.
58.  Rajchman 2000, 4.
59.  Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 218.
60.  Rajchman 2000, 114.
61.  Rajchman 1998, 100.
62.  Rajchman 2000, 115.
63.  Deleuze 1995, 89.
64.  Rajchman 1998, 56.
65.  Rajchman 2000, 118.
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or organisational innovation, but also one, which incorporates the actions 
and intentions of philosophers alike – in this case of Rajchman as one ‘in-
tercesseur’ for a working together of architecture and philosophy.
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Abstract
In his book In the World Interior of Capital Peter Sloterdijk (2013) describes how Western 
civilization managed, over the course of a process that lasted about 500 years, to build 
up a global system of communication and exchange that ended up enclosing the whole 
planet into one “psychotechnical” construction.
The process of Globalization, implemented through a series of material and immaterial 
constructions — defined by Sloterdijk as “canopies of globalization” —  determined 
both the (work) ethics of Modernity (devoted to exploration, research, and innova-
tion), and the essential character of modern space as an interior.
In February 2015, Google presented the project for its new headquarters in Mountain 
View, California: a series of gigantic transparent canopies frame both large stretches of 
natural landscape and the space of production, the “workspace,” seemingly embodying 
Sloterdijk’s narrative of the construction of the global interior. On the one hand, the 
new Google campus appropriates and transfigures the character of past radical pro-
jects, from 1954 Mies’ Convention Hall Project in Chicago, to 1969 Superstudio Con-
tinuous Monument and 1970 Archizoom No□Stop City. On the other hand, it is seems 
to call for the construction of a new outside (even if not a real one) that will be able 
to break the boredom of life within the global interior and re-activate the processes of 
discovery and innovation that are essential to modern enterprises.
Keywords
Canopy; Google; interior; Sloterdijk
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The global interior
In February 2015, Google presented the project of its new headquarters 
to be built in Mountain View, California. The project presents a series of 
lightweight structures, gigantic transparent canopies stretched above Ame-
rican suburbia, that aim to provide the community of the Googlers an en-
closed and controlled environment capable of replicating the complexity 
and the diversity of both the natural and the urban settings, constituting a 
persuasive alternative to the outside.
The attempt to build this kind of substitute worlds, all-encompassing, 
enclosed and controlled yet explicitly built to foster innovation and chan-
ge, is not new neither within the history of architecture nor to within the 
history of capital ventures.
On the contrary, the endeavour to build a totalizing environment, 
enveloping all human activities, is recognized by Peter Sloterdijk as the 
most typically modern enterprise: the construction of the “global interior 
of capital.”
Looking at the ways in which this process historically unfolded can 
give us useful insights about the character of this space (the global inte-
rior), about the nature of the activities that they host (modern work or 
the process of construction of the global interior itself), and about the 
character of the subject that lives in them (the modern subject, the global 
worker).
Modernity as interiorization project
In In the World Interior of Capital Sloterdijk outlines the “grand narrative” 
of the formation of the world we live in; it is a 500 years long process that 
started with the geographic discovery of the globe in the fifteenth century 
and ended with its total enclosure within a global apparatus of communi-
cation and transport that make us perceive the world as one continuous, 
global, interior.
In Sloterdijk’s view, the very definition of modernity coincides with 
the process of globalization (modernity = globalization) and westerniza-
tion of the world, implemented “practically through Christian-capitalist 
seafaring, and politically implanted through the colonialism of Old Euro-
pean nation-states” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.9).
Globalization, the unfolding of modernity, acted in parallel on two 
levels: on the one hand, there was the literal geographic discovery of the 
world; on the other hand, this “penetration of the unknown” was always 
accompanied by the simultaneous extension of the respective motherlands 
laws, cultural, social, and economic frameworks that progressively enclosed 
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ever larger territories. It is in this sense that modernity can be seen as a 
gigantic interiorization project carried out at a global scale by means of a 
continuous process of discovery and appropriation by enclosure.
The formation of this global interior, a construction that is at the same 
time psychological and material (or, as Sloterdijk would put it, psychotech-
nical), is accompanied by two phenomena: the emergence of the modern 
subject and his ethics, and the new relationship established by this subject 
with the environment where he/she performs.
How the global interior was built. The modern subject at work
We can think of modernity as an enterprise carried out at a global scale 
by a series of different subjects — discoverers, conquistadores, preachers, 
colonizers, merchants, etc. — each having a different agenda that steered 
their behaviour and shaped their character. Beyond the particular aims 
and attitudes of each category it is possible to notice the emergence of 
common features that, all together, contributed to the construction of the 
generic modern subject. These features are still recognizable in present 
times, especially if we think of the way we work today; in fact, many of the 
rhetoric of work that accompany both our daily life and the successful busi-
ness models are shaped on a type that can be traced back to the unfolding 
of modernity.
The modern subject is the active agent of modernization, the one 
who carries out “the penetration of the unknown.” Direct exploration (of 
the globe) and the discovery of previously concealed truths can, therefore, 
be considered the typically modern enterprises: “the essence of the Age of 
Discovery remained determined by the expedition as an entrepreneurial 
form” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.95).
It is important to underline that, for Sloterdijk, “not everyone [...] is 
a subject, but rather one who takes part in the experiments of modernity, 
in the psychological formatting of entrepreneurial energies” (Sloterdijk, 
2013, p.57). Those who do not take part “in the experiments of modernity” 
are non-modern subjects and their attitude and behaviour can be taken as 
reference for practices of resistance to the process of globalization.1
1.  If, on the one hand, Sloterdijk presents globalization as a historically unavoidable process, 
throughout the book, he presents a few possible forms of resistance. I would like to mention them, 
because they might be useful, as it will hopefully become clear at the end of the essay, when there 
was the need to break the monotony of life within the global interior. Moreover, Sloterdijk often 
devises anti-modern heroes whose attitudes seem able to undermine the globalization process.
The first of these forms of resistance is skepticism: a fixation in an “endless reflection” that does not 
allow the subject to become modern, performing the transition from theory to practice that lies 
at the basis of the modern construction. Hamlet, with his impossibility to be entirely convinced by 
anything, is the hero of this “chronic inhibition to act” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.61). The second form 
of resistance is pessimism as opposed to the optimistic future projection of wealth that anticipates 
Modernity, at least in its unfolding, does not subjugate individuals; 
rather, it is constructed, through exploration and appropriation. Even if 
this may sound almost like an oxymoron, the modern subject is, therefore, 
an active figure: it is the subject that makes modernity and not the other 
way round.
In a way this implies, that there is not such a thing as “the project of 
modernity:” modernity defines its goals in its making, while it is construc-
ted by those who take part in the endeavour.
This (work) ethic, heavily projected towards action, is a crucial quality 
of the modern subject: the modern subject has to find motivations to act. 
Disinhibition, the liberation from “what constrains us from action” (Sloter-
dijk, 2013, p.60) and most importantly self-disinhibition,2 becomes a fun-
damental aspect of modernity. In this sense also the very notion of theory, 
finds, in the modern era a new definition: the modern subject “theory, of 
course, no longer means the quiet gazing of thinkers before the icons of 
being; what is now meant is the active establishment of sufficient reasons 
for successful deeds” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.62).
Discovery and research, as well as the documentation of their making, 
become the key features for any venture, gradually shifting from their ori-
ginal geographical context towards less material fields. The original rush of 
European states into geographical discoveries through exploration takes, 
later on, the shape of the competition for innovation (and the opening of 
new markets) among businesses of different sorts.
Innovation, the promise of a future condition that is better than the 
present one, is the key factor that calls to action and that is able to perpe-
tuate the cycle of discoveries (even in our geographically saturated world). 
When certain routes become ordinary paths entangled within (global) tra-
ffic, the innovator explores innovative directions.
Looking at the process of construction of the global interior it is pos-
sible not only to delineate the character of the modern subject but also to 
look at the qualities of the space where he performs.
any (modern) deed. In this case the characters embodying pessimism are the mutineers on the 
ships. The third form of resistance to globalization devised by Sloterdijk is the attempt to re-
establish the distance between different points of the globe and re-affirming the presence of an 
uncompressible context between them: “participation, situatedness and indwelling” (Sloterdijk, 2013, 
p.255) seem able to oppose the spatial compression realized by globalization.
2.  In fact, if traditionally the transition to action happens by means of a command, modernity 
succeeded in placing this “command to act” within the subject itself. Along these lines, Sloterdijk 
notes how the “awakening of a taste for the passion” (seen as imitatio Christi, Sloterdijk, 2013, 
p.60) within non-religious practices becomes operational in this process of transition to practice 
and shows how a “sequence of adverse events can be experienced as a passion, [and] suffering is 
converted into ability.” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.60). We can see how it is not incidental, in our society, 
the recurrent invitation to have (a) passion, to be passionate about what we do: passion delivers 
the necessary motivation to act, and the suffering that passion provides is a reward in itself being 
the imitation, or mirroring, Christ’s passion.
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Beyond the Crystal Palace
According to Sloterdijk, throughout globalization two radically different 
kinds of spaces confront each other: the “pure outside” (Sloterdijk, 2013, 
p.109) and the interior.
As anticipated above, globalization is the process that succeeded in 
interiorizing ever larger domains of the “outside,” literally wrapping them 
into the (social, political, and technological) construction of western civi-
lization. Modernity, as interiorization project, consists in making inhabita-
ble (and exploitable) previously hostile, indifferent territories by means of 
a pattern of progressive discovery, appropriation and inclusion.
The final outcome of this process is the completion of terrestrial glo-
balization where the world becomes spatially saturated (the picture of the 
world is completed) and deprived of the possibility of further expansion 
(there is nothing left to discover). This saturated condition constitutes the 
fundamental aspect of the era we live in, the Global Age, or the age of 
Electronic Globalization.
If modernity succeeded in constructing the global interior, the next 
era (in this sense post-modernity) cannot but be permeated by a sort of 
claustrophobic feel, being a space where it is impossible to devise any way 
out.3
The global interior, this all-encompassing construction presents a 
very peculiar quality: it is not an entirely original, new, construction. On 
the contrary, it clearly presents features of the previous “outside.” The in-
terior appropriates the outside, mirrors and replicates it. However, what 
the interior presents is not an exact replica of the outside: the outside is 
domesticated, deprived of any dangerous element. 
Modern architecture delivers multiple examples, either realized buil-
dings or theoretical architectural projects, that make apparent the process 
of interiorization of the world and seem able to materialize the construc-
tion of what Mark Pimlott has called “the continuous interior” (Pimlott, 
2009).
The Crystal Palace built for the 1851 World Exhibition in London 
is probably one of the most spectacular structures that renders the literal 
interiorization of the world: “with [the construction of the Crystal Palace] 
the principle of the interior overstepped a critical boundary: [...] it revea-
led the timely tendency to make both nature and culture indoor affairs” 
(Sloterdijk, 2013, p.170). The Crystal Palace was not simply a “magnified 
arcade” (as Walter Benjamin saw it) aiming at sheltering bourgeois urban 
life and its commodified relations, but, much more ambitiously, “anticipa-
3.  Isn’t this the feeling we have at times when we perceive ourselves entangled in a world entirely 
saturated by information technology, communication devices, more or less social networks? 
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ted an integral, experience-oriented, popular capitalism in which no less 
than the comprehensive absorption of the outside world in a fully calcula-
ted interior was at stake” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.175).
Since the construction of the Crystal Palace, the technological develo-
pments have enabled the construction of ever larger buildings that aim at 
producing not simply large interiors, but rather environments, ingeniously 
controlled despite the sheer size, that are able to reproduce the complexi-
ty, the richness, and the diversity of the outside world.
In the early 1940s the journal Architectural Forum commissioned 
Mies van der Rohe a project for a Museum for a Small City. The project 
represents a seemingly infinite field where the artworks — a collection 
of recently completed contemporary masterpieces — seem to float in an 
uninterrupted horizontal space extended towards the horizon beyond a 
transparent pane. Ten years later, Mies developed a project for a Conven-
tion Hall in Chicago. The scale of the building dwarves the visitors gathered 
under the gigantic steel structure of the roof, supported by the perimetral 
columns that leave the interior completely free from any vertical structure. 
A similar structure, where a square roof is supported on its perimeter by 
few monumental columns, finally gets built in the Neue Nationalgalerie in 
Berlin (a project that appropriates a scheme originally conceived for the 
headquarters of the Bacardi company in Santiago de Cuba): the perma-
nent collection of the museum is gathered in the semi-underground lower 
level, while the entrance floor simply frames a portion of the surrounding 
urban context. In these projects the roof, or the floor, simply highlight 
certain forms of life that they host, establishing a direct continuity with the 
uninterrupted space outside.
It is important to underline that these structures simply forget, or bet-
ter, erase “the outside.” Even in the drawings elaborated for these projects 
there is little space for the representation of the facades and for the rela-
tionships with a surrounding context: life happens inside, and the features 
of the outer space are merely replicated in the interior, a place where one 
can find everything.
Besides Mies’ projects, the idea of building a gigantic roof, under whi-
ch the most diverse activities can “freely” happen, was widely implemented 
in the typology of the American shopping mall and in the construction 
of large infrastructural hubs such as airports. In both cases, the original 
freedom of use that the open plan was supposed to provide is significantly 
twisted: these large constructions become environments where activities 
are carefully controlled, and where the “public” becomes a crowd of con-
sumers.
Along these lines, and with the provocative boldness of a purely 
theoretical project, in the late 1960s the group Archizoom developed the 
model of No-Stop City. It is a “city without architecture” that refuses “all 
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the design criteria still linked to figurative codes” and aims at producing 
a “knowledge of architecture in exclusively quantitative terms” (Branzi, 
2006, p.70). In No-Stop City the artificially ventilated and lit environments 
of factories and commercial malls extend to include all the activities of 
the city; and the city itself becomes “a conglomerate of habitable parking 
lots, [...] a system of typological storages and free residential forest”: No-
-Stop City “no longer had an external form, but had infinite interior forms” 
(Branzi, 2006, p.71).4
We could say that No-Stop city and “the Global Interior of Capital” 
described by Sloterdijk converge in a space where one can find “everything 
under one roof” (Pimlott, 2009).
Mountain View.
In a video published on YouTube,5 in February 2015 Google presented the 
project for its new headquarters in Mountain View, California.
The project consists of a series of buildings, a campus, wrapped within 
gigantic transparent canopies stretched over large areas of the typically 
suburban landscape of the Silicon Valley. Under these canopies, the actual 
buildings aim to be constructed in a way that will easily enable reconfi-
guration of programs and activities to adapt to the future changes of the 
working environment. 
Even if, in the presentation video, three speakers — Dave Radcliffe 
(Google’s Vice President of Real Estate), Bijarke Ingels, and Thomas Hea-
terwick (the odd couple of designers chosen by Google) — alternate in 
describing the features and the goals of the new Google campus, it is possi-
ble to say that there is only one discourse,6 generally charged by a rhetoric 
that revolves around a series of contemporary architectural commonplaces 
about “environmental sustainability” and the need to create inspiring envi-
ronments for creative and innovative activities.
However, it is interesting to see how one of the companies that most 
clearly represents the character of the globalized capital describes the pro-
ject for its headquarters entirely along the lines of the “global interior.” 
In fact, it is possible to read the description of the project for the Google 
campus as a comment to the projects presented above, from the Crystal 
4.  The social and cultural context that anticipated No-Stop City project are thoroughly described 
and commented in Aureli, Pier Vittorio (2008). The Project of Autonomy: Politics and Architecture 
Within and Against Capitalism. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
5.  Google’s Proposal for North Bayshore. 2015. YouTube video, 9:51. Posted by Google. 28 Febru-
ary 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3v4rIG8kQA
6.  In the following lines the quotes are transcriptions from the video presentation; for the purpose 
of this essay, they will not be attributed to the actual speaker but will be considered as parts of the 
same homogeneous communication.
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Palace to No-Stop City.
One of the most compelling parts of the video refers to the rela-
tionship — mediated by the porous boundaries of the campus and by the 
transparent canopies — between the Google campus and the surrounding 
environment, either natural or urban.
As far as the natural landscape is concerned, the Google headquarters 
aim to establish a symbiosis with the natural environment even re-creating 
nature where it was erased by previous developments. Nature will seam-
lessly extend inside and outside the buildings, described as “greenhouses 
that will protect [one might ask: from who?] pieces of nature” and “create 
wildlife [sic] habitat.” Here one might say that natural nature does not exist 
anymore: nature, in the global interior, is a construction.
Also the relationship with the surrounding urban context is marked 
by the attempt to establish a productive exchange. Literally productive: 
Google cannot afford to “shut away the neighbours,” therefore “the buil-
dings [...] allow both the public as well as employees to move through 
them: [...] part of our work is to try to find ways to make places that you 
would go and have a conversation and go for a walk with great pleasure, 
and choose in a weekend to be. So in that sense, our idea for the Google 
campus is really to give it the diversity, the liveliness that you find in an ur-
ban neighbourhood so that a lot of the traditional distinctions in an urban 
setting or in an office environment will have evaporated or at least been 
blurred significantly.” Production and consumption, work and leisure, the 
city and the workplace finally coincide thanks to an architecture that is at 
the same time an office, a piece of neighbourhood, and a nature reservoir.
The seamless continuity between the natural environment, the city, 
architecture, and the modes of production (“the way we work”) is further 
made clear: “in nature, things aren’t over-programmed or over-prescribed. 
And in a way, if our cities or our work environments could have more of 
this flexibility or openness for interpretation, they would become more 
stimulating and more creative environments to live and work in. [...] The 
desire, really, is to try to create pieces of environment you can work in, in 
multiple ways. Suddenly, within this, the architecture of the building beco-
mes almost like giant pieces of furniture that can be connected in different 
ways. […]. You can just pile them up and assemble them differently, with 
basically no new materials.”
Again, instead of looking at the project for Google campus, we should 
read these words and simultaneously look at the work of Superstudio, who-
se projects Continuous Monument (1969), Supersurface (1972) and the 
later furniture design products seamlessly connect landscape, architecture 
and domestic space.
The project of the Google campus makes apparent that the project 
of No-Stop City is accomplished: both nature and the city are interiorized, 
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the architect looks at the city as pieces of furniture meaning that scale re-
lationships do not matter anymore, program is incidental and can change 
at any time in any location.
The real outside (does not exist)
We have seen how modernity coincided with a progressive interiorization 
of the world and how a series of architectural projects made apparent this 
process. We have defined modern work as the activity that aimed at ap-
propriating ever larger expanses of previously unknown territories, finally 
realizing globalization. Then, looking at the Google campus project we 
have seen a series of semi-transparent structures “colonizing” the sub-ur-
ban American landscape and framing nature and working environments 
within gigantic canopies.
The figure of the canopy is particularly interesting.
The “canopies of globalization” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.120) are a series 
of material (e.g. the ships) and immaterial (e.g. the insurance system) cons-
tructions — “psychotechnical figures” — that helped European states to 
displace their power across the globe, exporting value(s) and meaning(s) 
of motherlands into previously inhospitable spaces (the oceans and the 
unknown continents).
The canopies were, in the first place, instrumental to build a familiar 
framework; otherwise, outside these canopies, the modern subject was con-
fronted with a physical and moral state of absolute deterritorialization with 
no attachment to objects and no need to respect any house rule. In order 
to escape this condition of spatial alienation (being “displaced bodies in an 
abandoned space”, Sloterdijk, 2013, p.110) the modern subject had to find 
ways to inhabit the outside: “the living arts of modernity aim to establish 
the non-indifferent within the indifferent” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.115).7 It was 
precisely the activity of constructing, dismantling, displacing, rebuilding 
settlements into the unknown, in a repeated cycle, that characterized the 
realization of the project of modernity as continuous effort to explore, 
discover, appropriate, and innovate.
Eventually the canopies of globalization grew to enclose the whole 
world. With a side-effect: both the Crystal Palace (as read by Sloterdijk) 
and Archizoom’s No-Stop City ended up producing boredom. The cons-
truction of the Crystal Palace aimed at presenting the world as an object 
to be exhibited, entirely tamed and pacified: inside the crystal palace “hu-
7.  Initially, the ship was one of the technical devices that work in this sense. The space of the ship 
is an extension of the motherland (as long as it carries the flag of a crown). Once landed overseas 
its qualities will transfer into the unknown space by a series of other light, mobile, and more or 
less provisional “interior” spaces spawning from it (canopies, tents, caravan, cars, etc., Sloterdijk, 
2013, p.122)
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mans are cheated of their ecstasy, their loneliness, their own decisions, and 
their own direct connection to the absolute outside, namely death. Mass 
culture, humanism and biologism are the cheerful masks that [...] conceal 
the profound boredom of an existence devoid of challenge” (Sloterdijk, 
2013, p.172). Similarly, according to its authors, No-Stop City deliberately 
internalized “the catatonic dimensions of the market” (Branzi, 2006, 71). 
If the construction of the global interior was the goal of modernity, its 
accomplishment brings mankind into a new era — post-modernity or post-
-history — and sets a new goal: the crystallization of this status and the 
generalization of boredom.
But, looking at the Google campus project, why would canopies be 
needed within the global interior? What are these canopies doing?
There is one property of the canopy that should not be overlooked. 
By drawing a protective boundary, the canopy actually draws an outside. We 
believed that there was no outside anymore, and that spaces of different 
nature were seamlessly connected at a global scale. Now, we are confronted 
with a series of structures that re-establish an outside, even if it is, as in the 
case of the re-created wilderness of the Google campus, a constructed — a 
fake — one.
It seems that there is a need for re-inventing, re-cognizing, and re-
-constructing an outside as if this friction between the inside and the outsi-
de was the fundamentally productive activity, the zero degree of (modern) 
work, the only process that is actually able to innovate, break boredom, 
produce value; re-establishing an outside would create “inexhaustible ho-
rizons for projection and invention in the face of a geographically exhaus-
ted world” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.115). In order to breach contemporary 
monotony “the task of philosophy would then be to shatter the glass roof 
over one’s own head and directly make the individual the monstrous once 
again” (Sloterdijk, 2013, p.173).
If this is the task of philosophy, what is the task of architecture?
Two different strategies could aim at re-establishing an outside. 
The first looks at practices that could be defined in a hybrid discipli-
nary territory between art (installations and performances), architecture, 
and political activism: temporary projects, subversive occupation of public 
or abandoned spaces can activate certain sensible spots constructing wi-
thin the otherwise frozen and ossified condition of the global interior. It 
can be noticed that this is not an original strategy, but — I would argue — 
needs to be re-initiated from time to time picking up a tradition that can 
be referred back to the activities of the collectives Ant Farm (in the late 
1960s and early 1970s) and, more recently, Raumlabor.
The second strategy takes a more theoretical or psychoanalytical 
(post Lacanian / Zizekian) direction investigating the perverse need to 
construct a fake outside (a projected one, a non-real one) in order to re-
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-initiate the productive process of exploration, discovery and innovation; 
it seems that we will have to pretend that the global interior does not exist 
and put at work the mechanisms that regulate the relationships between 
the symbolic, the imaginary, the real in the Lacanian triadic construction 
of the most radical interior space: our unconscious. 
References
Aureli, Pier Vittorio. 2008. The Project of Autonomy: Politics and Architecture Within and 
Against Capitalism. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Branzi, Andrea. 2006. Weak and Diffuse Modernity: The World of Projects at the Beginning of 
the 21st Century. Milan: Skira.
Google’s Proposal for North Bayshore. 2015. YouTube video, 9:51. Posted by Google. 28 
February 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3v4rIG8kQA
Pimlott, Mark. 2007. Without and Within: Essays on Territory and the Interior. Rotterdam: 
episode publishers.
Pimlott, Mark. 2009. “The Continuous Interior. Infrastructure for Publicity and Con-
trol.” Harvard Design Magazine, 29 Fall/Winter 2008-09, pp.75-86.
Scott, Felicity D. 2007. Architecture or Techno Utopia: Politics after Modernism. Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press
Sloterdijk, Peter. 2013. In the World Interior of Capital, For a Philosophical Theory of Global-
ization. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Zizek, Slavoj. 1991. Looking Awry, An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
65Of Canopies and Roofs
© Maribel Mendes Sobreira
philosophy@lisbon, 5, 59-69. Lisboa: CFUL.
Hermeneutics, Architecture and Belonging
Lucy Elvis
National University of Ireland Galway
L.ELVIS1@nuigalway.ie
Abstract
For many aestheticians, architecture occupies a difficult position within the pantheon 
of the arts. Hegel’s normative approach leaves architecture limited in its truth-disclos-
ing capacity due to its brute physicality. This paper argues, with Gadamer, that this 
physicality is fundamental to architecture’s role in establishing a space for the emer-
gence of all other art forms. As such, architectural space creates a space for the creation 
of and encounter with all other forms of cultural expression. Architecture, therefore, 
both includes decoration and is, in its very nature, decorative. It is bound to imposing 
its aesthetic content and then foregrounding its contents in order to facilitate the en-
counter between viewer and art work.
Gadamer’s interpretation of architecture thus requires a rehabilitation of ornamenta-
tion which refutes Hegel’s separation of ornament in his reading of architecture. Or-
namentation becomes inseparably related to the harmony of the architectural work as 
the whole, its komospoeisis. This reciprocity between ornament and the work as a whole 
is an analogue of the relationship between architecture and ‘bildung’. Once shaped by 
culture, architecture becomes the ‘house’ in which culture is established and sustained. 
As a result, Gadamer restores the connection between art and the ethical life of a com-
munity that is lost in Romantisicm where the artists is sequestered through the concept 
of genius.
The paper makes reference to selected passages from Truth and Method, On the Relevance 
of the Beautiful and other select essays by Gadamer. Although for such a brief presenta-
tion an exhaustive account of the advantages of a hermeneutic approach to architec-
ture cannot be provided, the paper suggests that it is perhaps incorrect to debate its 
position within the pantheon of the arts, for, as Gadamer’s approach highlights, it re-
mains the foundational space of culture itself; the site in which culture and community 
are brought not only into being, but into question.
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1. Introduction
In Gadamerian aesthetics, through its space designating function, architec-
ture occupies a position of distinct significance. Since architecture, for Ga-
damer, creates the settings in which art, as cultural expression emerges and 
is set to work, architecture and the other arts are placed into a relationship 
of contingency. Without architecture’s mediation, the art work can obtain 
no real ‘presence’(Gadamer 2013, 156.) In recognising Dasein as always-
-and-already situated in not only a physical world, but a system of norms 
and values, both emergent from and sustained by tradition, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics recognises architecture as the ground from which Bildung 
(culture) is physically articulated and thus questioned or sustained. Wi-
thout this crucial process, dangerous ideas or indeed delicate balances of 
power cannot be fully comprehended and thus refuted. Gadamer iden-
tifies the richness of expression possessed by other art forms as uniquely 
present in architecture. A space that expresses something in itself, whilst 
facilitating cultural expression, or indeed a certain function; works of ar-
chitecture make a claim that, although initially striking, necessarily recede 
to foreground its respective function or cultural meaning.
In a break with Hegelian aesthetics, architecture transcends the lowly 
position it’s often afforded in aesthetic hierarchies, obtaining lasting re-
levance as that which establishes and sustains the ground for the cultural 
life of its own epoch and those that follow(Hegel 1998).1With architecture 
thus established, as a means of designating and articulating the priorities 
of a given community, in accordance with his wider project of reuniting 
ethics and poetics; Gadamer returns architecture to a position of centrality 
within the ethical life of the community of history; a unique expression of 
epochal ethos.
Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach has several implications then for 
architecture and belonging. It gathers a work and its community together, 
creating a ‘fitting’ environ for hermeneutic dialogues to unfold. As works 
of permanence, architecture attests to the vital role of tradition in world-
-articulation, a theme central to Gadamer’s understanding of Dasein’s self-
-realisation. It can serve to foster the community of spectators vital to the 
setting to work of the work of art, but also to aid in the recognition of 
Dasein’s membership to a wider community of historically effective cons-
1.  Gadamer draws heavily on Heidegger in this reading. Progressing his idea of activities owned 
and designated by dwelling as articulated in Building, Dwelling, Thinking in particular; but with cru-
cial difference(Heidegger 2001). Gadamer stresses architecture’s space designating function in 
order to develop a position that sees architecture as a womb from which other forms of art might 
be born. Whereas for Heidegger, earth’s claim over being, overtly stresses a rootedness incompat-
ible in many ways with our modern living(Harries 1998). Gadamer’s reading, on the other hand, 
based in poesis or the articulation of a world provides for the evolution of architectural expression 
within the laterally expanding horizon of our spatial understanding.
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ciousness. As that which resounds with the ‘echoes of the past’ it occupies a 
central position in the memory of collective historically effective conscious-
ness, and reconciles the divide between the architect and artist forced into 
being by the post-enlightenment rise of ‘genius’.
In order to understand the fruitful revision of architecture provided 
in Gadamer’s aesthetics, the following paper will examine the references 
made to architecture within a range of texts by Gadamer: The Artwork in 
Word and Image, On the Relevance of the Beautiful, The Philosophical Foundations 
of the Twentieth Century and his magnum opus: Truth and Method (Gadamer 
and Bernasconi 1986; Gadamer and Palmer 2007; Gadamer and Linge 
1977; Gadamer 2013.) This brief introduction to Gadamer’s architectural 
theory will be presented thematically, firstly to the role of the architectural 
work as playful interlocutor, and the vital role of play in the emergence of 
cultural critique. Following this, a brief examination of Gadamer’s com-
ments on the role of the architect in contrast to that of the artist will iden-
tify the rise of ‘artistic genius’ as an alienating force in our understanding 
of artistic and architectural practice. Gadamer’s redefinition of the archi-
tectural as necessarily decorative, will cite a crucial feature of the experience 
of architecture. Namely, that it ‘speaks’ to us through a twofold mediation, 
as both aesthetic object, and as the fitting scene for the commerce of our 
daily lives. This designation I argue, serves to reconcile the harsh division 
between building and architecture enforced by the Pevsnerian line, which 
arguably reduces  architecture to the following: ‘mere’ building + aesthetic 
intention= architecture (Pevsner 1948, xix). This understanding of the ar-
chitectural work as decorative will be deployed in a brief account of the 
Gaddamerian concept of festival and the event-like nature of understan-
ding. Though brief, it is hoped that this introduction will serve to indica-
te the significance of Gadamer’s approach to architecture as one which 
reconciles the aesthetic at work in building without alienating it from the 
commerce of our daily lives or forcing the assumption of a detached aes-
thetic regard in order to let it speak. In this sense architecture rehabilitates 
us into the community of historically effective consciousness to which we 
are necessarily members, and as such achieves a gentle rehabilitation that 
highlights the framing of our experience within the fragile temporality of 
existence.
2. Artwork as playful interlocutor
The dialogical structure at work in aesthetic experience and indeed all 
experiences within Gadamer’s hermeneutic system, places the emergence 
of meaning for the historically situated subject within the to and fro of 
question and answer. Artistic practice likewise becomes an interpretative 
act (although the reconstruction of artistic intention is of no relevance for 
Gadamer.)  Through the concept of play he rejects the impossibility of a 
Kantian ‘aesthetic consciousness’ characterised by disinterest as well as the 
validity of readings based on intentionality, arguing that such a stance al-
ways eludes the historically situated subject (since each subjectivity is held 
and sustained tradition, the position of objectivity proposed by Kantian 
and various romantic aestheticians necessarily inaccessible.) (Gadamer 
and Bernasconi 1986, 29) The play of question and answer engages the 
spectator in dialogue with the work, bringing about an extension of being 
and an uncovering of meaning such that each experience gives rise to a 
further question. In the play brought about by the artwork the spectator 
enters into a process of self-representation developed after Huizinga’s ac-
count of play as the origin of social ritual(Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986, 
23):
Primitive society performs its sacred rites, its sacrifices, consecration and 
mysteries, all of which serve to guarantee the well-being of the world, in a 
spirit of pure play truly understood. Now, in myth and ritual the great ins-
tinctive forces of civilized life have their origin: law and order, commerce 
and profit, craft and art, poetry, wisdom and science. All are rooted in the 
primeval soil of play. (Huizinga 1971, 5)
The participant belongs to the play in a way that the artist (or archi-
tect) belongs inseparably to their social context, or indeed the way in which 
partners in ‘genuine’ conversation belong to the process of question and 
answer. For Gadamer, each creative act should be the result of this praxis, 
an interpretive act in relation to the world-as-text. ‘To interpret [Gadamer 
states] means precisely to bring one’s own preconceptions into play so that 
the text’s meaning can really speak for us.’(Gadamer 2013, 415) 
For architecture, this entails an articulation of the aspirations of a 
given community. Play and festival as concepts underline the need for spa-
tial designation, for indeed for one to be ‘at’ play either of the immersive 
kind that Gadamer offers in the case of the art work or the more common 
formulations of the practice of play he gives as examples; a specific venue, 
domain or arena in which the play might take place is required. Archi-
tecture, whilst inviting the spectator into a ‘play’ of its own also performs 
the double function of establishing a ground from where the types of play 
instigated by other forms of art can be established. 
There are those that might cynically claim this process simply means 
the slow acceptance through sensuous experience of the ideas of a domi-
nant group. Certainly, the idea architecture preserves and sustains culture 
could give rise to concerns in this regard. As projects of scale and expense 
architectural works would suggest the preservation of the ideas of the most 
powerful or well-moneyed. Gadamer does not dispute the power of social 
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norms or that in the development language there may be a certain balance 
of power that is at play:
Fundamentally in our world the issue is always the same as it was in the be-
ginning: in language we are trained in conventions and social norms behind 
which there are always economic and hegemonic interests. But this is preci-
sely the world we as humans experience: in it we rely on the faculty of judge-
ment, that is, on the possibility of our taking a critical stance with regard to 
every convention. (Gadamer 2013, 573)
On the contrary, it is the awareness that we are always and already in 
this state of affairs that allows the emergence of criticality. What he says of 
authority is instructive here: ‘…..authority cannot actually be bestowed but 
is earned, and must be earned if one is to lay claim to it.’ (Gadamer 2013, 
291) If the work of architecture is the site of the self-understanding of a 
community, then it possesses a crucial role in bringing about critique of do-
minant ideas and affecting understanding between communities divided 
by time, distance or social contrast. In order to find or dispute common 
ground one must first understand the community in which they find them-
selves and their relation to the ideas dominant within it. 
3. Defining the Architect and the Architectural
Gadamer adopts open criteria for the designation of objects or items as: 
‘art’. He states in The Artwork in Word and Image:
In contrast to this, an artist, even if he or she uses a mechanical means of 
production, constructs something that is for itself and is there only to be 
contemplated. One allows an artwork to be exhibited or would like to see 
it exhibited, and that is all. And precisely then it is a work. (Gadamer and 
Palmer 2007, 202)
The proper reception of artwork, is contingent on the exhibition spa-
ce to create a fitting or situation in which the work of art to be encountered 
as such. Architecture on the other hand is not offered the same freedom. 
In a somewhat more prescriptive tone, Gadamer informs us that the work 
of the architect may not: ‘stand anywhere like a blot on the landscape’ as 
result of the myriad concerns it must arbitrate in order to truly bring truth 
to bear(Gadamer 2013, 156). The restoration of the public nature of all art 
in Gadamer’s Truth and Method, serves to reconcile the gulf between archi-
tects and other artists opened up through the post-enlightenment rise of 
genius. An alienation of the artist as genius had transformed him/her into 
an ‘ambiguous figure’ in Gadamer’s reckoning, with the result that:
today we feel that the architect is someone sui generis, because unlike the 
poet, painter or composer, he is not independent of commission and occa-
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sion. (Gadamer 2013, 80)
To our detriment we overlook the fact that most artistic production 
has historically been subject to the predilections of patrons and public bo-
dies. Far more than the simple historical fact of the need for commission 
in placing the artist as interpreter and viewer as the same at two ends of an 
elliptical process of emergent understanding, both the production of art 
and the reception of its becomes a matter of praxis. Gadamer’s refutation 
of aesthetic disinterest reunites the architect and the artist through the 
identification of the crucial processes of interpretation at the heart of the 
activities of both. Gadamer’s more astringent criterion in relation to the 
work of architecture relates closely to his contention that architecture is 
fundamentally decorative in its performance of a ‘twofold mediation’; at 
once a visually engaging schema, able like the work of art to ‘pull one up 
short’ but also fundamental in the creation of fitting environments that 
sustain a given culture and preserve its ethos. 
4. Rehabilitating Ornament
Central to Gadamer’s reading of architecture is a re-conceptualisation of 
ornament or decoration as a necessary element of architecture’s basic cha-
racter. In great works of architecture, it is the countenance of the whole 
building, inclusive of the scheme of decoration that bears forth its mea-
ning to the contemporary viewer. Decoration itself, is more than embellish-
ment, it retains a sense of propriety that resonates through the work as a 
whole. He writes:
On surveying the full extent of the architect’s decorative tasks, it is clear that 
architecture explodes that prejudice of the aesthetic consciousness accor-
ding to which the actual work of art is what is outside all space and all time, 
the object of an aesthetic experience. One also sees that the usual distinc-
tion between a work of art proper and mere decoration demands revision. 
(Gadamer 2013, 158)
A criticism not only of Hegel’s hierarchical Aesthetics, in which orna-
ment serves to usher in the demise of architecture and the rise of sculpture 
but something of a response to Loos’ pejorative use of the term, Gadamer 
firmly argues that architecture is, in its very nature, decorative. That is, that 
the architectural work provides a fitting backdrop to the activities of the 
given community for which it has been created. Decoration is thus rehabi-
litated as an element of the self-presentation of the architectural work and 
thus of the culture in which it is situated. In this sense he returns ornament 
to its original relation to the Greek Kosmos or the concept of komospoeisis 
the specific ordering of parts in respect of a harmonious whole; and the 
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later conception of fitting ornamentation in relation to the built whole 
recounted by Vitruvius:
The temples of Minerva, Mars, and Hercules, will be Doric, since the virile 
strength of these gods makes daintiness entirely inappropriate to their hou-
ses. In temples to Venus, Flora, Proserpine, Spring-Water, and the Nymphs, 
the Corinthian order will be found to have peculiar significance, because 
these are delicate divinities and so its rather slender outlines, its flowers, 
leaves, and ornamental volutes will lend propriety where it is due.(Vitruvius 
2014, 29)
The propriety of any given building rests for here on the use of a 
fitting mode of decoration in keeping with the characteristics of the diety 
to whom the temple had been erected. He applies the same principles 
to the construction of Florentine villas. Ruskin to cites the expectation of 
propriety as a characteristic ‘good’ buildings in The Stones of Venice(Ruskin 
1960). The position of ornament in relation to the built whole is analogous 
to the hermeneutic structuring of experience. Each experience points to 
a yet-to-be conceived whole, each moment of understanding gives rise to a 
new question, a Socratic wisdom whose depth of knowledge is wedded to a 
recognition of its own ignorance. The re-conceptualisation of the decorati-
ve in Gadamer’s aesthetics cements the belonging between all elements of 
building within a harmonious whole as well as presenting architecture as 
both an aesthetic object and vital element of the commerce of life.
5. Architecture as Occasion and Festival
Gadamer extends his concept of the event-like structure of understanding 
to the hermeneutic encounter with the work of art. Thus the work of ar-
chitecture when encountered draws the subject into its own temporality 
through a mediation of its rootedness in its own time and yet retains its ca-
pacity to remain contemporaneous. Even as they stand amid the changing 
built landscape around them, buildings possess a unique duality; belon-
ging profoundly to their own time and irrefutably to the present in which 
they stand. They are: ‘bourne along’ by the stream of history.(Gadamer 
2013, 156) The complex reality in which it was conceived remains a vital 
element of its being, although it can only be reconstructed in terms of the 
horizon of understanding possessed by successive viewers. The space-sha-
ping function of architecture means that it always and already embraces all 
other forms of representation displayed and consumed as art. Individual 
works of art must lay claim to space in their own right and their claim to 
a certain or ‘fitting’ space for an encounter between the and the viewer 
becomes an intrinsic element of the ontology of the work itself:
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This is why works of art can assume certain real functions and resist others: 
for instance, religious or secular, public or private ones. They are instituted 
and erected as memorials of reverence, honour or piety only because they 
themselves prescribe and help fashion this kind of functional context. They 
themselves lay their claim to place, and even if they are displaced- e.g., by 
being housed in a modern collection-the trace of their original purpose can-
not be effaced. It is part of their being because their being is presentation. 
(Gadamer 2013, 155)
As such, architecture possesses a ‘twofold mediation’. Where other 
works of art simply invite the viewer to tarry with them; architecture once 
having captured the attentions of the viewer is bound to redirect them 
‘to the greater whole of the life context which it accompanies.’ (Gada-
mer 2013, 157) In creating an appropriate setting for a given way of life, 
architecture ensures the potential of such experiences to be genuine and 
meaningful. Gadamer accounts for this capacity in the concept of the fes-
tival. Like play, the festival infers a goal-less intentionality. The festive in 
art works, like play, serves to suspend the day-to-day, allowing experience 
to unfold in the liminal space between spectator and work. Like archi-
tecture, the festival has an inherently public character performing a ga-
thering function in contrast to the individuation of ‘work-time’ or labour. 
(Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986, 41) The work of architecture, like the 
celebration, is an immersive experience. Indeed, Gadamer explains the 
power of ‘festive quiet’ in light of his experience of the national museum 
at Athens(Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986, 40).  
The festival possesses an ‘autonomous time’ and, like architecture, is 
fundamentally communal. The work of architecture expresses this time in 
its unique physicality. Unlike the other arts, Architecture consistently stan-
ds exposed to the unrelenting passing of time. In their submission to the 
ravages of time, the body of buildings undergo a kind of graceful ageing. 
Stone is worn away by rain and harsh weather conditions, users inscribe 
themselves into the given space. In the surrounding areas, new buildings 
spring up in the face of which the existing structure seems stylistically out 
of step, to embrace practices for which the old building is ill-equipped. Al-
though such a reading might be excessively anthropomorphic, it illustrates 
the applicability of Gadamer’s concept of ‘autonomous time’ to the aesthe-
tic encounter of architecture. We can extend his observation of our intuiti-
ve recognition of aging to our relationship with the built environment.(Ga-
damer and Bernasconi 1986, 42) Although we may not ‘know’ the specific 
completion date of a certain building in terms of objective time, we can 
recognize it as aged and worn. We can distinguish between architecture in 
its youth and in decline. Just as the individual cannot extricate themselves 
from their given historical context, and the ornament cannot be isolated 
from the architectural work at large, neither can the practices of life be 
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seen in isolation from the physicality of its setting. 
6. Ethics, Culture and Community
Culture possesses a fundamental role in hermeneutics. As a product of 
tradition, it is the means by which the historically effective consciousness 
situates itself within and against tradition. As physical artefact, architecture 
serves as a powerful reminder of the historical context from which sub-
jectivity cannot extricate itself. Gadamer follows Hegel in his definition of 
Bildung (culture) as an element of spirit. Gadamer argues that: ‘Keeping in 
mind, forgetting, and recalling belong to the historical constitution of man 
and are themselves part of his history and his bildung.’  An acute awareness 
of this becomes the mark of a ‘cultivated consciousness’. (Gadamer 2013, 
15-16) The concept of communion with a wider community of historical 
consciousness is intrinsic to the experience of all works of art despite the 
distancing effect of history or social division:
The essence of the beautiful is to have a certain standing in the public eye. 
This in turn implies a whole form of life that embraces all those artistic 
forms with which we embellish our environment, including decoration and 
architecture. If art shares anything with the festival, then it must transcend 
the limitations of any cultural definition of art, as well as the limitations asso-
ciated with its privileged cultural status. (Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986, 50)
Above, as with the festival, Gadamer firmly roots art within the deve-
lopment of a cultural consciousness that is in no way esoteric or associated 
with the good taste. Rather, culture is the sum total of a life-world. In de-
manding the attention of the viewer, the art work brings the viewer into its 
distinct temporality. In tarrying with architecture, one becomes a player or 
guest at the feast that is the festival of the work at work. 
As a means of designating space, architectural works put dwelling at 
issue. They provide a ground for the self-understanding of a given commu-
nity. As historically situated, any encounter with a work of architecture is an 
interpretation of ones belonging in the light of their own community and 
in the historical community of consciousness. It is this capacity of architec-
ture to provide a fruitful self-encounter that reunites art with the ethical 
and political life of a community. With the reference to the Greek concept 
Kalon, Gadamer strives for a reunion of the good and the beautiful. Ga-
damer presents music and architecture as prime examples of this kind of 
praxis, the only place where one ‘find[s] the art of getting it just right’ (Ga-
damer and Bernasconi 1986, 222) In reuniting art with a ‘good’ life in this 
way, Gadamer elevates it from the disinterest of an aesthetics of good taste 
or amusement to a vital position in the general health of a community:
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… one must admit that for the good life in general this art is needed “if one 
is simply to find one’s way home” (Gadamer and Palmer 2007, 222)
In his concept of community Gadamer infers a community across his-
tory, rather than of simple geographical or historical immediacy (he says 
of artists):
Nevertheless, he does create a community, and in principle, this truly uni-
versal community (oikumene) extends to the whole world. In fact, all artistic 
creation challenges each of us to listen to the language in which the work 
of art speaks and to make it our own. (Gadamer and Bernasconi 1986, 39)
It is this community that a Gaddamerian understanding of architec-
ture ushers its subjects into. One that recognizes the processes of chan-
ge across tradition, tests ideas through their articulation and experience 
through its repeatability.
Conclusion
Although such a brief paper cannot give a full account of the Gadame-
rian approach to architecture, it is hoped that the foregoing has served 
to provide an introduction to the deeper implications a hermeneutics of 
architecture has for the concept of belonging. As a form of art in which 
the creator (the architect) has never been displaced from their role within 
the concerns of their peculiar societal setting, architecture is the art par 
excellence in terms of the praxis Gadamer demands not only from the 
architect but from artists and viewers alike. The latent aspirations of a com-
munity must, Gadamer reminds us, be instantiated in order for their full 
comprehension. With proper understanding necessary for the conclusive 
refutation of such ideas, architecture is reunited with the ethos of the com-
munity, ethics re-joined with poetics. Spatial priorities and the implications 
of the decorative schema adopted in a given epoch therefore allow for 
such assumptions to be brought into question and for our unique position 
within a wider community of historically effective consciousness to be com-
prehended.
In a post-modern age where debates around the temporary and the 
virtual seem to dominate, Gadamer’s approach to architecture serves as a 
quite reminder to architect of the lasting significance of the built environ-
ment to our self-understanding and sense of belonging. As clients demand 
iconic buildings of their architects and architects themselves strive to crea-
te universally recognised ‘signature’ styles, a hermeneutic understanding 
can help to traverse such difficult debates between plurality and commu-
nality. The concept of architecture presented by Gadamer possesses sig-
nificance, not only to the communities of immediacy which we foster, but 
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the wider process of tradition and community of a historically unfolding 
culture from which we cannot stand apart.
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Abstract
“Bernard loved the valleys, Benedict the mountains; Francis the towns, Ignatius loved 
great cities”. According to Thomas M. Lucas SJ this is an old Jesuit proverb which, I 
think, clearly expresses the strong bond between the Society of Jesus and urban set-
tings. In fact, the establishment of most of its colleges followed a precise urban strategy. 
Thus, even though limited by numerous circumstances such as the patron and the in-
habitants’ wishes, the frequent reluctance of previously settled religious orders, and the 
urban layout, the Jesuits used to achieve significant locations inside the city walls. And 
this, along with the orientation, dimensions, configuration and iconographic elements 
of their façades, makes it evident that the Society carried out a quest for representative-
ness –or, from Evonne Levy’s perspective, “propaganda”– that is paradigmatic of the 
cultus externus promoted by the Counter Reformation. In other words, they strove to 
show their peculiar white wall/black hole to as many people as possible. Therefore, to 
consider aspects like the urban layout and its unfolding, viewpoints, transit dynamics, 
current and past functions of space, or toponymy can be very useful to better under-
stand Jesuit architecture. This paper aims to reflect on Jesuit urban strategy with a 
special focus on Galicia –in the Northwest of Spain– by using the wandering gaze of 
Michel de Certeau.
Keywords
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Location is the key
As Thomas M. Lucas SJ explains in his magnificent book Landmarking. City, 
Church & Jesuit Urban Strategy, location was of capital importance for the 
Society of Jesus’ establishments. Whereas the previously settled mendicant 
orders used to prefer the countryside, Jesuits realised from the beginning 
that cities were the ideal place to implement their particular project2. This, 
along with the rapid expansion of the Society from short after its founda-
tion in 1540, impelled Ignatius and his companions to quickly develop 
a precise strategy in order to get the best urban settlements all over the 
world. A strategy that, despite encountering constant obstacles3 generally 
led them to excel in fulfilling most of their desired features for urban lo-
cations (Lucas 1997, passim). Jesuit urban locations ought preferably to 
be: in downtown and as central as possible4; close to the main political, 
religious and social centres5; large enough6; and salubrious7 (Lucas 1997, 
135-137, 140-141, 151).
The example of the Gesù, the Society’s Mother Church, certainly 
worked as a model for other Jesuit establishments in many ways, also regar-
ding the siting. Located in the core of Rome, the complex of church and 
‘headquarters’ dominates a central area within the walls of the city, not far 
away from the Campidoglio and with its façade “oriented squarely onto the 
piazza that fronted the Via Papale”8 (Lucas 1997, 158). Similarly, Florence’s 
college is just a few steps from the duomo and right next to its powerful 
patrons’ palace, Palazzo Medici. And also the colleges of such distant and 
different places as Naples, Ferrara, Sienna, Palermo, Messina, Prague, Mi-
2.  In Father Lucas’ words, that of the Jesuits was “an aggressive, interactive urban ministry” quite 
different from the passivity of other orders (Lucas 1997, 36).
3.  As Father Lucas summarizes, Jesuits “invariably collided with the interests of other orders and 
other urban religious institutions” (Lucas 1997, 157).
4.  “Ignatius deliberately and strategically opted for downtown sitings of his most important works, 
both in Rome and elsewhere.” (Lucas 1997, 135). “Finding a convenient, central location […], 
what Ignatius called the commodo luogo, was a major concern from the beginnings of the Society. 
For Ignatius, the idea of commodity […] denoted aptness and convenience for the needs of the 
ministry.” (Lucas 1997, 136).
5.  “The ministerial proposito for a residence or professed house required certain “commodities”: 
[…] a convenient location that was easily accessible to large numbers of citizens; and a residence 
for the Fathers. Proximity to the local court was a decided advantage.” (Lucas 1997, 137).
6.  “Take special care that you obtain a good and sufficiently large site, or one that can be enlarged with time, 
large enough for house and church, and if possible, not too far removed from the conversation of the city”, 
Document  EpisIgn 3, 1899, dated June 13, 1551 (quoted in Lucas 1997, 140).
7.  “it is expedient that attention should be given to having houses and colleges in healthy locations with pure 
air and not in those characterized by the opposite.”, Constitutions, final paragraph (quoted in Lucas 1997, 
141).
8.  It was an explicit desire of Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, who promoted the works (Lucas 1997, 
157-158).
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lan, Vienna, Lisbon (Lucas 1997, 141, 150-151), or Porto, where the Jesuit 
college was built very close to the cathedral.
In Galicia, in the Northwest of Spain, the Jesuits settled four urban 
colleges. A central position was very much pursued for all of them, but 
not always possible. Pontevedra and Coruña colleges had to reluctantly 
accept sites on the edge of the wall, though in rather good locations inside 
it. Whilst Pontevedra’s college was next to a wall gate widely used by wine 
traders and not too far away from a grocery market, Coruña’s college was 
very close to the market and next to the only public fountain, exactly in 
the limit between the two main quarters of the city (Rivera Vázquez 1989, 
372-377, 404-405). On the other hand, Santiago’s college was settled in the 
place of a former Franciscan convent which was also next to the wall, but 
not too far from the cathedral and very close to some landmarks of the city 
such as a church which was key in its foundational legend or the place of a 
former Neolithic fortified settlement. Besides, an important weekly market 
was held at the square next to the college, so the site was a neuralgic point 
of city life (Rivera Vázquez 1989, 218-220). And finally, Ourense’s college 
was established in the city’s best location [Fig. 1], very close to the cathe-
dral and in the former Jewish Quarter, whose synagogue may have been 
very close to or even in the same place where the Jesuit church was built 
and still stands nowadays (Rivera Vázquez 1989, 345).
Fig. 1
Everyday life writing
In the essay “Walking in the City”, written by the French Jesuit and phi-
losopher Michel de Certeau, the Wandersmänner –unlike the idleness of 
Baudelaire’s flâneur and Rousseau’s promeneur9– are the busy inhabitants of 
the city, the ordinary people whose daily activities make them move cons-
tantly rewriting the urban layout. However, they are incapable of reading 
the whole writing because each of them is just a little part of it, a tiny piece 
that barely guesses the existence of other pieces (Certeau 1988, 93). And 
yet their walking discloses the city, it is to the urban system what the speech 
act is to a language. Walking is constructing the city as writing or speaking 
is materializing the language (Certeau 1988, 97-99); both actions have the 
power of turning something that belongs to an intellectual stratum into 
reality. Nevertheless, as Wittgenstein pointed out “the limits of my langua-
ge mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein 1922, 74), and therefore the 
limits of my city mean the limits of my walking. In other words, the pos-
sibilities are not infinite, they just stay hidden until speaking/writing –or 
walking– make them become real, allow them to temporarily exist10. For 
Roland Barthes, “The user of a city picks out certain fragments of the state-
ment in order to actualize them in secret.” (quoted in Certeau 1988, 98). 
Or, as Francesco Careri observes, “It is as if Time and History were updated 
again and again by ‘walking them’” (Careri 2004, 44-48).
At the same time, for de Certeau “To walk is to lack a place” (Certeau 
1988, 103), so using a place just as a transit space transforms it into the “non-
-place” formulated by Marc Augé (Augé 1992). Moreover, as the French Je-
suit clearly states, there is a rethoric of walking that, in my opinion, is always a 
Baroque one in everyday life. In de Certeau’s words, everyday life “practices 
of space also correspond to manipulations of basic elements of a constructed 
order”, “deviations relative to a sort of ‘literal meaning’ defined by the urba-
nistic system.” (Certeau 1988, 100). Everyday walking selects and fragments 
the space, transforming it into a “spatial phrasing” “composed of juxtaposed 
citations” as well as of “gaps, lapses, and allusions” through rhetorical opera-
tions (Certeau 1988, 102)11. Unlike the stillness of architectural landmarks, 
the restlessness of everyday life is constantly forcing the adaptation of the 
space to new functions. As in Lamarck’s theory, function creates space.
9.  A text about the multiple works which reflected on the art of walking can be found in the Span-
ish edition of one of these works, Die Spaziergänge by Karl Gottlob Schelle (López Silvestre 2013, 
165-182).
10.  For the architect Francesco Careri, member of the Stalker urban art workshop, “walking has 
always generated architecture and landscape” (Careri 2004, 13), and “It’s walking, too, which 
makes the internal frontiers of the city evident; which, by identifying it, reveals the zone” (Careri 
2004, 15).
11.  In a certain way, de Certeau’s comparison between walking and speaking reminds me of 
Barthes’ analysis of Ignatius of Loyola’s Ejercicios Espirituales (Barthes 1997, 51-92).
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Fig. 2
Baroque viewpoints
Furthermore, in Michel de Certeau’s text the act of looking has a petri-
fying quality which connects with that of the camera capturing the decisive 
moment; it places a period or full stop in the walking that instantly trans-
forms the city: “Its agitation is momentarily arrested by vision. The gigantic 
mass is immobilized before the eyes.”, he says (Certeau 1988, 91). That 
superior, half mystical-half voyeuristic eye, which in the Jesuit’s text looked 
down from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center (Certeau 1988, 91-
92), operates not very differently from the one that Baroque urbanism and 
architecture generate through framing and surprising effects.
The surrounding streets of Santiago’s Jesuit church give the walker a 
wide range of perspectives. The slightly crosswise façade appears gradually 
after crossing the only remaining city gate, just before the old marketplace; 
and its only tower is suddenly revealed around the corner of a house when 
arriving from a frontal narrow street12 [Fig. 2]. In Ourense, since the cur-
rent square in front of it was not opened until the 20th century, the façade 
was originally suffocated by the narrow street to which it is oriented, so its 
concavity was probably thought as an attraction tool. The whole façade, sli-
ghtly crosswise like that of Santiago, shows up unexpectedly when coming 
12.  In fact, other authors have dealt with Santiago’s Baroque viewpoints before (Martín González 1964). 
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from the city’s main square and arises overwhelmingly when looking up 
closely and frontally [Fig. 3].
The Baroque eye, half mystical-half voyeuristic just like de Certeau’s, 
operates upon the reality of the building making it become a kind of “still 
frame”, a static image, from very specific viewpoints.
Fig. 3
White wall/black hole
But actually it is not a mere static image. The façades of these churches are 
a brand, a face, the presentation card of the college to the city, its particu-
lar “white wall” in Deleuze and Guattari’s words (Ballantyne 2007, 64-79). 
Their orientation, dimensions, configuration and iconographic elements 
must therefore have been as wisely chosen as the location of the whole 
college13.
In regard to the orientation, in both Santiago’s and Coruña’s cases a 
flow of people would pass by or clearly see the façades in their way to the 
marketplace. Similarly, in Pontevedra the façade is oriented onto the street 
that leads into the wall gate near Santa Clara’s convent. And in Ourense 
the proximity of the cathedral surely determined the Jesuit church to be 
facing it, despite merely having an alley to connect both temples. In fact, 
13.  As Luce Giard emphasises, “Among the authorities there was a clear awareness of the impor-
tance of colleges to establish the public image of the Society of Jesus.” (Giard 2008, 5).
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the canonical orientation towards the east was hardly followed in all these 
examples. In Ourense and Coruña the church is orientated to the west, 
in Pontevedra to the north, and Santiago’s building follows the normative 
orientation, probably because that was also the most suitable one for the 
Jesuits’ purposes.
In their quest for representativeness –or “propaganda”, in Evonne 
Levy’s words (Levy 2004)–, the Society also managed to ensure a sort of 
alluring façade in every place of the world by cleverly combining Jesuit 
and local traits. Pontevedra’s façade, for instance, was designed after the 
prestigious model of the Gesù –until then scarcely used in the region– but 
with two typical Galician bell towers [Fig. 4]. Santiago’s and especially 
Ourense’s churches present strong Italian reminiscences because of their 
respectively rectangular and curved fronts, which make them distinctive. 
And even Coruña’s façade, closer to Galician architectural trends, seems to 
show a sort of structural connection with the Roman Gesù.
Finally, the presence of Jesuit emblems, its patrons’ coats of arms 
and a few places for sculptures of Jesuit or titular saints complete a repre-
sentativeness which is paradigmatic of the cultus externus promoted by the 
Counter Reformation in opposition to Protestant ideas (Repishti and Scho-
field 2004, 125-249). A carefully planned and captivating white wall that 
the Society strove to show to as many people as possible. That, no doubt, 
was the key of its success. The “still frame” of the white wall at which the 
inhabitants of the city stared when their restless everyday walking reached 
a period or full stop was, and is still, a powerful weapon.
Fig. 4
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Toponymy as memory
But the meaning of such a powerful weapon can change in a moment, and 
after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 a damnatio memoriae process was 
carried out by removing or replacing all of the Jesuit emblems and sculp-
tures from their façades.
For de Certeau, walking “is attracted and repelled by nominations 
whose meaning is not clear”, because “proper names carve out pockets of 
hidden and familiar meanings.” In other words, toponymy affects itinera-
ries by giving them a meaning that –generally according to a historical ba-
ckground– works as the “impetus of movements” (Certeau 1988, 103-104). 
Thus, these names have the power to make a place believable –and therefore 
habitable– by associating it to a word, memorable by recalling its past, and 
primitive by creating a sort of nowhere due to its conflict with today’s func-
tion of the place (Certeau 1988, 105). “The places people live in are like 
the presences of diverse absences” (Certeau 1988, 108) which toponymy 
barely evokes.
As many others, some Galician Jesuit buildings have left an evident 
trace in their surrounding toponymy. Thus, in Santiago an alley called 
“Tránsito dos Gramáticos” (Grammarians’ Passage) leads into the former 
Jesuit complex, and several streets surrounding Pontevedra’s college are 
named after two of its Jesuit inhabitants and one of its most outstanding 
students. However, the Society’s expulsion in 1767 changed the names of 
many nearby streets and squares along with the functions of the former 
Jesuit colleges. In Santiago there is a “University” street and square; in Ou-
rense, the narrow street to which the façade of the church is oriented was 
renamed “del Instituto” (Secondary School Street) in the 19th century be-
cause of the use of the building; and in Coruña, one of the nearest streets 
is nowadays called “San Agustín” (Saint Augustine), the order to which the 
building was given after the Jesuits’ departure. Sadly enough, however, the 
original names and functions of these streets and buildings, as well as the 
meaning behind the Jesuit related names are today unreadable for most 
Wandersmänner.
As father Lucas states, “Jesuits understood the urban equation.” (Lu-
cas 1997, 163), but in de Certeau’s words “Places are fragmentary and in-
ward-turning histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumula-
ted times that can be unfolded but like stories held in reserve, remaining 
in an enigmatic state” (Certeau 1988, 108).
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Abstract
Chaos is an extremely important concept throughout the work of Félix Guattari. Re-
lated both to deeply personal troubles and to epochal epistemological correlates in the 
context of post-structuralist discourse, we will describe its relationship with the concept 
of composition –one of the keys of his later aesthetic theory. In order to illustrate some 
of the concepts behind his epistemological proposals, we will comment some of his 
texts on Japanese architect Shin Takamatsu.
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1. Uneasy chaos1
Félix Guattari’s later work seems to give free reign to chaos, which was 
a consistent obsession of him. Certainly, almost any quote in Guattari’s 
texts from the eighties and up to 1992 shows some consistency with actual 
personal issues which he fought throughout his life, more so in those final 
years of “winter”. Dissolution, particularly, casts a shadow that was already 
impossible to ignore in his early work. In a way, the radical Lacanian “spee-
dy-Guatt” of the fifties is not that different from the aesthetics theoretician 
who wrote Chaosmose. If it was not for his continuous -if nor rather obses-
sive- enterprise of formalization, of constantly redefining his conceptual 
web through decades of constant rewriting and revisiting of texts, we could 
take the risk of forgetting that some of his original intentions, needs, and 
interests remained essentially the same, from the structure to the machine, 
from the machine to the rhizome, and still onto the final chaosmos.
However, probably the most important thing to acknowledge is to 
which extent all of his epistemological retracing was particularly in tune 
with the very core of Nietzschean post-structuralist discourse. Even though 
Guattari’s name is frequently erased from its pantheon, in terms of the His-
tory of Philosophy his work is probably the most revealing and informative 
in order to understand the changing flows of post-war French philosophy 
after the glorious success and -up to a point deceiving- fall of structuralist 
regimes, both in faculty departments and in Parliament.
The core of it all is chaos. Of course, this could lead us to a very old, 
and way too vague, confrontation between so-called Order and so-called 
Disorder. However, as simple as it may seem the fortune of chaos throu-
ghout the French philosophy of the sixties and up to the eighties -between 
the decline of pan-linguistics and the return of the already-quite-old nou-
veaux philosophes- reveals itself as a rather specific historical problem.
From a “merely” morphological point of view, which is possibly not 
the best way to call it, but probably one of the most suitable in order to 
open up such a question, chaos is not defined by its “disorder”, but by its 
velocity:
On définit le chaos moins par son désordre que par la vitesse infinie avec 
laquelle se dissipe toute forme qui s’y ébauche. C’est un vide qui n’est pas 
un néant, mais un virtuel, contenant toutes les particules possibles et tirant 
toutes les formes possibles qui surgissent pour disparaître aussitôt, sans con-
sistance ni référence, sans conséquence. C’est une vitesse infinie de naissan-
ce et d’évanouissement. (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 117-8).
The tone which Guattari and Deleuze are here using is rather ambi-
guous. Although it is not a negative depiction, there is a certain feeling of 
1.  I would like to thank Cristina R. Lesmes for her generous and useful comments.
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excess, of something which not only exceeds it all, but which is firstly cha-
racterized by its very aversion to control. There is a sort of dizziness in the 
face of the seemingly absolute powers of chaos, powers which at same time 
remain somehow attractive. Even in 1991 -the year of the publication of 
What is Philosophy?-, we still perceive -notably given the overall celebratory 
tone of the book- that certain unease which is always present throughout 
post-war French thought, whether in its neurotic -structuralist- or in its 
schizoid -68’s post-structuralism- manifestations, both on philosophy and 
the more general forms of culture.
Post-structuralists are often accused of speaking in riddles. Be that 
as it may (seem), they are in any case very historical ones, related to very 
real problems. In the case of chaos, it truly is everywhere. Certainly, chaos 
constantly appears in numerous Guattari’s papers, books, and diary en-
tries throughout his last years. At the same time, chaos is also omnipo-
tent in epistemological terms. However, chaos is neither chance nor mere 
formlessness. It is in fact the very Form which allows for the possibility of 
thinking to emerge. In a very general but also immediate way, dissolution 
is the main enemy of thought:
Nous demandons seulement un peu d’ordre pour nous protéger du chaos. 
Rien n’est plus douloureux, plus angoissant qu’une pensée qui s’échappe à 
elle-même, des idées qui fuient, qui disparaissent à peine ébauchées, déjà 
rongées par l’oubli ou précipitées dans d’autres que nous ne maîtrisons pas 
davantage. […] [I]l n’y aurait pas un peu d’ordre dans les idées s’il n’y eu 
avait aussi dans les choses ou état des choses, comme un anti-chaos objectif: 
‘Si le cinabre était tantôt rouge, tantôt noir, tantôt léger, tantôt lourd…’. 
(Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 201-2).
Again, the mixture of both truly personal and transversal historical 
issues is evident. The image of ideas “simply flying off”, that recurrent me-
nace to production itself -the molar word, the tendency towards reterrito-
rialization, the fear and rejection of the institutions which merely produce 
anti-production- is an everlasting topos in Guattari’s work. However, it is also 
true that this is a fundamental feature of the vaster epistemological cons-
tructions of post-structuralist discourse, particularly in aesthetics.
The inherent logic of such a discourse is simultaneously simple and 
ambiguous: In the same way as “chaotization” -that is, the continuous disso-
lution of any consistency- is both the opposite to what Philosophy and Art 
seek for, and, at the same time, their only possible beginning, déterritoriali-
sation is simply not possible without a reterritorialisation -and vice versa. The 
same is applicable to any molecular multiplicity that is truly far from molar 
groupings. It is not a matter of essences and/or structures, but of moments 
and becomings:
Le plan d’immanence est comme une coupe du chaos, et agit comme un cri-
ble. Ce qui caractérise le chaos, en effet, c’est moins l’absence de détermina-
tions que la vitesse infinie à laquelle elles s’ébauchent et s’évanouissent: ce 
n’est pas un mouvement de l’une à l’autre, mais au contraire l’impossibilité 
d’un rapport entre deux déterminations, puisque l’une n’apparaît pas sans 
que l’autre ait déjà disparu, et que l’une apparaît comme évanouissante 
quand l’autre disparaît comme ébauche. Le chaos n’est pas un état inerte ou 
stationnaire, ce n’est pas un mélange au hasard. Le chaos chaotise, et défait 
dans l’infini toute consistance. (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 46)2.
2. Composing a house
This plan d’immanence borrows from chaos the determinations that allow 
it to perform its infinite movements: “On peut, on doit dès lors supposer 
une multiplicité de plans, puisque aucun n’embrasserait tout le chaos sans 
y retomber, et que chacun ne retient que des mouvements qui se laissent 
plier ensemble” (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 53). “Nous ne le vaincrons qu’à 
ce prix”: In order to “déchirer le firmament”, we have to submerge our-
selves into chaos (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 202). What ties together the 
work of both philosophers and artists lies in composition, and is the very 
same element that allows Guattari and Deleuze to establish a fundamental 
distinction:
L’art lutte effectivemente avec le chaos, mais pour y faire surgir une vision 
qui l’illumine un instant, une Sensation.3 […] L’art n’est pas le chaos, mais 
une composition du chaos qui donne la vision ou sensation, si bien qu’il 
constitue un chaosmos, comme dit Joyce, un chaos composé –non pas prévu 
ni préconçu. L’art transforme la variabilité chaotique en variété  chaoïde, par 
exemple l’embrasement gris noir et vert du Greco; l’embrasement d’or de 
Turner ou l’embrasement rouge de Staël. L’art lutte avec le chaos, mais pour 
le rendre sensible, même à travers le personnage le plus charmant, le paysa-
ge le plus enchanté (Watteau). (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 204-5).
2.  It is always a question of chaos and the ways to confront it in order to produce: “Ce qui définit 
la pensée, les trois grandes formes de la pensée, l’art, la science et la philosophie, c’est toujours af-
fronter le chaos, tracer un plan, tirer un plan sur le chaos. Mais la philosophie veut sauver l’infini 
en lui donnant de la consistance: elle trace un plan d’immanence, qui porte à l’infini des événe-
ments ou concepts consistants, sous l’action de personnages conceptuels. La science au contraire 
renonce à l’infini pour gagner la référence: elle trace un plan de coordonnées seulement indé-
finies, qui définit chaque fois des états de choses, des fonctions ou propositions référentielles, 
sous l’action d’observateurs partiels. L’art veut créer du fini qui redonne l’infini: il trace un plan 
de composition, qui porte à son tour des monuments ou sensations composées, sous l’action de 
figures esthétiques.” (Guattari & Deleuze 1991, 198). 
3.  The examples that then follow are singularly interesting for us: “Même les maisons…: c’est du 
chaos que sortent les maison ivres de Soutine, heurtant d’un côté et d’autre, s’entrempêchant d’y 
retomber; et la maison de Monet surgit comme une fente à travers laquelle le chaos devient la 
vision des roses. Même l’incarnat le plus délicat s’ouvre sur le chaos, comme la chair sur l’écorché” 
(Guattari & Deleuze 1991, 204).
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As stated in a quote that is extremely revealing of Guattari’s attitude 
towards architecture: “Composition, composition, c’est la seule définition 
de l’art. La composition est esthétique, et ce qui n’est pas composé n’est 
pas une œuvre d’art” (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 192-3). If the artist is the 
composer of chaos -someone who is able to build something out of chaos-, 
then the primordial sense of architecture reveals itself: “L’art commence 
non pas avec la chair, mais avec la maison; ce pourquoi l’architecture est le 
premier des arts” (Guattari & Deleuze 2005, 187).
3. Shin Takamatsu and Japanese subjectivity
Taste is a strange companion to a philosopher’s work, and numerous rea-
sons explain why this is frequently the case. However, this is not what ha-
ppens with Guattari, an author who frequently delved into his pantheon 
as much as he did with his own work -always retuning, always looking for 
better arranged concepts-, and is frequently in his texts on Joyce and Kafka 
that we find the most interesting side of his work. This is also the case when 
it comes to his relationship with Japan, a country to which he repeatedly 
travelled to, and about whose culture and arts wrote several texts.
From a historiographical point of view, his theories on Japanese archi-
tecture are not always consistent or systematic, nor should we read those 
texts as if those were his intentions. The history of contemporary Japane-
se architecture is, as simplified as it may sound, the history of its detach-
ment from the International Style, a movement initiated by Kenzo Tange4 
and Arata Isozaki5. Guattari is mainly interested in the then so-called “new 
wave”. Even though this is a label whose arbitrariness is acknowledged by 
Guattari himself, he prefers it to the “imprudence” of placing those archi-
tects under the umbrella of post-modernism, given that the Japanese “new 
wave” “échappe heureusement à l’opportunisme superficiel et éclectique 
que recouvre généralement cette qualification aux Etats-Unis et en Euro-
pe” (Guattari 1994, 4). 
In Guattari’s words, if there is a link between the authors frequen-
4.  “Dans les années 60, Kenzo Tange opéra une rupture radicale avec les aspects simplistes du 
fonctionnalisme international par la fondation d’un mouvement structuraliste dans l’architecture 
et l’urbanisme japonais. En contrepoint de ce structuralisme, qui mettait l’accent sur la com-
plexité des aspects relationnels propres aux espaces architecturaux, se développa un courant se 
dénommant « métaboliste » qui, de son côté, s’efforçait d’adapter la nouvelle industrialisation du 
bâtiment aux besoins humains, en particulier en édifiant des agglomérats de capsules modulaires. 
Dans le même souci de prise en compte des spécificités sociétales, individuelles et culturelles, les 
métabolistes furent également très préoccupés de composer des formes évoquant les construc-
tions japonaises traditionnelles ou s’y rattachant indirectement.” (Guattari 1994, 4).
5.  “Isozaki, qui fut l’élève de Kenzo Tange, s’efforça de dégager radicalement l’architecture japo-
naise de son classicisme moderniste, pour laisser libre cours à une créativité symboliste et manié-
riste, confinant quelquefois au surréalisme.” (Guattari 1994, 4).
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tly thus labelled is their processualisme, a surprisingly vague term that here 
stands for nothing more than the fact that those architects “échappent 
aux modélisations préétablies par des écoles ou des courants”. The impor-
tant thing, however, is that they were trying, so says Guattari, to step out 
of functionalist guidance, context dependency and, even, “any humanist 
reference” (Guattari 1994, 4). However, he is mainly interested in what he 
calls “creative becomings” of those architects: 
Un “devenir enfant” (par exemple, chez Takefumi Aïda, Kazuhiro lshii, Mi-
noru Takeyama), soit à travers des constructions directement à destination 
des enfants, soit s’inspirant indirectement d’une vision enfantine. Un ‘de-
venir végétal’, par exemple chez Mayumi Miyawaki, qui a construit à Tokyo 
sa Boîte bleue, enserrant totalement la cime de quelques grands arbres, ou 
chez Kijo Rokkaku, avec sa Maison aux trois racines, où des troncs d’arbres 
et une partie de leurs racines émergent, à l’état brut en haut d’une façade 
de ciment. D’une façon plus générale, on retrouvera, chez la plupart des 
architectes de cette nouvelle vague, l’utilisation d’éléments boisés à titre de 
symbole de la nature. Un “devenir animal”, explicitement revendiqué par 
le Team Zoo de l’université de Waseda à Tokyo, influencé par Takamasa 
Yoshizaka, et qui a réalisé, par exemple, le Domo Celakanto, édifice construit 
comme un mystérieux monstre marin. Il conviendrait également d’évoquer 
un “devenir abstrait” chez Tadao Ando qui parle de “catabolisme du paysa-
ge”, un “devenir Nirvana” chez Aida, une politique du vide et de la lumière 
chez Toyo Ito, un “devenir non-objet” chez Hiromi Fujii et chez Shinohara, 
dont le conceptualisme voudrait ramener l’architecture à son degré mini-
mal, Mozuna, de son côté, étant parti à la recherche d’un principe “anti-
-résidence”… (Guattari 1994, 5).
However, Guattari’s interests are elsewhere, invested in the becoming-
-machinic -“devenir machine”- of Shin Takamatsu, one of the architects 
about whom he has more eloquently spoken. Leaving aside the beautiful 
imagery used by Guattari -Takamatsu’s buildings as a Buto dancer6- and 
his arguable historical appreciations -his statement that Takamatsu rejects 
any idea of “style”7-, the core of Guattari’s exposition is that Takamatsu is 
6.  “Quel type de rapport entretient donc ce créateur avec le contexte urbain au sein duquel il 
travaille ? Rappelons que deux positions s’affrontent classiquement pour aborder ce genre de 
question, d’ailleurs sujette à d’interminables controverses. Il y a ceux qui, à la manière de Le 
Corbusier, prennent en compte le contexte de telle sorte que la gestion de la forme instaure 
l’objet architectural dans un rapport de continuité avec le tissu urbain. Et il y a ceux qui, à la ma-
nière de Mies van der Rohe, détachent l’œuvre du milieu  ambiant de façon à ce qu’elle prenne 
un caractère d’objet structurant l’organisation d’une forme. Mais peut-être que l’architecture 
de la nouvelle vague japonaise et, tout spécialement, celle de Shin Takamatsu nous conduisent à 
une troisième position possible telle que l’œuvre se trouve à la fois parachevée en tant qu’objet 
esthétique et totalement ouverte au contexte. Cela m’évoque la position d’un danseur Buto, tel 
que Min Tanaka, totalement replié sur son corps et, cependant, hypersensible à toute perception 
émanant de l’environnement.” (Guattari 1994, 7).
7.  “Et en cela nous restons encore sur le terrain de Shin Takamatsu dont l’un des principaux 
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a builder of machines, and those machines are “processuelles et resingu-
larisantes”: in Guattari’s eyes, they reinvent Japanese subjectivity (Guattari 
1994, 9). These machines being machines in the strict sense of the word 
constantly operate coupures, opening up new universes of reference which 
allow for the potential emergence of new territories and new agencements 
collectifs d’énonciation. 
Even though the objective is always the same -“parvenir à ce que 
l’édifice devienne sujet non humain, capable d’œuvrer de concert avec 
des segments de subjectivité humaine individuelle et collective” (Guattari 
1994, 9)-, Takamatsu’s becoming-machinic manifests itself through a varie-
ty of methods: symmetry breaks -Kitayama Ining 23, Kyoto, 1987-, interlo-
cking of decentred forms -Kido Clinic, Kyoto, 1978-, horizontal and vertical 
fissures -Yamamoto Atelier, Kyoto, 1978; Koboko Lighting Showroom, Kyo-
to, 1978-, or, most important, the game of scopic structures, be it cyclopean 
eyes -Miyahara House, Kyoto, 1982-, superimposed eyes -Pharaoh, Kyoto, 
1984-, or “machinic” eyes -ARK, Kyoto, 1983- (Guattari 1994, 10-3). Within 
such architectural machines, Takamatsu is somehow playing with chaos, 
forcing that very Form to multiply itself, to proliferate, and thus trace new 
plans for the city’s subjectivity.
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impératifs est de refuser toute idée de style parce qu’il entend ne jamais faire deux fois la même 
chose, ne jamais livrer la même bataille avec la ville et n’appréhender l’histoire qu’à partir de son 
propre message.” (Guattari 1994, 7).
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Abstract
This paper argues that vegetation can be used as a tool in the struggle by the weaker 
against the stronger. I do not mean the art of camouflage, nor a return to a primi-
tive state; rather, I mean that vegetation can be used as a subordinate weapon for the 
preservation of autonomy. In this case, vegetation is neither a planning tool or a man-
agement tool; it offers a possibility to escape from the colonial grid and to disappear. 
Vegetation has also been used to create the conditions to live different and autono-
mous lives apart from state authorities, as James Scott describes it in his book The Art 
of not Being Governed. Vegetation was often used as a political agent in asymmetrical or 
revolutionary wars, during decolonizing process, as theorized by Mao Tse-Tung and Ho 
Chi Minh. I will use the Viet Minh Guerrilla during the first Vietnam conflict as a case 
study to explore these and related issues. From a theoretical point of view, I argue that 
the use of vegetation contributed to the reconstruction of another modernity, upturn-
ing the conceptualization of culture as a key point of reference for modern society. In 
the case of the Viet Minh, Nature replaced Culture to form a new agency that was able 
to destroy a modernity construct based on infrastructure and total territorial planning. 
Nature was defined as the new point of departure instead of culture, and helped to 
form a revolutionary society.
Keywords
Modernity; culture; nature; vegetation; guerrilla
Philippe Zourgane106
This paper purposes to analyze the relation between territorial planning 
and theory. Field work has presented territorial planning as a technique 
and an action against a pre-existing reality.  But it can be seen as well as a 
theoretical activity, that is to say as an action which is part of an ideological 
set of tools to organize territory for a state administration.
Culture, Nature and Modernity seen from Europe
From the beginning of colonial conquest, the colonial subject is supposed 
to be a savage. In the late nineteenth century Social-Darwinism played a 
crucial role in arguing scientifically that African, Asian, Indian were all 
beneath the European race in terms of racial classification.
Culture has always been considered as a concept born inside the city 
during the Greek civilization. It was a value and a heritage circumscribed 
inside the city for centuries. There was a direct link in European cultu-
re between civilization, culture and city, which was pushed ahead by the 
colonial system. The essence of the the colonial subject became insepa-
rable from civilizing the savage. Nature was defined from the beginning 
in opposition to culture. Marcus Colchester’s definition is fairly precise: 
“In ancient Greece, untamed nature was perceived as the domain of wild, 
irrational, female forces that contrasted with the rational culture ordered 
by males. In this world view, not only was nature a dangerous threat to the 
city state, but the wilderness beyond was peopled by barbarians, the epito-
me of whom were the Amazons — long haired, naked, female savages who 
represented the antithesis of Greek civilization”.1
Colonization established a direct link between culture, civilization, 
and the city. Considered as a savage, the colonized is put outside the civili-
zation. Its uncivilized figure clearly refers to nature as its unique domain. 
We must have in mind that in English, “savages”, which is a word that comes 
from the French word “sauvage” and the Spanish “salvaje,” which signifying 
“forest inhabitant.” Civilizing the savage could be considered as bringing 
the city to the savages. This is one of the tasks of the civilizing mission of 
colonization.
The myth that the city in the colonial space was the colonizer’s cons-
truction is still very present in our contemporary society. Catherine Co-
query Gondrovitch, who specifically studied African Urban History, de-
monstrates that colonizer importance in urbanizing was not as important 
as was previously supposed. It is interesting here to note a long passage that 
describes what I mean precisely “The decisive supposed role of the wes-
tern initiative: the colonizers would have created their cities, often ports, 
either strategic implanted knots ex-nihilo or, from thin villages at the heart 
1. Colchester 1994, 11.
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of a zone to be conquered and to be exploited. Certainly it was exact. But 
very partially. Most of the time, Europeans community, only a few number 
of people were worried about a fast efficiency. They especially used the 
existing centres. But they selected, among the African villages, those who 
would become in turn the centre of their power.”2
Let us have a look at the etymology of Metropolis. Metropolis is a 
Greek word, coming from μήτηρ, or mḗtēr, which means “mother” and πόλις, 
or pólis, meaning “city” or “town.” In the antiquity, Greek colonies refer-
red to their mother cities as their Metropolis. The subjection link between 
these two territories was established in the beginning. The use and abuse 
of  Metropolis and Metropolitan in the colonial context functioned as the 
marker of the active domination of the western world on the non-western. 
Whatever the domain of excellence, “the one relationship that does chan-
ge is the hierarchical one between the metropole and overseas generally.”3
This domination was not only political and economical. It was acti-
vated in the remodeling of the colonial cities in Africa (Dakar, Johannes-
burg, Dar-es-Salaam) and in Asia (Delhi, Saigon, Shanghai). City reshaping 
was conceived as the insertion inside the existing urban fabric of landmark 
buildings. Architecture and urbanism were used to inscribe these Euro-
pean cultural fragments in the metropole. European architecture was used 
both to materialize the inferiority of other cultures (African, Indian or 
Asian) and to materialize the colonizer power. Territorial planning, as well 
as infrastructure construction overseas, has to be seen as part of the Euro-
pean project; it sits in a strict relation with modernity as a global project. 
It was the construction of a mobility network that made for trading policy, 
displays of force abroad, and the aesthetic representation of the European 
power.
Modernity is seen in Europe as the foundation of the state nation 
system, and social democracy is linked in a strict relation with the age of 
Enlightenment. Modernity can be seen as a set of facts that established 
the European power over overseas territories. From the beginning, it was 
a concept applied worldwide. Negri and Hardt define modern sovereignty 
as a concept organizing “European domination both inside and outside its 
border. There are two coextensive and complementary faces of one cohe-
rent action: power in Europe and Europe’s power over the world.”4
2. “Le rôle supposé décisif de l’initiative occidentale : les colonisateurs auraient créé leurs villes, 
souvent des ports, ou bien des noeuds stratégiques implantés ex-nihilo ou, au mieux à partir de 
maigres villages au coeur d’une zone à conquérir et à exploiter. Certes ce fut exact. Mais trés parti-
ellement. La plupart du temps, les Européens peu nombreux et soucieux d’une efficacité rapide, 
ont surtout utilisé les centres existants. Mais ils ont tout au plus sélectionné, parmi les bourgades 
africaines, celles qui deviendraient à leur tour le centre de leur pouvoir.” Coquery Gondrovitch 
1993, 329.
3. Said 1994, 106.
4. Negri and Hardt 2000, 103.
In his book The Art of Not Being Governed, James Scott in two different 
chapters decodes the territory organization, first through total territorial 
state planning and then through an anti-total territorial state planning. He 
focuses on the transportation system, agriculture and village settlement. 
However, I would like here to put forward  the intellectual goal of territo-
rial planning as prescribed by James Scott in two very different  ways.
In chapter two, “State Space” Scott asks us to:
Imagine for a moment, that you are a  Southeast Asian counterpart of Jean-
-Baptiste Colbert, chief minister to Louis XIV. You, like Colbert, are charged 
with designing the prosperity of the kingdom. The setting, like that of the 
seventeenth century, is premodern: overland travel is by foot, cart and draft 
animals, while water transportation is by sail. Let us finally imagine that, 
unlike Colbert, you begin with a blank state. You are free to conjure up an 
ecology, an demography, and a geography that would be most favorable to 
the state and its ruler. What, in those circumstances, would you design?5
In chapter six, “State Evasion, State Prevention,” Scott asks us to:
Imagine, once again, that you are a Southeast Asian counterpart of Jean-
-Baptiste Colbert. This time, however, your task is not to design an ideal state 
space of appropriation but, rather, the precise opposite. How would you go 
about designing a topography, a subsistence strategy, and a social culture 
that was as resistant to sate formation and appropriation as possible ?6
The territory outside the city, and especially the agricultural space, 
was considered as the first space of capital accumulation from Greek ci-
vilization to nineteenth-century European colonization. Appropriation of 
new state space is strictly linked to the visibility of the whole agricultural 
space and its workers and owners. What is planted, what is harvested, whe-
re it is stocked, and how much it is sold for are the important questions for 
the state administration. By contrast, a space that doesn’t allow appropria-
tion as state space should be a space with low visibility, with cultivated lands 
not visible, even to the trained  eye.
Construction or deconstruction of the appropriated state space is 
linked to visibility as a major factor of space organization. Analyzing the 
politics of vegetation in relation to agriculture, natural spaces, and conser-
vation is a way to investigate the politics of space, as well as the regime of 
governance of the territory itself.
Plant life is central in the development of modern operational spatial 
framework. To focus on plant life is to juxtapose several scales. The micro-
-scale of plant life includes botany and economy, while the macro-scale 
includes vegetation and cultivation; lastly, the territorial scale includes ter-
5. Scott 2009, 40.
6. Scott 2009, 178.
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ritorial planning and infrastructures.
Plant life has been a subject of study and contemplation for botanists, 
a source of wealth via spices or coffee, a field of production for the agri-
cultural plantations, and an exotic subject for travel tales. During the 17th 
and 18th century, vegetation had a central position in the whole Western 
society. Its power was enhanced: the plants analyzed by botanists, drawn 
by naturalists, and acclimatized in the botanical gardens were modified to 
be more robust and productive. For this reason, from the very beginning, 
plants were fundamental to the creation of colonial space. It is well-known 
that flows of capital, maritime industry and market capitalization were or-
chestrated around plants. But we can also say that the colonial territory 
was structured at the service of plants. There is a reversal of the rules of 
the game here: the cultivated areas are ordering the whole territory, even 
the city. To that extent, plant life has a certain autonomous agency, the 
major/minor relationship between built and non-built space is inverted. 
Linking this inversion to the economic, financial, and political conditions 
of colonialism and post-colonialism allows us to re-read these territories in 
a different way, for their planning and their iconic architectures. To treat 
vegetation–plant life–as a political agent enables us to foreground the ways 
in which vegetation orders social and economic relations. It is an ordering 
agent of the colonial and postcolonial territory, of agricultural planning, 
and of urban space.
I use the word vegetation as it was defined by Buffon in 1749, where 
“all the plants inside a defined area” constitute an areas vegetation7. There 
is a strict relation between market, empire, and plant life. The key role 
assigned to plant life in the colonial system is what I am defining as “vege-
tation as a political agent.”
During the same period of time, vegetation was also used in another 
way, that is, to struggle against the colonizer by people, or in the decolo-
nizing process. If vegetation has been a tool employed in the struggle by 
the weaker against the stronger, it was because it was seen also by natives, 
slaves, or oppressed people as a weapon in itself. I do not refer here only 
to the art of camouflage, nor to a return to a primitive state; rather, vegeta-
tion is used as a subordinate weapon for the preservation of autonomy. In 
that case, Vegetation is not a planning tool or a management tool. Vegeta-
tion offers a possibility to escape from the colonial grid and to disappear.
Culture, Nature and Modernity seen from the Global South
Vegetation was often used as a political agent in asymmetrical or revolu-
tionary wars, during the decolonizing process, as theorized by Mao Tse-
7. «Ensemble des plantes d’un endroit.» Buffon, 33.
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-Tung and Ho Chi Minh. It was a very powerful weapon throughout the 
Vietnam’s war, and more specifically during its first phase, the Indochina 
War (1945-1954). I will focus in this section on describing guerrilla action, 
and the subjection link that exists between the spaces of organization put 
in place by vegetation, on the one hand, and the way this specific natural 
space was used to reinvent different human activities, on the other.8  The 
use of vegetation as a political agent in war time could be considered as a 
mass weapon in itself.
First, we have to revisit the concepts of culture and nature concepts 
and as redefined them through by independence movements in the for-
ties1940s. The redefinition of these concepts works at the same time, at 
both a very pragmatic level and at a theoretical level.
It was a matter of fact that many guerrilla movements had to first gain 
to their cause the large part of the rural community for then to be able to 
attack urban areas. Their progression into the city space was risky, as it was 
the space of colonial representation with the presence of an important 
concentration of the legal army, the presence of the colonial  administra-
tion, and of the European community. These guerrilla movements develo-
ped themselves for strategic reasons, but also for ideological reasons in the 
countryside, in the natural space, and in the natural environment to then 
progress to the city space.
The strategic reasons of this location in the natural, rural environ-
ment are military. For instance, it allows them to be at a long distance 
from the different sites where legal armies are stationed. This is not the 
only argument in favor of the natural environment as a source of guerri-
lla planning, and particularly wild nature, but the ideological reasons are 
much more complex. Partially, we have to refer ourselves to culture; it was 
a place to find the local culture, itself untouched by colonial assimilation. 
Wild nature was a place to reinvent the local culture away from the colo-
nial administration. The new local culture, under development there, had 
to compete the universal culture imposed by the colonizer. This nature, 
untouched by urban civilization, was clearly seen as a place untouched or 
sidelined by colonial administration (except for plantations). Two cultures 
were in opposition, one within a minor c, the local millenary Vietnamese 
culture,  in this particular case and the other one within a major C, the 
European one, imported by the colonizer. The European culture was re-
presenting progress in the technical fields (scientific, medical, etc. …) and 
imposed its civilizing mission.
The local culture found, at this time, the place to reinvent itself in 
the countryside with the peasants, or in the remaining wild spaces (forests, 
8. The word vegetation is defining both “natural spaces” not constrained by human actions such 
as forests, mountains, etc. and “artificial natural spaces” such as fields, pastures, planted forests or 
largely transformed by human actions.
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swamps, mountains, and so on …). The natural environment is seen as the 
only jewel box for the new rising power, a place of legitimacy to reconquest 
the ancient link with the territory itself and its inhabitants. Nature was used 
to reinvent links with topography, history, and local culture, but also pea-
sants, fields works, and crafts. The Viet Minh used nature, and especially 
vegetation as a source of power. It was a military and a political movement 
that was conquering the territory, transforming it from the natural space 
to the urban space. It was using nature as a weapon  in se. The Viet Minh 
were are fighting Modernity as a European project supporting European 
Imperialism, which that was put into crisis by these guerrilla movements.
The Viet Minh guerrilla begun its conquest in the countryside where 
it found large support from peasants. To win the territory from countrysi-
de to the city was seen at the same time as both a cultural movement and 
a political movement. Reintroducing the local culture, here Vietnamese, 
as secular, as noble and vital, was an ideological way to introduce other 
values far away from the occidental ones. We have to remind ourselves 
that assimilation has always been the only organized policy in the French 
colonial space. Culture has been underestimated in many national libe-
ration struggle. Amilcar Cabral, in a text titled “Le rôle de la culture dans la 
lutte pour l’indépendance” written for a UNESCO meeting in 1972 in Paris, 
argued “that culture is a method of group mobilization, even a weapon in 
the fight for the independence.”9 References to the peasant works are very 
present in manifestos texts from Mao Tse-Tung, Amilcar Cabral, or Ernes-
to Che Guevara, and there are also many important theoreticians such as 
Pierre Bourdieu, Andre Gunther Frank and Giovanni Arrighi that worked 
on peasants labour, struggles and education in the sixties. This important 
corpus linked politicians, agriculture labour forces, and theoreticians in 
the southern countries.
The General Vo Nguyen Giap book’s People’s War – People’s Army, was 
prefaced in the 1964’s Cuban edition by Ernesto Che Guevara. It was seen 
for both of them as a political book to propagate revolution in the Third 
World and also as a means to form a new group of southern countries, 
with a new ideology along the non-aligned movement. Guevara points out 
that: “Vietnam has peculiar characteristics: [it is] a very ancient civilization, 
[with] a long history as independent kingdom having its own specificities 
and its own culture. Compared to its thousand-year-old history, the epi-
sode of the French colonialism is only a drop of water.”10 Its intellectual 
9. “la culture est une méthode de mobilisation de groupe, voire une arme dans la lutte pour 
l’indépendance.”Cabral 2013, 70.
10. “Le Vietnam a des caractéristiques particuliéres : une très ancienne civilisation, une longue 
histoire en tant que royaume indépendant ayant ses spécificités et une culture propre. En regard 
de son histoire millénaire, l’épisode du colonialisme français n’est qu’une goutte d’eau.“Che Gue-
vara 2006, 91.
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independence is acquired through culture and the civilization preexisting 
revolution, rebellion, or guerrilla actions. Culture is replaced as an act of 
resistance, but also as a mass weapon.
On the one hand, urban space at this particular moment was seen 
only as a place of oppression and assimilation supervised by the colonizer. 
On the other hand, rural space was seen as a space of freedom, which kept 
its secular roots and history. From the dense forest or countryside to the 
city space, it was a collective human experience that was conducted from 
nature to culture by guerrilla movements. A collective and collaborative 
experience proposed an alternate relationship with nature, not a second-
-zone citizenship for peasants. Culture was not seen anymore as the one 
with a major C, defined in Europe and imposed in the colonial space. It 
was precisely this that was part of the urban colonial experience, operated 
by local bourgeoisie and European bourgeoisie as unique social class. This 
decolonizing process ideologically put in place, using culture as a mass 
weapon, was precisely inverting the way European colonization program-
med the colonial territory. If European colonization was based on agricul-
ture exploitation, it found its representation, its strength, its power and its 
local staff (or European community) in the city centre that was designed 
in total reference to the metropole.
During the whole Vietnamese war (1945-1975) thousands of soldiers 
and logistic workers traveled across the country without using established 
infrastructures. Instead, they were using pathways that were allowing them 
to avoid detection by the French occupiers. In this way they invented a new 
map. As we’ve already seen, this new mapping of the territory was inver-
ting the relationship between city and countryside. The guerrillas created 
a new territory built from nature (the countryside) toward culture (the 
city).  Airports, ports, and roads were seen as the symbol of power, a power 
to see from the air, space and sea using new technology. Destruction of 
pre-existing infrastructures is a very basic action in any war period. Cut-
ting fluxes (logistics fluxes, soldiers fluxes, as well as information fluxes) 
is oftentimes a key in winning important battles. During the decolonizing 
war period after World War II, these infrastructures were supporting the 
colonizer power. Movement, speed, and intensity were the army obsessions 
to obtain the quick deployment of patrols, to pacify any place in the colony. 
Infrastructures were seen as a key point in the battle also because they were 
vectors to distribute the flux of weapons made in Europe and the United 
States. There were the symbol of the unlimited power of the Occident. 
That is the reason why each infrastructure was seen as a support systems 
for capitalism and imperialism. No infrastructure was a leitmotiv in this 
asymmetrical war. Thus this strategy was pragmatic as well as ideological.
Relying on photograms extracted from the film Chiến thắng Tây Bắc’ 
(The victory of the North West) shot in 1952 by the military forces in the 
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Viet Minh zone, during the war against French occupation to support the 
conquest, one can see that these archive images demonstrate a form of 
counter-planning of the land that allows topography (plains and moun-
tains), geography and the ecosystem (the forest or the savannah) to be 
used as a weapon. These images are depict the strength of the soldiers who 
are becoming one with their own territory. These three photograms discus-
sed below are extracted from this propaganda film.
The first photogram (TC 00 29-37 B) shows a group of soldiers walking 
in the countryside. Disappearance is at work here as a concept. The first 
report is on the art of camouflage: to disappear in the natural environment 
is theorized as a guerrilla technique, when facing a stronger enemy. The 
meaning of the motto, the guerrilla is in the countryside is as a fish in the 
water, should be obvious.
Vegetation is used as an anticolonial weapon. It allows the magic to 
operate: as a magician the guerrilla is able to disappear and reappear el-
sewhere. Another nature definition is at work, a nature that was used not 
to order, and not to discipline as in the colonial project. This time nature 
is used to protect oneself, to hide oneself, to disappear, to reappear so-
mewhere else, and to disappear again if necessary.
It seems to be a scene (TC 00 30 29 B) in the nature with soldiers, 
walking or waiting for something. In fact there is no movement, everything 
is frozen. Troops are having their lunch on the pathway. They just stopped 
in the middle of their traveling. They are eating their lunch of white rice, 
with their bare-hands. There is no need to get out from the natural en-
vironment. The picturesque is very present in this photogram, as it is a 
very odd setting. The disconnection of genre, between the environment 
and the action, should catch our attention. A new community is created, 
linking the human figure and nature without hierarchy. Behind this ima-
ge, there is also the crucial collaborative work made with peasants. Giap 
pointed out that: “Our army always organized days of assistance to the far-
mers in the field works, in the fight against the flood or the drought. It 
always observed a correct attitude in its relations with the people. Never it 
struck a blow at its properties, were it only a needle or an end of thread.”11 
11. “Notre arme a toujours organisé des journées d’aide aux paysans dans les travaux de pro-
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So the unity with the vegetation and landscape is a reality in the muscle of 
each soldier who also became for some periods of time a field worker.
The last photogram (TC 00 26 53 B) presents a multitude of humans 
(men and women) crossing a river with rafts made of bamboos. Different 
characters cross the river not in a line ; rather, it’s more like a fluxed form. 
Disorder is exploited as a tactic here. There is a mimesis with the nature 
development process.
Bamboo rafts were used to cross rivers, swimmers produced the ener-
gy to move the raft from one bank to another. This basic technique for 
crossing river was used only in the first part of the war. New equipment 
replaced it such as invisible bridges made from bamboo and positioned 10 
centimetres under the surface of the water, which allowed them to escape 
the enemy’s bombardment. What stands out in these peculiar inventions is 
the use of vegetation to support the resistance effort. Here, in this specific 
situation, there is the very clear idea to be one with nature. The human 
being is becoming again an animal, he is renaturalising itself.
The use of low technology was also for ideological reasons. Low tech-
nology was considered a condition for a guerrilla to fight a greater enemy. 
In this asymmetrical war: topography, rivers, and mountains became im-
portant tools and potential weapons to defeat the colonizer. French troops 
that did not know the territory used only the existing infrastructure to 
move. So it was easy to preview their movements and neutralize some parts 
of them during these operations. Guerrillas used to have a perfect know-
ledge of the territory. They used forests, fields, and mountains like they 
were gardens, and moved without being visible.
The route de la Cordillére was the most important road that fed the 
front during the Vietnamese war. The route was vital for the conquest of 
the power, it was considered as the main infrastructure owned and opera-
ted by Viet Minh forces. Can the Route de la Cordillére, or as Vietnamese 
used to call The Ho Chi Minh road,12 be considered as an infrastructure or 
a anti-infrastructure ?
This is a very ambiguous and difficult question. It was not an infras-
tructure built off the ground, but it was functioning like a dispositif inserted 
in a topography that was negotiating with it continuously, more than impo-
sing its own logic. It was partially buried with invisible bridges constructed 
under water level. It was built in a very precise way in order not be seen 
from aerial report airplanes and photography. Its completion and non stop 
exploitation throughout aerial bombing was a real achievement. It was a 
very hybrid construction with hospitals, dormitories, and canteens cons-
duction, dans la lutte contre l’inondation ou la sécheresse. Elle a toujours observé une attitude 
correcte dans ses relations avec le peuple. Jamais elle n’a porté atteinte à ses biens, fussent il seule-
ment une aiguille ou un bout de fil.” Giap 1967, 53.
12. Cordillera Road is the Vietnamese name of the so called Ho Chi Minh road in Occident.
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tructed under ground. There is no need for infrastructure as a power in it-
self as guerrillas action unfolded. Infrastructure was seen only as a demons-
tration of one’s economical superiority not a military superiority. Perhaps 
that’s why even the most incredible logistic that supported  Vietnamese 
conquest, the so called Ho Chi Minh road, could be considered as the 
natural support given the nature to reconstruction of another modernity.
Conclusion
Another Modernity was constructed during this period by guerrillas in 
Vietnam. Infrastructure destroyed places to a collaborate between the en-
vironment and guerrilla movements. A specific collaboration was put in 
place between the new Vietnamese army and peasants. A complete colla-
borative system was put in place between human activities and nature. It 
reveals a specific attention to nature, that is, it was site specific. From a 
theoretical point of view, it was the reconstruction of another modernity 
that turned upside down the conceptualization of culture as a key point 
of reference for modern society. Nature replaced Culture to form a new 
agency that was able to destroy a modernity constructed on infrastructure 
and total territorial planning.
Édouard Glissant characterizes another modernity by the fact that it 
can accept a degeneralization process. He is mixing ideas from culture, 
politics, and human relations when he argues that: “The Western work 
of “generalization” has for centuries equalized diverse community tempos 
and tried to order (to prioritize) their flowering. The panorama resolved, 
the equidistances defined, perhaps is it time to return to a “degeneralisa-
tion” no less necessary? Not to an excessive renewal of specificities, but to 
a total freedom (dreamed-of) of their relationships, even worn down to 
chaos by their confrontations?.13 In otherwords, it is a modernity that is 
dealing the singularity of each element, without any will for hierarchy as a 
domination process.
We have to remember ourselves that, once the war finished, mutual 
assistance didn’t survive or carry over to the reorganization of a more or 
less classic state with its own infrastructure. Collaborative systems found du-
ring the decolonizing process were reduced to nothing, to let places enter 
into a very hierarchical system, top down, very similar to the pre-existing 
one put in place by the European colonizer.
This construction of another modernity was seen both as the end of 
13. “Le travail occidental de «généralisation» a, pendant des siècles, introduit à l’équivalence des 
divers temps communautaires et tenté d’ordonner (de hiérarchiser) leur floraison. Le panorama 
résolu et les équidistances définies, peut-être y a-t-il lieu de revenir à une «dégénéralisation» non 
moins nécessaire? Non pas à une outrance renouvelée des spécificités, mais à une liberté totale 
(rêvée) de leurs rapports, frayée au chaos même de leurs affrontements.”Glissant1990, 75.
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imperialism and as a possibility to reconstruct another postcolonial society. 
Unfortunately, this modernity based on a collaborative system existed only 
during war time.
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Abstract
Architecture, where from, where to?
Memory is as a modus operandi in establishing rapports between the material and the 
metaphysical, such that objects endowed with a forceful meaning permeate in the space 
of memory. The complex evolution of humanity takes place directly proportional to the 
evolution of consciousness and cognitive flow, understood not only through intellectu-
al eyeglass, but also through identity, emotion, empathy. Considering that architecture 
is an “infusible fusion” of culture, art, technology, functionality, vital and spiritual sup-
port, augmenting society, we may state that consciousness, architecture and memory 
determine the system of our conscious existence. The temporary character of architec-
ture represents the outgrowth of the society evolving at an accelerated pace, surpassing 
the individual, thus making the evolution of memory unpredictable and its life shorter.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the connection between architecture and memory, 
starting with the known phenomenon of memorizing, continuing with the memory’s 
path through architecture and “the built memory” within historical or contemporary 
patterns of our cities and connecting it with its complexities of philosophical and met-
aphysical origin - the discourses of architecture – the implicit theoretical discourse, 
the fictional1 discourse (the literary dimension of architecture) and the philosophical 
discourse. In order to transcend into the space of long-term memory, an object perme-
ates through three essential perception stages: the sensorial stage (regarding sensorial 
memory), the semantic stage (related to short-term memory) and the emotional stage, 
triggering the long-term memory. Thus, in order to imprint its values to long-term 
memory, architecture should comply to these four conditions: synesthetic, semantic 
and syncretic, and emotional. 
Reinterpreting architecture through the way it is being memorized and rediscovering 
memory as an architectural meta-language imply their reconnection with the identity 
and consciousness of a culture.
Keywords
Memory; architecture; consciousness; identity
1.  Vais, 2008, 121 
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The study suggests memory as a method of understanding and perceiving 
architecture and landscape, beginning with the derived function of lin-
guistic structuralism and considering memory a veritable, truly universal 
language and primordial matter in the creation of individual and collec-
tive identity. If space represents a materialization of society in a certain 
time in history, it also is a materialization of consciousness. The study upon 
“petrified landscapes” constitutes an important venue of investigation of 
human memory itself, from neuroscientific perspective. The urban dimen-
sion of space formulates a context for the incidence of consciousness ins-
tances, catalysing them through manifestation into an illo tempore and illo 
spazio of collective memory. 
Architecture is the peremptory expression of a culture’s spirituality, 
sine qua-non metalanguage within the identification and understanding al-
gorithm of collective memory manifestation and it constitutes the physical 
space of memory as long as the collective memory encodes those crucial 
values of spirituality that constitute collective consciousness. Memory, ar-
chitecture and consciousness make up a unitary principle of cultural exis-
tence (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1
The dependency between memory, architecture and consciousness
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The bidirectional relationship between architecture and memory sets 
consciousness as the unifying context, where architectural memory bleeds 
into the space of consciousness and the consciousness of memory bleeds 
into architectural space. The unified principle of architecture, memory 
and consciousness constitutes the effervescent motor for the existence of 
society and for the condensation of cultural thinking. The whole lands-
cape is, or should be, built memory, abiding by the intrinsic laws of spiri-
tuality, with sufficient actuating force to activate human existence in all its 
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aspects – social, cultural, creative etc. In this context, the landscape is the 
translation of any form of scenography of the surrounding world, as it is 
the result of human activity and humanity’s intent to mould space. Becau-
se, “in that world of memory where music and vision, adjusted by the other 
senses, polarize around some major themes, according to cadences that 
create an interior rhythm, everything is solidary, including the great mess 
that engulfs the rare islands that our attention, with time, is drawn to.” 2
When speaking of his book, Autobiografía Científica, Aldo Rossi con-
cludes that “to forget architecture” becomes a pertinent title for his book 
because “I may talk about a school, a cemetery, a theatre, it is more correct 
to say that I talk about life, death, imagination.” 3 This platonic perspective 
considers the physical world an exponent of transposition in the world of 
ideas, a dimension one would consider relevant to existence. In a heracli-
tian manner, truth and absolute reality are represented by the becoming, 
the transcendence, the flux, whereas static condition is a mere illusion and 
an inability of consciousness to transcend towards the space of becoming 
(in the world of ideas, objects are not but they become). Thus, an analysis of 
the possibilities to interpret the built landscape as an essential vector of 
transposition in the space of consciousness is warranted, along with a study 
of the mutation of architecture, both as a means and conclusion and as a 
hypothesis and moment of becoming.
The main argument for a study about memory has roots as far back 
as antiquity. The will to fortify a cultural heritage, to rule a potential space 
of universal cognition, has been fuelled by the constant pursuit of iden-
tity. In the vision of G.M. Cantacuzino “perception takes all its value and 
is amplified only within memory. The mutation of images of reality into 
memories is what we call sensibility, including the act of grouping and se-
lection of perceptions. From the synthesis of these perceptions, new form 
and harmonies are born, meaning art. Sensibility is the actual quality of 
our memory. In intimate parts of memory /…/ new images and personal 
experiences from the field of thinking take their place, live, get amplified 
or remain the same /…/ but all of them are part of that unitary climate 
that is defined by what we call identity.” 4 Ultimately, a study of memory is 
equivalent to a study of self. The loss of memory, be it individual or collec-
tive, is equivalent to the loss of identity, context, thus a tear in the evolution 
of consciousness reflected through the spectrum of its activity. 
A study upon memory assumes its understanding as a process and 
phenomenon. Starting from the simple process of memorizing and inter-
2.  Cantacuzino, 1993, 28
3. “Forgetting Architecture comes to mind as a more appropriate title for this book, since while I 
may talk about a school, a cemetery, a theatre, it is more correct to say that I talk about life, death, 
imagination.” Rossi, 1998, 94
4.  Cantacuzino, 1993, 32
preting its implications in the perception and memorizing of architecture, 
as object and sequence (urban or not), we identify the essential steps and 
understand the lasting character of architecture of the stages of transcen-
dence in the space of memory. The process of individual memorization 
offers an essential perspective for the analysis of collective memory, of for-
ming identity and the dynamics of consciousness. 
The first part of this analysis follows the defining and the memorizing 
process, as well as its transposition in the phenomenon of “memorizing ar-
chitecture”, understood as both the object and the ensemble (scenery, city, 
etc.). The approach focuses on the interconnections between “individual 
memorizing” and “collective memorizing”.
Sensory memory – A first relation between information about self and 
the surrounding world enables the manifestation of sensory memory, who-
se “operators”, sensorial organs - hearing, sight, smell, touch, taste - transfer 
specific coded information towards the areas of memory that harbour the 
processes of consciousness. Architecture that requires the full experience 
of sensory, gnoseology and ontology will form stronger long-term memory.
From a critical perspective on the history and theory of architecture, 
this is easy to see – from antiquity, whose spaces, from housing to urban 
places, seem to imagine epistemological experience and metaphysical mo-
dels of sacredness, by appealing to the senses, consciousness and memory, 
to Zumthor’s atmospheric architecture, in which, to transcend architec-
ture to the plane of consciousness and memory, it is essential to perceive 
it thorough the sensorial apparatus. Within the cities of newness, of the 
experience of the sacred and the sensorial is an amputated dimension. In 
the landscape of post-industrial or forcefully reinvented cities of the last 
decades, many urban contexts are too incoherent to convey an architec-
tural message, at most, paying tribute to visual aspects, in a quest to satisfy 
only the lower tiers of achieving and perfecting consciousness. A visually 
tributary architecture, as manifested in many cases in recent years, annihi-
lates its potential of being perceived as a whole and to establish a complex 
relation with the human instance and its entire corolla of sensitivity.
Short-term memory implies the infusion of architectural concepts throu-
gh semantism. Its implicit temporary nature attributes the metaphor of a 
sketchbook or draft to this type of memory, the information that will ulti-
mately slide to the space of long-term memory, whose main trait is the avai-
lability of immediate information, acting similarly to connecting idioms 
and words in written text. The subtler the analogy needed to understand 
the information is, the more its eligibility for long-term memory storage it 
is.
A “landscape” (we will consider the general notion of landscape with 
the entire perceptive plethora implied – visual, acoustic, auditory, olfac-
tory, tactile, spatial-temporal, etc.) ensures its place in long-term memory 
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space by its familiarity or its novelty, as it is juxtaposed to a meaning, an 
emotional connotation or any other type of relation with existing informa-
tion. A landscape that is indifferent, who’s nature infringes more than it 
intrigues perception or that requires a sum of information without rhyme 
or reason will have problems breaking into the realm of memory. Archi-
tecture that does not actively communicate with its users or whose message 
does not constitute a part of its user’s reality and identity will rarely pierce 
the filter of memory. 
Long-term memory, involving syncretism and affect in architecture, correla-
tes the space of a multi-dimensional complex made of the previously de-
fined levels of perception. The material support, merged with perceived 
space, make up a metaphor of bonding material with immaterial, defining 
the aesthetic category of sublime in architecture. The ability to communi-
cate with architecture generates a sense of belonging, of spiritual connec-
tion with the environment and meanings – carriers of values of tradition. 
Syncretism in architecture refers to all the levels that make it up, physical 
and metaphysical, which constitute an indivisible architectural presence, 
and whose evocative or one of a kind force refracts into consciousness, re-
sulting in the generation of emotion. Analog to individual consciousness, 
self-awareness and identity recognition involve the development of long-
-term memory. The same step involves acknowledgement of the subjective 
dimension of existence, corresponding to affect. Affect in architecture is, 
therefore, the humanizing of architecture. 
The second part of this analysis refers to memory mapping. A relevant part in the 
study of memory refers to the relation between memory and space, from 
the perspective of time, analysing “radiographs” of “life slices” (as the natu-
ralist exegesis names them). Space, as a place for the memory, has potentiated 
a historical will of conveying knowledge through creation, including the 
creation of space. The concept of place constitutes itself a space endowed 
with memory, an important way through which civilizations have mapped 
their memory. One could say that, throughout history, consciousness has 
mapped its memory through creation. The risk of losing or forgetting the 
importance of memorable places lead to the importance of understanding 
the theory that lies behind the creation of these places and their impact on 
collective memory. Mathematical and astronomical principles have been 
encrypted through the construction of the pyramids and other ancient re-
presentative ensembles; Cicero envisioned the concept of memory palaces; 
Camillo imagines memory as a theatre; Saint Augustin connects the con-
cept of “sancta memoria” to the concept of “aedificatio”5, stating that the 
5.  “A soul places far from God creates a kind of machine, that by its means [the soul] may be lifted 
to God.” Gregory the Great, “Expositio in canticum canticorum”, 3.14-15, quoted in Carruthers, 
1998, 81
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science of building thoughts is reflected through the science of building 
architecture; Gregory the Great, then, describes the memory as “machina 
mentis”, a device of the mind able to carry the consciousness to divinity. 
However, it was not until the Renaissance that architecture was considered 
relevant to physical conservation within cultural patrimony as a wilful act. 
Yet, the place, as a space for the memory, manifested itself continuously, as 
a way of memorising through architecture. The functioning of collective 
memory as a radiography of the cultural – identity matrix can be identified 
through its mapping (through architecture, implicitly and through arts, 
explicitly). The immateriality of its namespace has often lead to reducing it 
to the cartographic material, but one could axiomatically affirm that each 
consciousness represents a memory, that we are living memories of our 
culture (Fig. 1). The potential memories within Canaletto’s works have 
inspired the “Analogous City” of Aldo Rossi. 30 Years later, Christine Boyer 
criticises the modernist city, now displaced from the coherent discourse of 
the memory and history and responsible of the nihilism of the idea of an 
interpretative and cultural device, able to “translate memories and tradi-
tions into meaningful contemporary forms”6. Memory, thus, describes the 
function of a metalanguage in the study of architectural and urbanistic 
language. Continuing the structuralist and poststructuralist point of view, 
the structures of the memory, yet to be conquered from a neuroscientific 
point of view, could represent a new paradigm in the theorization of archi-
tecture. 
Fig. 2
Collective Consciousness
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The place as a space for the memory also implies the reverse perspec-
tive of recovering messages and memories encrypted through the above-
-mentioned processes, in order to reconnect humanity with its memory, 
with its past, present and future, understood as a “fountain” (in the world 
of the unconscious, Romanian Philosopher Lucian Blaga identifies three 
time horizons: the “waterfall” time, related to the past, the “fountain” time, 
related to the future, and the “river” time, related to the present. Regar-
ding his categorizing, memory) of tradition, spirituality, history, culture 
and identity of a civilization. Aggressively reacting to the abundance of 
6.  Boyer, 2001, 28
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forms without substance, modernism alienated itself from everything that 
constituted history and tradition in previous times. It dislocated the indivi-
dual, with its consciousness, thus emerging an undeniable syncope within 
collective consciousness. Also generated through a reactive phenomenon, 
radical historicist tendencies have altered the perceiving of memory and 
identity in the plenitude of their semantics.
The study upon memory combines three approaches, which, inter-
twined, generate a complex analysis upon the cultural memory. The first 
point of view is generated by the attitude of remembrance and defining 
the archiving, the cultural-identity, and the historical function of the me-
mory. The second approach is related to the manifestation of the memory 
in the present tense and the third point of view is oriented to the poten-
tiality of the memory and its force to discover and enrich the identity of a 
culture, its becoming and alternating future.
Places of remembrance range from the monument, the memorial or 
the museum to any other form of building a collective memory. The “built” 
memory represents a wilful act of collective consciousness. The gesture 
of edification itself bears the value of a ritual, to embody and coherently 
put in words flows of meanings. They empower existences that lay beyond 
life, death, and even memory, imprinting even on a subconscious level. 
Their dispersion throughout public spaces mark the historical discourse of 
a culture’s becoming, at least in theory.
Yet, the architecture of the memory does not rely only on its galleries 
and monuments. The meanings that transcend towards long-term memory 
are not restricted by the criteria of bearing a message. Memory itself occurs 
in our day-to-day life and is strongly impacted by the subjective nature of 
humanity in general. Our day-to-day happenings shape our memories. The 
city, judged by its impact on collective memory, emphasizes the procedural 
study of its evolution. Often, the contemporary city is not centred on the 
human dimension. It is hard to say to what extent this tope can be viewed as 
the most complex result of the existence of a culture and to what extent it 
defines the identity of its inhabitants, provides them with a sense of belon-
ging, appropriation. Tradition, in its timelessness circumscription to the 
city, comes from a timeline with strong cultural substrate and presents, and 
manifests itself in the present foretelling scenarios of the future. The con-
temporary city risks the disjointing of tradition and memory from everyday 
modern life. Reinvented in modernism, “accelerated” and more crowded 
in recent times, the city has had numerous scenarios of reinventing itself. 
Assuming the complexity of current city requires its mental reconstruction 
and reinterpretation through memory. Mental maps, psycho-geography 
are known concepts of dealing with the hyperspace of our city.
The sequences of nowadays capture collective memory circumscribed 
to the city by defining three instances – residents, communities and non-
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-residents. The city’s memory is perceived through its constitutive elements 
– routs, fronts, urban units (districts), nodes, landmarks, and boundaries 
(historical stratifications, plan-metric and vertical). These constituents 
make up, firstly, the endogenous image (Marius-Cristian Neacsu) corres-
ponding to inhabitant and community, and secondly, the exogenous image 
(Marius-Cristian Neacsu) corresponding to un-inhabitant, the perception 
by tourists. The instances of recollection become points of incidence be-
tween endogenous and exogenous dimensions of the city. Places marked 
by interventions made without consideration for the substance of spiritual 
and cultural substrates that memory implies are deserted places. These 
also constitute a point of incidence between the exogenous and endoge-
nous memory, to a lesser extent than the first, but are fascinating through 
the anti-memory impact and dystopian character.
Creative memory, enhanced by its oneiric and utopian character, is a lu-
dic or imaginative reconstruction of known realities. It polarizes around 
the creative act as a generator and regenerator of memory. The dream 
is a meta-reality in which space and the universe are deconstructed and 
reconstructed by non-physical laws, specific to human subjectivism. Throu-
ghout history, the manifestation of creation through oneiric leitmotif has 
constituted a new type of memory, usually attributed to utopian visions. 
The act of creation is doubled, therefore, by the act of recreation. The re-
creation of space in contemporary times plays a crucial role in the recovery 
of history, through what Romanian architect Augustin Ioan called “virtual 
heritage”. Thus, the act of “re-creation” manifests itself in possible ways of 
recovering memory through heritage.
The final part of the study suggests a method to redefine the identity of 
architecture through cultural memory. The memory represents a space for 
the recovery of the values of society: consciousness is constantly remode-
lled by memory and memory survives only by the will of consciousness to 
impose its values. To survive the time consuming and perishable destiny, 
consciousness maps out memory with the act of creation, be it of artistic 
nature or not. The metaphor of a city’s “becoming” is the metaphor of 
consciousness’s “becoming”, which centres memory as a generative spirit, 
“genius loci” of identity substance. The “becomings” manifest themselves 
as acts of creation, not limited to the boundaries of artistic vision. Architec-
ture represents the synthesis of numerous dimensions, which we will sym-
bolically separate into mathematical perspective and poetical perspective. 
The “becoming” of architecture space constitutes, generically speaking, 
the synthesis of the significance that it can portray, which, through a coeffi-
cient of remanence within the realm of memory, have the potential to re-
fract through various filters of active modelling that define memory. An ar-
chitectural space that has gone through the process of “becoming” implies 
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the physical and metaphysical crossing, an almost ritualistic gesture in the 
process of interchanging memory. In the Romanian context, architecture 
can regain the values of cultural memory by re-establishing the dialogue 
with philosophy and literature, as obvious proponents for the perpetua-
tion and individualization of cultural identity on the universal scale. The 
stylistic matrix defined by the philosophy of Lucian Blaga represents an 
important point for redefining the potential routes for local architecture.
The interpretation of architecture by using revelatory metaphors em-
phasizes the importance of poetic language in architecture. The “poetiza-
tion of architecture”, not limited to lyrical interpretation but to a spectrum 
of syncretic composition, semantic and subjective, concretely formulates 
the principles of remanence within the bounds of collective memory. This 
poetization also implies considering architecture a poetic art, doubling the 
architectural discourse with a proustian depth every architect should have. 
As a man of architectural language, the architect must also be a man of let-
ters (as Le Corbusier also stated once), capable of deciphering and encryp-
ting metaphors. Poetic language constitutes the main avenue of understan-
ding architecture for both its creator and its receiver, in a coagulated will 
of memory, culture, spirituality and identity. The poetics of architecture 
embody its subjective nature and its affective dimension.
Fig. 3
The architecture of memory
© 2015 Ramona Costea
The reinterpretation of architecture through the way in which it is me-
morised and the redefining of memory as architectural meta-language re-
quire a reconnection to the identity of consciousness and culture. This study 
strives to analyse this potential method of reinterpretation of architecture 
and memory, starting with the simple act of memorization and following 
through to its philosophical and metaphysical complexities.
In conclusion, this gigantesque consciousness, whose rhythm and hid-
den geometry operates as an artful cryptographer of time embodied throu-
gh architecture, must constitute an essential part of every signified, without 
altering the experience of the new, but empowering it and potentiating it 
with value, coherence and continuity.
127The Architecture of Memory. The Memory of Architecture
References
Boyer, Christine M., 2001. The City of Collective Memory. Its Historical Imagery and Architec-
tural Entertainments, London: MIT Press
Cantacuzino, G.M., 1993. Letters to Simon – The Second Letter, Cluj-Napoca: Dacia
Carruthers, Mary, 1998. The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the making of Im-
ages, London: Cambridge University Press
Rossi, Aldo, 1998. Autobiografía Científica, Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili
Vais, Dana, 2008. Arhi-texte: în căutarea unei noi modernităţi: eseuri de arhitectură = Arhi-texts: in 
search of a new modernity: architecture essays Bucharest: Arhitext Design Foundation
Ramona Costea128
© Maribel Mendes Sobreira
philosophy@LISBON, 5, 131-141. Lisboa: CFUL.
An autonomist view 
on the ethical criticism of architecture
Ricardo Miguel
LanCog, Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa
Centro de Filosofia, Faculdade de Letras
Alameda da Universidade
1600-214 Lisboa
Portugal
ricardomiguel{at}campus.ul.pt
Abstract
It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and 
even artists point out moral flaws in artworks while evaluating them. Philosophers, how-
ever, have maintained a hot debate on the meaning of such criticism. This debate can 
be understood as a disagreement about the kind of relation between the artistic value 
of artworks and their alleged moral value. While some claim that moral value can con-
tribute to artistic value (moralism), others claim that there cannot be such a contribu-
tion (autonomism). Since at least some works of architecture are artworks, that debate 
also concerns architecture. A moderate moralist view claims that some works of archi-
tecture have moral flaws/merits that bear on their artistic evaluation. In an apparently 
promising version, the contention is that some moral flaws/merits are aesthetically rel-
evant. In this paper I argue against such contention and defend an autonomist view. 
Following some taxonomy remarks I distinguish the views in the debate and present 
two points in favour of autonomism: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. 
Then I discuss Carroll’s merited response argument for moralism and I argue that in its 
best interpretation either it begs the question against autonomism or it is compatible 
with it. I conclude with some possible objections that may help further investigations 
on the subject.
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1. Ethical criticism of art and its philosophical debate*
Ethical criticism of art is the practice of ethical evaluation of artworks. The-
se are often considered good/bad or better/worse in virtue of some mo-
ral properties. For example, a story where the hero is a wicked person is 
considered to be ethically flawed, but the one where the evil character is 
punished is ethically approved. This kind of judgements is widespread and 
assumed to be artistically relevant. And they are not specific to art critics 
since the general public and even artists engage in ethical criticism. And 
even though, like Carroll said, there has been, throughout the twentieth 
century, “a gap between theory and practice with respect to the ethical 
criticism of the arts”,1 it is now safe to say that philosophers are trying to 
bridge this gap. Still, they disagree about how this should be done. This 
disagreement, then, gives rise to the debate on whether and how ethical 
criticism is relevant to artistic evaluation.
I take the philosophical debate on ethical criticism to be essentially 
about answering the question can moral value contribute to the artistic value of 
artworks? In a similar way, Gaut shapes the debate around the question “are 
the ethical flaws (or merits) of works of art also aesthetic flaws (or merits) 
in them?”.2 Although values and properties are two different things, I will 
ignore this difference here for it is commonly assumed in the debate that 
artworks may have moral properties and that these determine a correspon-
ding value. The issue is rather if moral properties or, as in the question 
above, moral value, also help to determine artistic value. This is why I will 
freely move from talk about properties to talk about values and vice versa. 
However, since, in this context, scepticism about values is not even a view 
to take into account, I believe that Gaut’s question depicts the problem in a 
restrictive way. If some ethical property is identical to, or part of, some aes-
thetic property, then surely moral value can contribute to artistic value. But 
this contribution might occur even if there is no identity nor mereological 
relation between the properties. Unless there is some additional argument 
that precludes such contribution, I believe it is better to pursue the more 
general question.
2. Taxonomy remarks
There are two main answers to the question above: (1) moral value can 
* Firstly I thank Maribel and Tomás for organizing this conference. I am also thankful to the audi-
ence for helpful questions and comments on my talk. Lastly, this written version of my talk was 
concluded under the FCT Studentship SFRH/BD/107907/2015 with the financial support from 
POPH and FSE.
1. Carroll 2000, 350.
2. Gaut 2013, 394.
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contribute to artistic value – Moralism; (2) moral value cannot contribute 
to artistic value – Autonomism. These two views are usually divided into 
more specific theses, each one having a radical and a moderate version.3 
Radical moralism states that moral flaws in artworks always count as aesthe-
tic defects in them, while the moderate version only makes the particular 
claim that moral flaws in artworks sometimes count as aesthetic defects 
in them. On the other hand, radical autonomism says that it is nonsense 
to ask if moral value can contribute to the artistic value of artworks, just 
like it is nonsense to ask e.g. what is the square root of a building. It is a 
category mistake. The point of radical autonomism is that moral value and 
aesthetic value are so independent of each other that thinking about their 
interaction is meaningless. As for moderate autonomism, despite accep-
ting the meaningfulness of the question, it insists that the two values are 
independent.
A first taxonomy remark is that that there are good reasons to deny 
that radical autonomism is a relevant view to this debate. Firstly, such a 
view does not seem to have any supporters. As Giovannelli points out, the 
foremost figures of autonomism do not fit under Carroll’s ‘radical’ tag.4 
Following Giovannelli, another, more significant reason to set Carroll’s ra-
dical autonomism aside is that it provides no answer to the question that 
frames the debate.5 Claiming that the question is nonsense is not really an 
answer to it. To be sure, even granting that such claim represents a legiti-
mate logical view, it is not one on a par with all the others that agree with 
the meaningfulness of the question. And the interesting, lively debate is 
about these last views’ different answers to a sound question, not about the 
soundness of the question itself.
A second remark is that I part ways with Giovannelli regarding his 
characterization of autonomism. Even though he dismisses Carroll’s radi-
cal autonomism, he preserves the ‘radical’ predicate to describe the view 
that I simply call ‘autonomism’, that is, the view that accepts (2) above. 
As a consequence, we disagree about the characterization of moderate 
moralism as a view “allowing for the ethical status of artworks to bear, on 
occasion, on their artistic value, but claiming that it always does so in an 
unsystematic way.”6 Under the approach I am favouring, this would be a 
moralist view since it accepts the answer (1). Giovannelli, in contrast, takes 
it as an autonomist view because he believes that the relevant property to 
3. I am following Carroll’s 2000 characterization of the views.
4. See Giovannelli 2007, 118-119.
5. Giovannelli presents his taxonomy under three principles and Carroll’s radical autonomism 
does not satisfy the principle of ethical amenability. This principle says that we ought to look at 
theories that “at least agree on the fact that art can be subject to ethical evaluation” (Giovannelli 
2007, 118).
6. Giovannelli 2007, 122.
distinguish between the basic views is not the acceptance of (1) or (2) but 
whether there is or not a systematic contribution of moral value to the 
artistic value. Instead, I believe that differences in such systematicity only 
allow for distinctions between moralist views. Otherwise we would be using 
the terms ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ with different meanings in relation to 
autonomism and moralism.7 
The last taxonomy remark is about immoralism, which is the view that 
positive moral value contributes negatively to the artistic value and that 
negative moral value contributes positively to the artistic value. Giovannelli 
dismisses a radical version of immoralism and says that a moderate version 
is “germane to this discussion”.8 However, in my view radical immoralism is 
not irrelevant to this debate. It may be a very unappealing view to defend 
but, contrarily to Carroll’s radical moralism, it provides an answer of the 
sort that is relevant to this debate.
So, to summarize, if we are trying to answer if moral value can con-
tribute to the artistic value of artworks, then there are two basic views, mo-
ralism and autonomism, which offer a positive and a negative answer, res-
pectively. Moreover, moralism can be divided into two more specific views, 
according to the quantity or the generality of the relation between the 
moral and artistic values: the radical view claims that the relation holds 
for all kinds of artworks while the moderate claims that the relation only 
holds for some kinds of artworks. In more detail, moralist views can also be 
distinguished by the quality of the relation between the two values: it can 
be symmetric, where moral merits and moral defects correspond, respec-
tively, to artistic merits and defects; it can be inverse, where moral merits 
and moral defects correspond, respectively, to artistic defects and merits; 
and it can be contextual, where the context will determine whether moral 
merits and moral defects will count positively or negatively to artistic value, 
which means, using the taxonomy just given, that the relation between 
both values is not always symmetric or inverse.9
7. Regarding moralism the terms distinguish the generality of the relation (systematic, in this case) 
between both values, being radical when it concerns all types of artworks and moderate when it 
concerns only some. On the other hand, in the case of autonomism, ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ are 
not used to distinguish generality since radical autonomism accepts no contribution of moral 
value to the artistic value, be it systematic or not.
8. Giovannelli 2007, 122.
9. See Gaut 2013, 397, where he considers immoralism and contextualism as the same view. In the 
light of the remarks above these are two different views, although they are both forms of moralism. 
See also Baumberger 2015, to whom I owe the “symmetric” and “inverse” jargon. I should also 
mention that I do not claim that this taxonomy is original. Most of it was already present in the 
literature and these remarks are a mere rearranging of the relevant views according to the central 
question from section 1.
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3. Ethical criticism in architecture
Turning our attention to architecture, I believe that the great majority of 
works are buildings with little or nothing to do with art. Most of them 
are homes and workplaces. Some of us are fortunate enough to live or 
work in good buildings, that is, buildings capable of providing shelter and 
comfort beyond the level of basic needs. Also, I think that the really lucky 
ones inhabit artworks or have their daily occupations inside them. Fortune 
aside, the point is that even though not every work of architecture is an 
artwork, some of them are. Now it is certain that trying to offer a detailed 
explanation for this will necessarily involve a conception of art. And it is 
well known that the debate about what is art stands on its own and is much 
more demanding than the ethical criticism debate. Still, is seems rather 
uncontroversial that, say, Frank Lloyd Wright’s Guggenheim Museum or 
Gaudí’s Casa Batlló are artworks. This, then, is enough to extend the deba-
te between moralism and autonomism to architecture.
According to Baumberger we can morally evaluate works of archi-
tecture in two ways: i) through a work’s causal impact on well-being and 
environment during planning, construction and use; ii) and through its 
symbolic meaning or endorsement of moral attitudes.10 It is obvious that, 
e.g., a house can cause quite an impact, and not just on the lives of those 
who inhabit it. All those involved in its construction are also affected. The 
architect, for example, may be happier with a few more digits in his bank 
account or maybe with another entry in his portfolio. And if we suppose 
that health and safety rules were broken, some of the workers would be 
better off if they had declined that particular job. Furthermore, if the ma-
terials used are harsh to the environment, then future generations will be 
affected as well. Accounting these and other less obvious causal impacts of 
architecture will, one assumes, lead to the conclusion that morality is really 
important when it comes to the evaluation of architecture. And, in a broad 
sense, it is. Architecture involves actions and these are morally relevant 
(or some at least are). Nonetheless, the debate about ethical criticism is 
concerned with artistic value and there is no such thing in architecture in 
general. What this means is that by looking at the causal impact of architec-
ture we are taking it as an action in general and not specifically as art. Con-
sequently, we need to focus on the moral assessment of architecture qua 
art. This is why I will ignore the causal impact of a work as a way in which we 
can morally evaluate works of architecture and instead I will concentrate 
on the work’s symbolic meaning.11
10. See Baumberger 2015, 184-185. In my point i) I am merging Baumberger’s first three ways of 
morally evaluating works of architecture.
11. With this agrees Gaut: “Ethical flaws should not be understood in terms of the causal powers 
of works to affect audiences (…) rather, we should understand flaws in terms of the intrinsic 
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3.1. Two points for autonomism
Before I go on to consider and criticize a well known argument for mo-
ralism, I would like to present two points that favour autonomism in this 
debate. The first one is about the burden of proof and second is about 
theoretical simplicity. Although important, these points are not in any way 
decisive and function more as advantages that contribute to an overall 
comparison between the theories.
Starting with the burden of proof, we can say that moralists accept a 
restricted autonomist thesis: that in some cases moral value does not bear 
on artistic value; so, they agree with the autonomist thesis that artistic value 
can be independent of moral value. Therefore, given that the autonomist 
view is a generalization of what both parties accept, and also that moralism 
implies the interaction between the two values, it is moralism that needs 
substantially different support to it. This, then, is why the burden of proof 
is on the moralist.
The moralist might reply that the autonomist view also demands addi-
tional evidence because it implies the universal claim that denies the inte-
raction between moral value and artistic value. And this is right, but the 
relevant difference is that moralism, but not autonomism, needs evidence 
of a kind that goes beyond what is already assumed. That the two values 
sometimes interact, if it is a fact, it is one over and above what both theories 
agree. On the other hand, the autonomist can be pictured as saying that 
what moralists accept in some cases – that the moral and the artistic values 
do not interact – actually apply to every case. Thus, in this sense, the au-
tonomist thesis requires nothing substantially new to the debate. Its initial 
plausibility remains until moralists are able to provide convincing evidence 
for their claim.
The second point that favours autonomism is its relative theoretical 
simplicity. If I am right about the taxonomy remarks from the last section, 
then there is only room for one autonomist view while there are many ways 
of being a moralist. As described above, moralist views differ according to 
the structure of the relation between the two values. Hence, we have sym-
metric, inverse and contextual moralisms. Moralist views can also differ 
about the relative weight given to the two values, that is, about whether 
moral value always worth more, always worth less or, say, if it depends on 
the kind of artwork and/or on the moral properties involved. As one may 
suspect, these issues are tricky to tackle. Additionally, owing to the varie-
ties of moralism, moralists need not only to argue against autonomism, 
but they also need to argue against competing moralist views.12 As such, 
properties of works.” (Gaut 2013, 395) And one of these properties is the artwork’s symbolic 
meaning, which may involve moral attitudes.
12. Jacobson 1997, for example, argues against moderate autonomism from a moralist view (immoralism).
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having a more demanding conceptual apparatus, all those tricky questions 
to address and also various opponents to argue against, moralism lacks 
simplicity when compared to autonomism.
3.2. The merited response argument and replies
I will now discuss Carroll’s version of the merited response argument 
(MRA) for moralism. Here is the argument:
(1) “Securing audience uptake to the responses a work prescribes is a 
leading feature of any artwork’s agenda (...) [and] failing to secu-
re uptake, then, is an aesthetic defect in an artwork”.
(2) Some artworks prescribe emotional moral responses.
(3) “An artwork may fail to secure the emotional responses it mandates 
(...) by being immoral.”
∴ “Sometimes a moral defect in an artwork can be an aesthetic flaw”.13
The intuitive idea of the MRA is that in some cases moral properties 
are aesthetically relevant. Consider, for example, Volkshalle (the people’s 
hall), a work by the Nazi architect Albert Speer that was part of Hitler’s 
project to rebuild Berlin after the war. For obvious reasons this work was 
never built. But from its model and concept we can say that this building 
was conceived to praise the Aryan superiority, represented in the huge, 
non-human proportions of its dome. These aesthetical features of Volkshal-
le, then, are assumed to be connected with racism, which, in turn, somehow, 
blemishes the appreciation of the work.
Returning to the MRA, I think that the conclusion is somewhat mis-
leading because it omits the connection between morality and aesthetics 
which figures in premiss (3). This connection is where the aesthetic rele-
vance of moral properties comes from, namely, their effect on audience 
response. However, the conclusion ignores this and states only that it is 
possible to have an identity between moral properties and aesthetic pro-
perties. Therefore, as presented, the MRA is invalid: one thing is immorali-
ty leading to an aesthetic flaw (through failure to secure audience uptake); 
another is immorality being an aesthetic flaw.
So, in order to maintain the argument’s intuitive idea in a valid form, 
the MRA needs some rephrasing. Here is a more adequate version of the 
argument:
(4) Failing to get the prescribed emotional moral response is an aes-
thetic defect in an artwork.
13. Carroll 2000, 377.
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(5) In some cases, an artwork being immoral explains its failure to get 
the prescribed emotional moral response.
∴ In some cases, an artwork being immoral explains an aesthetic de-
fect in an artwork.
Now that the validity problem is solved, it may look like the autonomist 
must reply by showing that at least one of the premisses is false. I will consi-
der this case but I also think that other, more interesting replies are available 
to the autonomist. A first thing he might say is that the MRA presupposes, in 
(4), that artists’ intentions about the consequences of their work in the au-
dience are relevant to artistic value. This makes moralism incompatible with 
theories of art that deny such a relevance. Although this alone is not enough 
to dismiss (4), it might be considered an unnecessary limitation to place 
on one’s theory of art. In addition, to defend that (4) is false he might ask 
us to consider the following: think of a great architectural work of art; now 
suppose that the author had immoral intentions regarding the work that no 
one knew about; would you say that, after all, you were mistaken about the 
work’s artistic evaluation? If not, does it become a worse work of art after his 
intentions become known? I admit that intuitions can go both ways here, but 
these are questions that the moralist needs to address while the autonomist 
is able to avoid them and offer a parsimonious explanation for the case. He 
can simply say that the author’s intentions are part of his moral character 
and, accordingly, the moral blame is on the author, not on his artwork.
A more damaging reply consists in arguing that the explanation rela-
tion involved in premiss (5) and in the conclusion can have two different 
readings, but that none of them serves the moralist thesis. On the first rea-
ding, the moral property is, by itself, the explanans. If this were so, aesthetic 
properties would play no explanatory role and, as a consequence, the moral 
property would have itself an aesthetic defect or it would be simultaneously 
aesthetic. The problem is that this begs the question since it assumes that 
moralism is true. Maybe moral properties have aesthetic defects, but this 
requires argument just like moralism.14 On the second reading of the expla-
nation relation, the moral property is only a part of the explanans – its role 
consists in causing aesthetic properties. The trouble for the moralist is that 
now the autonomist will be happy to agree that in this way moral properties 
contribute to the artistic value of artworks. Yet, he will insist that such con-
tribution is not qua moral value. Ultimately, aesthetic properties are what is 
relevant to artistic evaluation, not moral value by itself.15
14. The following argument might be used by the moralist: every aesthetic defect contributes 
to the artistic value; some moral properties of artworks have aesthetic defects; ergo, some moral 
properties of artworks contribute to the artistic value. Notice that the autonomist may accept the 
first premiss. But then he cannot accept the second one because it would lead to the conclusion 
that moralism is true.
15. These two readings are not a problem of the explanation relation itself. The problem remains 
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4. Possible objections and conclusion
I will now discuss some possible objections to what I have been defending. 
In doing so I am not trying to bulletproof my view on this debate. This 
would require a much more in depth discussion than the one I am able to 
offer here. In a sense, in this last discussion I suggest some ways that oppo-
nents might explore to enrich the debate. At the same time, considering 
these objections will also be useful to clarify some of the points I made.
One possible objection is that I have dismissed too lightly utility con-
siderations concerning artistic evaluation (in section 3). Someone might 
say that even architecture as art is also about utility and, in this manner, its 
causal impact cannot be ignored in ethical evaluation. Maybe this could 
provide another way to bring ethical and artistic evaluations closer. My wor-
ry with this approach is that by considering a work’s consequences we face 
epistemic difficulties that might lead to scepticism about artistic evalua-
tion. For instance, we would need to discriminate which consequences are 
relevant (all, foreseen, or foreseeable?). This seems hard to achieve, but 
even assuming that such work is done we could still wonder, for any given 
artwork, if some significant consequences were not accounted for. Conse-
quently, we might end up as sceptics about artistic evaluation. In the end 
we would have to choose between pursuing this approach and somehow 
get around its drawbacks or abandon it in favour of a simpler type of eva-
luation, like the aesthetics-based one.
Another objection consists in claiming that it is sufficient for mora-
lists that moral properties cause aesthetic properties. For this to be true, 
my argument at the end of section 3.2 cannot be right and the opponent 
needs to show why. Besides this, he also needs to frame such a reply against 
Carroll’s moderate moralism, since Carroll recently presented his view by 
saying that “sometimes an ethical defect in an artwork can also count as – 
i.e., be identical with – an aesthetic defect.”16 With this I am not assuming 
that Carroll’s authority about how to describe moderate moralism cannot 
be challenged. Rather, this is reminder that there might be good reasons 
to talk about the identity of those properties instead of there being just a 
causal relation between them. If the relevance of this difference is yet to 
be discussed, then this is something that might be explored to bring about 
new and interesting results.
The last objection I will consider has to do with practical implications 
of autonomism. Someone may argue that if architects as artists embrace 
autonomism, they will be careless about the morality of their artworks. 
And, arguably, this is dangerous. But this objection misses the point. It is 
based on a poor understanding of the autonomist thesis as being about 
even when ‘explains’ is replaced by ‘leads to’ or ‘causes’.
16. Carroll 2015, 151-52.
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prescribing actions when, in fact, it is solely about values. Moreover, in 
practice, architecture continues to be subject to moral assessment as an 
action in general. A building can be admirable as an artwork and yet terri-
ble regarding the actions which caused it – it would have been right not to 
build it even at the cost of loosing a fine work of art.
To conclude I will just underline the key points that I have defended. 
I started by presenting what is the ethical criticism of art and its philoso-
phical debate. In accordance with some authors my approach is centred 
on the question can moral value contribute to the artistic value of artworks? The 
varieties of answers to this question led me to present a taxonomy of the 
views on this debate that is slightly different from the ones already availa-
ble.
Then I showed that the debate between moralism and autonomism 
also applies to architecture since at least some works of architecture are 
artworks. Before discussing an argument for moralism I offered two points 
in favour of autonomist: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. 
These points should be viewed only as advantages that affect an overall 
comparison between the theories. While discussing the merited response 
argument I concluded that, in its original formulation, the argument is 
invalid. In order to give the idea behind the argument some more credit 
I rephrased it into a valid form. Yet, even with this adjustment the autono-
mist has at least two kinds of replies: firstly, he can argue that premiss (4) 
is false; secondly, he can say that there are two readings of the explanation 
relation involved in (4), both of them leading to an unsuccessful argument 
for moralism. The problem with the first reading is that the premiss alrea-
dy assumes moralism to be true. And the problem with the second reading 
is that it is harmless against autonomism.
Finally, I am aware that moralists have other arguments on their 
behalf. I choose to discuss only the MRA because it seems to be a staple 
among moralists and my goal was never to offer a comprehensive refuta-
tion of moralism. Rather, I wanted to present an autonomist view and how 
it fares relatively well against moralism. Even though I am convinced that 
the advantages of autonomism would retain their salience on a thorough 
comparison with moralism, the ethical criticism debate is still lacking such 
a work.
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Abstract
This paper adopts a hermeneutical approach to Japanese thought, in the light of Hei-
deggerian thought, in order to reassess the way we understand space. In a first stage, a 
few ideas concerning Japanese language and aesthetics will be briefly addressed for a 
better understanding of how space is embraced in Japanese thought and culture (ex-
perience precedes description). We will then turn to the two main concepts: fūdo (mi-
lieu) and basho (place), coined by two 20th century philosophers: Watsuji Tetsurō and 
Nishida Kitarō. The logic behind fūdo is that a true awareness of space is built not from 
thinking about it – since we are already objectifying it and, therefore, understanding 
ourselves detached from it –, but from being in it; experiencing it. The concept of basho 
represents a more logical argument and allows us to focus on the relation between the 
particular and the universal; or, as we will see, between being and space. What we can 
conclude from the articulation and interpretation of these two concepts is that space 
is certainly more than just a pure geometrical concept or a receptacle where human 
beings exist – it can also be thought of as a part of being.
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Human beings are creatures of distance! And only by way of the real pri-
mordial distance that the human in his transcendence establishes toward all 
beings does the true nearness of things begin to grow in him. (Heidegger 
1984, 221)
What exactly is space? And how can we define it? Probably, these questions 
will only be partially answered at the end of this paper; and, apart from the 
general notion of ‘space as a part of being’ that pervades this paper, answer 
them is not my purpose. Mainly because in trying to do so, tasks analogous 
to those required for interrogations such as ‘What it means to be a human 
being?’ or ‘What is good and bad?’ will certainly come up. The problem 
with all these notions – space included – is that defining them or theori-
zing about them might lead us towards a different direction than the one 
we wanted to go in the first place: the abstract. This does not mean that we 
should stop trying to think about space, but that the best way to know and 
understand it is through lived experience, through constant subjective and 
inter-subjective interpretation of ourselves in our relation to it. What I say 
or think about the word ‘space’ is near meaningless if not anchored to a 
concrete experience of it.
The role of experience in space is first credited to Kant for the sig-
nificant leap he gave by focusing on bodily orientation and experience, 
thus breaking with the polarity between absolute and relative space. His 
insights were then developed by Husserl, who expanded the focus of spa-
tial experience from the body to, what he called, the ‘near-sphere’ (nah-
-sphäre): “the proximal place or places in which I am or to which I can 
go”1 – space had turned into a kinesthetic dimension. Later, this focus on 
kinesthesia was reviewed by Merleau-Ponty who elevated the experiential 
dimension of space to a level embedded not in one’s body, but in the enti-
re perceptual field. In later works he reacts against the excessive focus (in 
Kant and Husserl) on “bodily bilaterality” (two eyes, two ears, two hands); 
for it led to a “fragmentation of being” and “a possibility for separation”2. 
Probably due to this “danger” of objectifying the body in order to invoke 
spatial experience, Heidegger did not apply it as a means to his discourse 
on space3. One interesting notion he uses when treating space is “making 
room” (einrãumen): an ontological aspect of Dasein that consists in the ways 
he creates a space that allows him certain actions. With this, he turns ho-
mogeneous space into a secondary dimension of spatiality. In Casey’s words4, 
“There can be no such homogeneous medium as space unless room as 
1.  Casey 1997, 219–220
2.  Merleau-Ponty as quoted by Casey 1997, 236–37
3.  Casey 1997, 243
4.  Casey 1997, 252
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been made within a given region of the ready-to-hand”. If we acknowledge 
that human beings are spatial – always already-in-the-world, and constantly 
“making room” – then space can be thought of as the medium through 
which human perception is constructed.
Nowadays, the role of experience is becoming crucial for any account 
of space. Even though, we still tend to build complex and intricate theo-
ries of space, even when focusing on body experience, which tend to over-
-objectify it. In the case of Japanese thought, until the encounter with the 
West in 1868, there was no problematization of space. Philosophy and Aes-
thetics were not thought of as separated disciplines, but as one single way 
to improve the self through the refinement of the sensuous experience of 
things – and not their exhaustive description. The word used today for spa-
ce, kūkan 空間, was only coined after the referred encounter as a translation 
of the western abstract and measurable notion of space. Prior to that, what 
we find in Japanese traditional thought is a conception of space primarily 
based on the word ma 間 ‘interval’ – a fundamental notion of the Japanese 
sense of space: space grasped not through description, but through direct 
perception of the sensible phenomena5.
The encounter of Japanese and Western philosophy brought up their 
differences while, at the same time, gave both sides new tools of thinking. 
The two philosophers discussed below were both living during an era of 
intense intercultural exchange with the Western traditions of thought and 
science when they wrote these works. Watsuji Tetsurō’s fūdo is embraced 
here as an ethical concept and shows us a reluctance towards defining or 
theorizing space or nature; Nishida Kitarō’s logic of basho, on the other 
hand, is helpful mainly from a pure logical perspective and from his ac-
count on the ‘particular-universal’ relation.
In the following arguments I will try to avoid theorizing too much 
about the nature of space itself while proposing a new way to think about it, 
drawing a few stimulating insights from a few sources of Japanese thought. 
We will first begin our analysis with a brief look into both Japanese lan-
guage (especially the word ma 間 ‘interval’) and aesthetic ideals, and their 
value for an account of space based on experience rather than description. 
Then, entering the realm of philosophy, Watsuji Tetsurō’s fūdo and Nishida 
Kitarō’s basho will be presented, each followed by an interpretation of their 
logics. Both these concepts are not problematizations of space, but hold 
some interesting clues that will help us reevaluate how we think about it in 
relation to being. But first let me define briefly what I understand as being 
is this paper.
5.  Nitschke 1966
A brief clarification of being
Before beginning our analysis, there are a few ideas that should be clarified 
regarding the notion of being used here. Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, or 
Dasein, presupposes a being already thrown up in the world before he starts 
to make meaning out of it. Furthermore, as he puts it, “Dasein is already 
ahead of itself”6. This means that one characteristic of Dasein is to be con-
cerned with the possibility of its own being. In other words, being-ahead-
-of-itself is a condition of being that directs him towards his own (future) 
possibilities of being. This structure of being is comprised in the notion of 
‘care’ (sorge); not emotionally (like worry, etc.), but ontologically, as being 
towards7. 
The way he addresses this dimension of being is an example of his 
need to reformulate language to convey his message. Nonetheless, the fun-
damental idea behind it is similar to Husserl’s ‘intentionality’: the idea that 
‘to be conscious is to be conscious of something’; there is always something 
towards which we are in the world. The difference between Heidegger and 
Husserl is that the former, although never using such a term, builds his own 
notion of intentionality by refusing to focus on consciousness itself, but on 
a level prior to our being-conscious-of-consciousness8. For Heidegger “our 
fundamental sense of things is not as objects of perception and knowledge, 
but rather as instrumental objects that fit naturally in our ordinary practi-
cal activity” 9– it is fundamentally a praxis-oriented account of being.
Nonetheless, what is important to retain here is being not as some kind 
of attribute embedded in the physical subject, but as a continuous process 
of intentional “circumspection” (umsicht) that constitutes that subject’s 
own existence. Charles Guignon10 summarizes it: “As ex-sisting (from ex-
-sistere, standing outside itself) Dasein is always already “out there,” engaged 
in undertakings, directed toward its realization” – and this is the essence of 
being I wish to emphasize in this paper.
Japanese perception: from language to aesthetics
There are two fundamental aspects that I want to focus regarding space 
in Japanese perception. The first one is the Chinese character ma 間, ‘in-
terval’. This is a very significant word in Japanese architecture, arts and 
ethics, and no account of space or place in Japanese thought can ignore 
6.  Heidegger 1962, 236
7.  Heidegger 1962, 237
8.  see Crowell 2005
9.  Hall 1993, 125
10.  C. Guignon 2005, 397
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its relevance. It has been rendered as “sense of place”, “not as something 
that is created by compositional elements, [but] the thing that takes place 
in the imagination of the human who experiences those elements”11. Its 
ideogram depicts the sun 日 showing through an open gate 門. Thus, aside 
from ‘interval’, the space that this character implies is not an empty space, 
but one that establishes the very possibility of relating to something – in 
this case: the sun. It is a relational space; a space that is not just a measurable 
area, but the very possibility of relation. In this sense, and as Nitschke 12 writes, 
it “fully expresses the two simultaneous components of a sense of place: the 
objective, given aspect and the subjective, felt aspect”. We can also identify 
this concept in (a) the sumi-e monochromatic painting, where, rather than 
an object’s detailed depiction, a great amount of space is left blank to in-
vite suggestion and imagination 13; in (b) architecture, as a principle used 
in the creation of a room or a space for a very specific action 14; or (c) as a 
concept influenced by Buddhism and in work, for example, in the famous 
temple Ryoan-ji 15, where space is experienced by the minimum detail and 
complexity, inviting the viewer’s imagination.
The most relevant aspect regarding ma is that it forms part of the Japa-
nese word for ‘human’: ningen 人間. The first character means ‘man’; the 
word literally means ‘among men’ or ‘interval between men’. Thus, unlike 
the West where ‘human’ usually means an individual contained in himself 
(like the Greek ‘Anthropos’, the Latin ‘homo’ or the English ‘man’), in 
Japanese language, we can consider that being human intuitively holds 
a sense of space. Watsuji Tetsurō works his theory of fūdo 16, that we will 
address later, and of Ethics 17 based on the analysis of the word ningen; in the 
latter he develops the notion aidagara 間柄 or ‘betweeness’ (note the first 
character) as an ethical foundation for being human.
The second aspect is the impact that this particular ‘spatial thinking’ 
has on the aesthetic ideals that permeate Japanese arts. Without going into 
detail I will introduce a few ideas that we can find in Japanese aesthetics 
that will prepare the ground for the philosophical approach we will take 
below. Donald Keene (1995) defined ‘suggestion’ as one of the four cha-
racteristics of Japanese aesthetics. He opposes it to the “Western ideal of 
the climactic moment” that “grants little importance to the beginnings and 
11.  Nitschke 1966, 117
12.  Nitschke 1993, 49
13.  Parkes 1995, 90
14.  The tea ceremony room, for example. Nitschke 1966
15.  Iimiura 2002
16.  Watsuji 1979; Watsuji 1988
17.  Watsuji 1996
149Is Space a part of being?
endings”18. Indeed, most painting (as we saw already in the sumi-e) and 
poetry, as well as most aesthetic ideals, are fundamentally suggestive. There 
is a manifest intention to present the least possible detail on what is being 
depicted, trying not to limit the reader/spectator’s possibility of unders-
tanding while allowing imagination to fill in the ‘empty spaces’. We can see 
this in the following poem:
An old pond,
A frog leaps in.
The sound of water.
Here the details are minimized; the poet just presents the scene. He 
does not explain it or puts his own emotions into it; for the scene itself 
cannot be described. The reader has to experience it himself and he does 
it through his own imagination, filling the poem’s ‘empty spaces’. Yasuda 
19 states it perfectly: 
Here we want no adjective to blur our impression; the picture speaks for 
itself. We seek no metaphor or simile to make the picture clear, but simply 
let the objects do their part. (…) then our understanding will supply the 
necessary adjectives.
There are many aesthetic ideals that could be discussed regarding 
‘suggestion’, but the one I feel is the most relevant for our analysis is yūgen 
幽玄 (mysterious, subtle, hidden beauty) 20, for it largely summarizes all 
the aesthetic ideals that permeate poetry, drama, painting, gardens and 
tea ceremony during the 12th to 17th centuries 21. Yūgen describes the hidden 
or profound feeling that “may be comprehended by the mind, but cannot 
be expressed in words”22. There are everywhere and at several occasions 
moments when the phenomena being experienced transcend any descrip-
tion. And even when someone describes such moments exquisitely – like, 
for instance, Marcel Proust did – we still tend to turn them inside and fit 
them to a similar moment in our own lived experience. There are certainly 
no words to define such moments – still, the Japanese managed to coin an 
emotionally charged word that would refer to what is indescribable: yūgen. 
Eventually other aesthetic ideals could be brought here and we would 
find in them more or less the same underlying principle: suggestion. In-
18.  Keene 1995, 31
19.  Yasuda 1995, 129
20.  The yūgen ideal was brought to the highest degree of refinement through the Nō theatre. The 
actor’s slow, stylized movements are used as a means to suggest and not represent something. Besides, 
there is also the idea that the “no-action” moments were the most enjoyable, since they incite our 
own involvement in the play. see de Bary 1958, Chapter 14; Ueda 1995
21.  de Bary 1958, 278
22.  a passage of a XV century book quoted by de Bary 1958, 279
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deed, there is a preoccupation with avoiding detailed descriptions or de-
finitions, inciting lived experience – experience precede description. Which 
amounts to saying, feeling precede thinking, aesthetics precede philosophy. 
And traditionally, until the 18th century Japan, aesthetics did not develop 
as a separate field from philosophy. On the contrary, the aesthetic expe-
rience – whether poetry, calligraphy, painting or the tea ceremony – was, 
to a great extent, the medium through which philosophical thinking was 
produced23. Now, if we turn to the origin of the word ‘aesthetics’ – the 
Greek aisthētikos, ‘perceptible things’, from the verb aisthesthai ‘perceive’ –, 
an aesthetic experience is but a relation with what surrounds us, a way of 
perceiving. In this sense, Japanese aesthetics can show us a particular way 
of relating to space through its conceptual language and arts.
Fūdo as space ethics
The term fūdo 風土 (literally ‘wind and earth’) was coined by Watsuji Tetsurō 
in 1935 in a book considered as a theory of geographical determinism: 
Fūdo: an anthropological inquire. In the first section he starts with a philoso-
phical consideration of the environment and its influence on humans. In 
the second section, he engages in a description of three types of climate 
– monsoon, desert and meadow – and the different characteristics of those 
who live under these different climates. 
However, just as Augustin Berque has been showing for more than 
thirty years24, there is more behind Watsuji’s book than simple determi-
nism. The first thing to take into account when trying to transcend the 
deterministic reading is the very translation of the word ‘fūdo’ as ‘climate’. 
In 1961 the book was translated into English by Geoffrey Bownas under the 
title Climate: a philosophical study; and then changed, in the 1988 edition, 
to Climate and Culture: a philosophical study. Just as Berque shows us below, 
the whole structure of this translation leads to strange renderings of the 
derivatives Watsuji coins from the substantive fūdo:
This lack of understanding sometimes leads Bownas to surrealistic 
roundabouts in order to avoid rendering the idea of fūdosei [‘function of 
climate’ or ‘human climate’, according to Bownas; ‘mediance’ according to Berque] 
in some passages which are meant to illustrate it; roundabouts which are 
indeed inescapable, since the translation, straightaway, locks out the pur-
port of the book.25
Many scholars still choose to use Bownas’ translation when treating 
23.  Parkes 1995, 82
24.  The book where Berque exposes his interpretation of Watsuji’s ideas was first published in 
French (Berque 1986), then translated to Japanese (Berque 1988) and to English (Berque 1997).
25.  Berque 2004, 390
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Watsuji’s theory26. For that reason, justifying the translation’s choice turns 
out to be essential to the present argument. We can start by taking a look at 
the terms used by Berque when translating Watsuji’s theory. The main one, 
fūdo, is translated as milieu. Here, the author wanted the translation to keep 
the underlying meaning of the original word: fūdo 風土 has the character of 
wind and earth, but the wind character 風 also means ‘ways’ or ‘customs’. 
Following this, Berque recovered the word milieu, coined by the French 
geographer Vida de la Blache (1845-1918), that stands for the relation be-
tween humans and their particular environment; a relation both subjective and 
objective, natural and cultural, collective and individual. With this, Berque 
moves closer to Watsuji’s intention of avoiding the word ‘nature’: when we 
think about the natural environment, we tend to think of it as the concrete 
base of human life, and so we separate both human life and nature; “we then 
find ourselves examining the relation between two objects”27. From the 
term fūdo, Watsuji derives fūdosei 風土性28 and fūdogaku 風土学29. The one that 
interest us the most here is the first one, which Berque translated as ‘me-
diance’. Being fūdosei the character of fūdo and fūdo a relation itself, as explai-
ned before, a word that could express the very character of that ongoing 
relation was required: mediance, then, is “the attributive character between 
the physical and the phenomenal, the natural and the cultural, the indivi-
dual and the collective”30. Is the instant, I would say, at the very middle of 
that relation (fūdo) where we find ourselves constantly; where both poles of 
each of the three dualisms meet. Or, as Watsuji defined it: “is the structural 
moment of human existence”31.
Now, why is fūdo an important notion for our reassessment of space? 
There are three main reasons. First, because Watsuji’s book is a reaction 
against Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and its emphasis on time, to the 
detriment of space. We saw how the word ‘human being’ in Japanese (nin-
gen) has an implicit notion of space, or betweeness; it is expected, then, 
that Watsuji reacts against Heidegger’s lack of focus on space. For Watsuji, 
Heidegger’s account of being primarily based on time and the Dasein leads 
to an excessive focus on the individual, without considering the collecti-
ve and, therefore, spatiality32. Here, we can recover the above mentioned 
26.  Mochizuki 2006; Carter 2013
27.  Watsuji 1979, 3
28.  The –sei  性 suffix adds the idea of ‘character/function of’; so, from ‘climate’ (fūdo), the notion 
‘climaticity’ (fūdosei)  is sometimes used.
29.  The –gaku 学 suffix turns the word into a discipline, like construction (kenchiku 建築), archi-
tecture (kenchikugaku 建築学). In Bownas translation we find ‘the study of climate’. In Berque’s: 
‘mesology’.
30.  Berque 1997, 130
31.  Watsuji 1979, 3
32.  Watsuji 1979, 4
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fūdosei as the character that is neither individual nor collective because it is 
both at the same time. This means that, in Watsuji’s thought, each pole of 
the three dualisms referred to above cannot be treated on their own, in-
dependently: they are the very character (fūdosei) of our fūdo and the point 
from where we stand and deal with the world. Hence, Heidegger focus 
on individual leads Watsuji to approach the spatiality of human existence, 
which implies society as well as the surrounding environment, through the 
lens of the constant relation between nature and culture, subject and ob-
ject, individual and collective: the fūdo (milieu).
Second, because of the conclusion he draws from his ‘metaphor of 
the cold’. Although Watsuji reacts against the lack of spatiality in Heide-
gger, he is also strongly influenced by him when developing the argument 
that supports this metaphor. Very briefly, he tells us that it is impossible 
for us to know the existence of cold, as a transcendental phenomenon, 
before we feel cold ourselves33. The cold, as an objective, independent 
thing, forms itself for the first time when felt by the subject that acts in 
constant intentionality. At this process of intentionality – Heidegger’s sor-
ge (care) and Watsuji’s sotoni deru (stepping outside) – when the subject 
is feeling cold he is actually stepping outside into the cold. He concludes the 
metaphor by saying that it is at this very moment, when we step outside 
into the cold, that we “find ourselves”34. It is in this stepping outside that we, 
within an encounter with something that is not us (later we will find a cor-
relate of this in Nishida’s logic of basho), comprehend ourselves. In one of 
Watsuji’s examples: “[j]ust as we encounter our self happy or saddened in 
the wind that scatters the cherry blossoms, we comprehend our withering 
selves in times of drought when the sun scorches the trees”35. I believe this 
example is enough for a better understanding of fūdosei. Watsuji introduces 
other examples, based on construction materials and culinary, not as pro-
ducts of a geographical determinism, but as expressions of that “structural 
moment” when nature and culture find each other and, to some extent, 
influence each other – they are expressions of how human beings com-
prehend themselves in their fūdo (milieu)36.
The third reason is related to the absence of a definition or proble-
matic of space in Watsuji’s book. Indeed, while he points out the lack of 
spatiality in Heidegger as the primary reason for writing Fūdo, in the rest of 
the book he does not talk about space, but about distinctive types of clima-
te and their influence on human beings. First, we have to recall the word 
ningen 人間 and its implicit spatiality, meaning that we cannot separate 
33.  Watsuji 1979, 11
34.  Watsuji 1979, 13
35.  Watsuji 1979, 15
36.  Watsuji 1979, 17–19
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humans from space and produce an independent account on each one of 
them. If Watsuji prefers to work his theory from the notion of fūdo instead 
of nature to avoid objectification, it is only natural that he also does not 
develop a problematic of space. What he does, then, is to work out a des-
cription of the phenomena of the world itself and of fūdosei: that “structu-
ral moment” when culture meets nature. Berque37, recovering Nakamura 
Hajime’s ideas, links this to Japanese’s tendency of attaching themselves to 
“the sensible manifestations of nature, rather than referring them to some 
abstract principle”, illustrated by the proverb ‘Matsu no koto wa matsu ni 
narae’ (About pines, learn from the pines) – a tenet also present in Japane-
se aesthetics. We might consider, then, that Watsuji could not develop an 
abstract theory of space after having rejected the very notion of nature. Ins-
tead of developing a problematic of space (or even nature), he examined 
the relation between nature and culture in particular milieus.
Space as the basho of being
Nishida Kitarō’s main goal is to deconstruct the subject and object dualism. 
With the clear notion that a too brief account of his logic holds the risk of 
being overly simplistic, I will attempt to sum it up in a few sentences and 
then draw some hints from his discourse that are enough to grasp the logic 
behind Basho (Place).
Nishida’s logic, in my point of view, can be summarized in two key 
ideas: if (a) everything that exists, exists in something else38, then (b) whe-
never objects are to be related and form a single autonomous system, there 
must be something that sustains that system, somewhere where it takes 
place39 – this forms, what I will call, the ‘core logic’. Following this, Nishi-
da starts developing his logic of basho from what is central to the act of 
knowing: the consciousness. He writes that when we think of things there 
must be a basho that reflects them, which he calls “the field of conscious-
ness”. Thus, “[t]o be conscious of something is to reflect it in the field of 
consciousness”40. He then goes on arguing against the idea that the object 
stands on its own outside our consciousness. If this were the case, how can 
we, who are within our consciousness, conclude that the object exists and 
transcends our consciousness? His answer his quite straightforward and 
follows the core-logic: “For the consciousness and the object to be connec-
ted, there must be something that envelops both of them; there must be a 
37.  Berque 1998, 64
38.  An axiom stated for the first time by Archytas of Tarentum, which has repercussions in Plato 
and Aristotle’s accounts of place. 
39.  Nishida 1987, 67
40.  Nishida 1987, 69
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basho where their relation takes place”41. Nishida then starts to account for 
what this basho might be by pursuing a strong dialectical and metaphysical 
line of thought where he speaks about the “basho of true nothingness”, 
which I chose not to bring into this analysis.
My goal here is not to present a fully explained account of Basho, for it 
has been done before by some academics well versed in Japanese language 
and philosophy, but a much more elementary one: to take the core-logic 
of Basho, along with some hints developed by Nishida along his essay, and 
to interpret them as tools to help us think about space.
The main hints I will refer to are from his definition of ‘judgment’ 
and from his account of the relation between the particular and the uni-
versal, the subject and the predicate. For Nishida, “the act of knowing is an 
act of enveloping”42. And this ‘enveloping’ can be thought of as the main 
feature of a basho. On the other hand, ‘knowing’ is also formed by acts of 
judgment; and judgment is, in Nishida’s words, “the process of connecting 
the gap between the object of cognition and the place where it is reflected, 
its basho43. Nishida explains this argument using a grammatical example, 
which will lead us to the most meaningful hint for my analysis here. In the 
judgment ‘the rose is red’ the copula ‘is’ places the particular ‘rose’ inside 
the universal ‘red’ – ‘red’ becomes the basho of ‘rose’. Judgment, then, 
connects the gap between ‘rose’ and ‘red’, both of which do not hold any 
meaning if taken on their own. 
Until now there is nothing new, but the way Nishida characterizes the 
relation between the particular and the universal leads me to an interpre-
tation of the logic behind basho in spatial terms. According to Nishida, the 
copula ‘is’ forms the foundation of a judgment and expresses the relation 
between the universal and the particular. The judgment, then, becomes 
the process through which the universal particularizes and develops itself 
through specialization44. The way he defines this relation is central to my 
argument: 
the universal does not possess the particular, the particular is not the result 
of the universal, neither the relation between the two carries a meaning like 
‘space that contains objects’ or ‘objects that exist in space’ (…). “The par-
ticular is a part of the universal; it is his silhouette. (…) [T]hat which exists 
possesses partially (分有) the proprieties of the basho where it exists: things 
in space are spatial. 45
41.  Nishida 1987, 70
42.  Nishida 1987, 75
43.  Nishida 1987, 73
44. Nishida 1987, 89 The word Nishida uses is bunka-hatten 分化発展. Bunka 分化 means specializa-
tion; differentiation; the process of division with the goal of creating two or more different things. 
Hatten 発展 means both development, as in ‘argument development’ or growth, as in ‘city growth’.
45.  Nishida 1987, 86–87
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When trying to make sense of this logic and reinterpret it as a resour-
ce for the ‘being-space’ relationship, the connection between Nishida’s 
arguments and an ontological account of space can be smoothly accompli-
shed. For that, I will divide his discourse into two arguments: the dialectical 
and the grammatical argument. In the dialectical argument what is at stake 
is the idea that things exist in relation to one another, and something that 
is exists against what is not: we are humans only by opposition to what is 
not-human; or, I am myself only in opposition to others that are not myself. 
But, in Nishida’s core logic, there must be a basho where this opposition is 
reflected and that sets it up. So, I am human against what is not-human, 
and this relation is sustained and made possible through a basho that is spa-
ce: I can only be through the medium of space. Once again, the core-logic 
tells us that ‘everything that exists, exists in something else’: meaning that 
being that exists, exist in space. Here, we are already forming a judgment.
The grammatical argument draws from the definition of judgment 
explained before and completes this logic: forming a judgment is to pla-
ce a particular inside a universal, i.e. turning the universal into the basho 
of the particular; then, by logical inference, when examining the relation 
between being and its surroundings, space is the universal and being is the 
particular. We can now reinterpret Nishida’s account on the relation be-
tween the universal and the particular in order to elucidate us about the 
‘being-space’ relation: space does not possess being; being is not the result 
of space – which breaks away with a possible claim for geographical de-
terminism –, neither the relation between the two carries a meaning like 
‘objects that exist in space’ nor ‘space that contains objects’. Again, what 
exists, according to Nishida, possesses partially 分有 the properties of the 
basho where it exists: being possesses partially the proprieties of the space – 
basho – where it exists. 
Kopf  quotes Ueda Shizuteru’s concrete example concerning the ‘par-
ticular-universal’ relation and complements it:
There is no escaping the fact that England and I cannot be separated. En-
gland is the country in which I reside, and I reflect England by living there.” 
Consequently [Kopf adds], universals like the historical situation and the 
Zeitgeist are not transcendent or abstract but are concretely particularized in 
individual events. In this sense, there is no postmodernism without Jacques 
Derrida’s writings, no Nishida scholarship apart from particular essays on 
Nishida’s thought, no American lifestyle without individual Americans living 
their lives.46
46.  Kopf 2003, 32
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Concluding remarks
The look into Japanese aesthetics assumed the role of a brief introduction 
to some of the general characteristics of Japanese perception and laid the 
ground for a better understanding of the subsequent analysis. As we saw, 
the general tendency is to avoid descriptions and details. Whatever sensi-
ble phenomena exist in the world, their most fundamental truths can only 
be apprehended by our own taking-part of it.
This taking-part, on the other hand, is analogous to the idea of ‘care’ 
that Heidegger used to refer to a subject that is always towards something, 
i.e. that continuous intentionality that, constituting the most basic feature 
of being, casts the way we deal with the world experientially. Ex-sistere or 
sotoni deru, ‘stepping outside’ (as Watsuji called it), is our way of being: the 
process where we are constantly stepping outside into our surroundings 
and its constituents and where we first comprehend ourselves. When we 
assume that we cannot think of human beings separated from our own fūdo, 
to think of being as this constant process of self-understanding through the 
space we always already inhabit is to turn a supposedly abstract and measu-
rable notion of space into an indispensible part of being – or like the ma 間 
word: the very possibility of relation. 
With Nishida’s logic of basho we were able to turn space into the basho 
of being. Furthermore, examining his account of the ‘particular-universal’ 
relation we could see that while being is not possessed by space, neither 
determined by it, it possesses partially its properties. Here we are not sim-
ply claiming for, in Berque’s words, an “absolutization of the predicate”, 
but creating a relation between the universal (space) and the particular 
(being); between the subject and the predicate. If being possesses partially 
the properties of the space where it exists, then, space, while constituting 
a part of being, is being’s self-comprehension as well as an interpretation of 
that same being.
We can now return to Heidegger. Just like his idea of a praxis-orien-
ted space ontologically preceding and abstract and homogeneous space, I 
am also proposing a similar notion of space: a relational space that, being a 
constitutive and absolutely essential part of being, can only be fully grasped 
through being’s practical activities; in other words, through its ontological 
condition of being constantly towards something.
Bibliography
Berque, Augustin. 1986. Le Sauvage et l’artifice les Japonais devant la nature. Paris: Gal-
limard.
———. 1988. 風土の日本: 自然と文化の通態 [Fūdo no Nihon : shizen to bunka no tsūtai] 
Le Sauvage et l’artifice les Japonais devant la nature. Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō.
157Is Space a part of being?
———. 1997. Japan : nature, artifice and Japanese culture. Yelvertoft Manor: Pilkington 
Press.
———. 1998. «The question of space: From Heidegger to Watsuji». Em Interpreting Japa-
nese Society, editado por Joy Hendry, 2nd ed., 57–67. London: Routledge.
———. 2004. «Offspring of Watsuji’s theory of milieu (Fūdo)». Geojournal 60: 389–96.
Carter, Robert. 2013. «The Kyoto school an introduction». New York: State University 
of New York Pres.
Casey, Edward. 1997. «The fate of place a philosophical history». Berkeley : University 
of California Press.
Crowell, Steven Galt. 2005. «Heidegger and Husserl: The Matter and Method of Philos-
ophy». Em Blackwell Companion to Martin Heidegger, editado por Hubert L. Dreyfus 
e Mark A. Wrathall, 49–64. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
de Bary, Wm. Theodore, ed. 1958. Sources of Japanese Tradition Vol.1. New York: Colum-
bia University Press.
Guignon, Charles. 2005. «The History of Being». Em Blackwell Companion to Martin 
Heidegger, editado por Hubert L. Dreyfus e Mark A. Wrathall, 392–406. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing.
Hall, Harrison. 1993. «Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time». Em 
Cambridge Companion to Martin Heidegger, editado por Charles B. Guignon, 122–
40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Traduzido por John Macquarrie e Edward 
Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
———. 1984. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Traduzido por Michael Heim. 
Bloomington: Indiana university Press.
Iimiura, Takahito. 2002. «A Note for MA: Space/Time in the Garden of Ryoan-ji». Mil-
lennium Film Journal: Winds From the East, n. 38: 50–63.
Keene, Donald. 1995. «Japanese Aesthetics». Em Japanese Aesthetics and Culture: A Reader, 
editado por Nancy G. Hume, 27–41. New York: State University of New York Press.
Kopf, Gereon. 2003. «Between Foundationalism and Relativism: Locating Nishida’s 
“Logic of Basho” on the Ideological Landscape». Nanzan Bulletin 27: 24–45.
Mochizuki, Taro. 2006. «Climate and Ethics - Ethical implications of Watsuji Tetsurō’s 
concepts: “Climate” and “Climaticity”». Philosophia OSAKA, n. 1: 43–55.
Nishida, Kitarō. 1987. «場所 [Basho] Lugar». Em 西田幾多郎哲学論集・Ｉ [Nishida 
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Abstract
The present paper aims to define “Intensive Architecture” as an aesthetic category 
in the Theory of Architecture, stemming from the problem of sensation, understood 
mainly in the light of Gilles Deleuze’s seminal work Francis Bacon: la logique de la sensa-
tion, which allows therefore to understand how certain sensations are composed in 
space and sustained through time. However, sensations and senses should not be con-
fused. A sensation has a direct impact on the nervous system, as well as every organ is a 
receptacle of sensation (and not only those of the senses) when a Body without Organs 
is fabricated (as the paper will demonstrate). 
Moreover, as sensation is “the being of the sensible,” it always obeys to an aesthetic com-
position mastered by the artist or architect. We will look into some of the Adolf Loos’ 
works to inspect how the sensation of intimacy is composed, through which artifices, 
forms and matters of expression, and how, in its turn, it is hold in space independently 
of time and seasons. 
Keywords
Deleuze; Intensive Architecture; Sensation; Body without Organs; Intimacy
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In the woodcut “Encounter in Space,” by Edvard Munch, we see two figures 
- a woman and a man - floating toward each other in an abstract weightles-
sness space among sperm cells. The critics usually mention the erotic ten-
sion between these two figures whose physical proximity, implies, however, 
an emotive distance. The encounter happens in space, as the title refers, 
and Munch himself used to compare people’s lives with planets, appearing 
from the unknown to meet briefly and immediately disappear. Indepen-
dently of the comparison, which in this woodcut is literal (the bodies float 
in a pure abstract dark space without gravity), we focus our attention on 
the space that these two figures create in between, which is, necessarily, 
a space of intimacy where the two naked bodies touch each other and a 
tension is mastered. 
We witness a similar encounter in the film “Intimacy,” by Patrice Ché-
reau, specially during the first part of the film when the two main charac-
ters meet every Wednesday in an informal or shabby room of a London 
flat just to have sex without knowing each other, without speaking a word 
(which would potentiate a story to be known). We could understand these 
scenes like some critics mention the erotic tension on Munch’s woodcut, 
although they mainly express a moment of pure intimacy for which Ché-
reau removed any trace of romanticism or tenderness. Of course, during 
the film, the characters will know their stories, the intimacy will dissolve 
and blur into feelings, and, in the end, we are left with the emotional self-
-delusion of the characters. 
These two examples, from different art expressions - painting and 
cinema - disclose part of our understanding of intimacy as an intensive 
encounter or moment between two bodies without resourcing to a story or 
any representation of personal feelings or emotions. Curiously as well, in 
these two examples, the space where the encounter happens is the most in-
different as possible - a black surface and an informal room - as if the space 
was not important to represent, notwithstanding allowing to intensify the 
encounter and bring to the surface a pure intimacy.
In another film, by Woody Allen, titled “Interiors” in English and 
translated into Portuguese as “Intimidade” (“Intimacy”), we watch Eve’s 
(Renata, Joey and Flyn’s mother) suicide on a night when the family (their 
father and his new wife) were at the beach house. After the funeral, the 
three sisters return to the house and contemplate, through the window, 
the tranquility of the sea where their mother chose to die. The acceptan-
ce of death and the tranquility, the serenity it brings, are inscribed in the 
surface that separates the interior space, where the three sisters stand, and 
the landscape they contemplate. In the most intimate moments of the film 
(in several moments, confessions-like), Woody Allen places his characters 
glued to that surface which separates them from the exterior world, indu-
cing us to think that the intimacy doesn’t limit itself to the interior, but it 
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happens precisely in that very limit between exterior and interior.
The meanings, attributed to the very word intimacy, do not clarify 
that difference, which undoubtedly exists, between interior and intimacy, 
which is not to be, solely, a difference of distance between the closer and 
glued to the exterior surface of the world and the more internal, distant 
or profound, similarly to the centre of the earth, which would be, that way, 
the absolute intimate space of the very world (never reached however). 
The difference is, above all, that of the degree of intensity (and never that 
of distance, which is always nullified in the intimate space), which transfor-
ms an interior space into an intimate space, which has the ability to attract, 
through its design and composition, a natural posture of the body, the I of 
the body in space, reminding us of the encounter between two embracing 
naked bodies. [Figure 1]
Figure 1
Axonometric perspective of the “Space of Intimacy,” project by SAMI Ar-
chitects for the 14th Portuguese Representation at the Venice Architecture 
Biennial, 2014. Within the pre-existent Albarquel Fort, the project unfolds 
a sequential composition (antechamber - chamber or room - post-chamber, 
which Sami looked for in what is understood to be one of the first examples 
of domestic architecture in Portugal, the medieval palace) that correspon-
ds to a variation in intensity, through successive steps and boundaries (not 
only for the sequence in itself, which begins, inclusively, on the ground 
floor, but, above all, through the unfolding, or even the unveiling sugges-
ted by the two levels of the space of intimacy: a higher level, whose curve 
welcomes and embraces the bodies, and a lower one, with a double height 
ceiling, whose limit is rapidly undone by the ramp that leads to the faraway 
horizon of the sea, whose movement “sucks us into the landscape”, as the 
architects explain), of an interior space to an intimate space, embracing 
and receiving the exuberant landscape, which reveals itself naked before it, 
in its composition.
Figure 2
View from the Albarquel Fort onto the Sea.
Photograph: Paulo Catrica, 2014. 
The question becomes, then, how to build a space which constitu-
tes that difference, since an interior space isn’t, necessarily, an intimate 
space and an intimate space, in turn, does not imply a separation from 
the exterior space either. On the contrary, there seems to exist a form of 
contemplation1 from the inside to the outside, from the body to the lands-
1.  At this moment, it’s important to clarify what we mean by contemplation, which 
comes from Deleuze & Guattari’s reading of Plotino: “La sensation est contemplation 
pure, car c’est par contemplation qu’on contracte, se contemplant soi-même à mesure 
qu’on contemple les éléments dont on procède. Contempler, c´est créer, mystère de la 
création passive, sensation. La sensation remplit le plan de composition, et se rempli de 
soi-même en se remplissant de se qu’elle contemple. […] Plotin pouvait définir toutes 
les choses comme des contemplations, non seulement les hommes et les animaux, mais 
les plantes, la terra et les rochers. Ce ne sont pas des Idées que nous contemplons par 
concept, mais les éléments de la matière, par sensation. La plante contemple en con-
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cape, which makes the body, which inhabits the space, contemplate itself 
from within, when it fills itself with tonalities, variations, colours, water and 
scents from the landscape that stands before it. [Figure 2] The intimacy 
will always be that which the body is able to create or compose between 
itself and the space, reducing it to a sensitive surface, capable of receiving 
the infinitesimal variations of its qualities. The space of intimacy is a space 
where to sleep, lie, sit, look at the landscape become imperceptible move-
ments, long unhurried pauses, where time stands still and the world is kept 
outside. And, nonetheless, it may occur also when the landscape emerges, 
unequivocally, as the Other to those who inhabit space, reducing the dis-
tance between the exterior and interior to a surface where the inhabitant 
is faced with his or her own nakedness (where he or she may feel intimate 
with the space they inhabit). [Figure 3]
But how do we compose this sensation of intimacy, in the work of 
architecture? At this moment, we ought to look into the object of study 
of Aesthetics, the being of the sensible, and find in Deleuze’s approach 
(we will focus on the deleuzian aesthetics, therefore using its terminolo-
gy) a practice named “body without organs”2 which enlightens us about 
architecture’s power to compose sensations or, in other words, to edify the 
sensible3. For Deleuze, a work of art is a bloc of sensations, understanding 
tractant les éléments dont elle procède, la lumière, le carbone et les sels, et se remplit 
elle-même de couleurs et d’odeurs qui qualifient chaque fois sa variété, sa composition: 
elle est sensation en soi”, Deleuze & Guattari 1991, 200. In architecture, we find its 
equivalent when a building contemplates the landscape where it stands, not through 
the openings onto the landscape (although these may also be part of the composition), 
but through its matter. The landscape is metamorphosed, its matters of expression are 
transformed into expressive qualities of the work of architecture, in its composition and 
hence a sensation is built.
2.  The body without organs is a deleuzian experimental practice upon the body. It’s an experi-
mentation that every person undertakes whenever he or she desires and the unconscious begins to 
work and the body and its organs discover their own power to create sensation after their intense 
matter. As explained: “At any rate, you have one (or several). It’s not so much that it preexists or 
comes ready-made, although in certain respects it is preexistent. At any rate, you make one, you 
can’t desire without making one. And it awaits you; it is an inevitable exercise or experimentation, 
already accomplished the moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as you don’t. This is 
not reassuring, because you can botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and lead you to your death. […] It 
is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices,” Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 166. 
Note: In the present paper, we use Massumi’s translation of Mille Plateaux, because it’s translated 
into English by a known deleuzian, although our interpretations and knowledge come from the 
original text in French, which obviously is more precise. 
3.  It would be impossible here to pormenorize all the different implications that come from the 
problem of the body without organs in Deleuze’s own plane of immanence (or body without 
organs), and then in architecture. We may recommend the reading of: Susana Ventura, O corpo 
sem órgãos da arquitectura (Architecture’s body without organs). Lisboa: Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e 
Humanas, Tese de Doutoramento em Filosofia, especialidade de Estética (PhD’s thesis in Philoso-
phy - Aesthetics), Novembro 2012 (only available in Portuguese). 
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the sensation, the being of the sensible, as the difference in intensity itself4. 
It’s in Francis Bacon: la logique de la sensation that Deleuze gives a precious 
insight into how a sensation is composed in the body without organs, the 
plane of composition of art5. Like philosophy needs a plane of immanence 
where the philosopher creates his or her concepts, the plane of composi-
tion is where sensations are created by the artist. However, some misun-
derstandings arose within this practice, as Deleuze’s favourite examples 
report cases of physical bodies (sometimes even sick or drugged), like the 
masochist who uses his or her own body to create a plane that will only 
be populated by intensities. First, he or she ties the body parts with elastic 
bands or ropes and sew the orifices turning the body into a plain surface. 
Then, starts the flogging through whatever means are allowed, increasing 
and intensifying the pain more each time. Deleuze & Guattari, in Mille 
Plateaux, explain that the masochist doesn’t look for pain or pleasure with 
it, but to populate his or her body with “intensities of pain, pain waves”6. 
The body without organs is the plane of desire defined by thresholds, po-
pulations, movements and speeds, that envelop a sensation of pain7. But 
4.  “C’est l’intensité, la différence dans l’intensité, qui constitue la limite propre de la sensibi-
lité. Aussi a-t-elle le caractère paradoxal de cette limite: elle est l’insensible, ce qui ne peut pas 
être senti, parce qu’elle est toujours recouverte par une qualité qui l’aliène ou qui la ‘contrarie’, 
distribuée dans une étendue qui la renverse et qui l’annule. Mais d’une autre manière, elle est 
ce qui ne peut être que senti, ce qui définit l’exercice transcendant de la sensibilité, puisqu’elle 
donne à sentir, et par là éveille la mémoire et force la pensée. Saisir l’intensité indépendamment 
de l’étendue ou avant la qualité dans lesquelles elle se développe, tel est l’objet d’une distorsion 
des sens. Une pédagogie de sens est tournée vers ce but, et fait partie intégrante du ‘transcen-
dantalisme’. Des expériences pharmacodynamiques, ou des expériences physiques comme celles 
du vertige, s’en approchent: elles nous révèlent cette différence en soi, cette profondeur en soi, 
cette intensité en soi au moment originel où elle n’est plus qualifiée ni étendue. Alors le caractère 
déchirant de l’intensité, si faible en soit le degré, lui restitue son vrai sens: non pas anticipation 
de la perception, mais limite propre de la sensibilité du point de vue d’un exercice transcendant”, 
Deleuze 1969, 305. 
5.  The body without organs disappears from the pages of Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie? when Deleuze 
& Guattari write about the plane of composition in art. It’s long known that some concepts were 
more of Deleuze and others of Guattari, as we also find Guattari’s doubts about the practice of 
the body without organs in his notes to Anti-Oedipe (Félix Guattari, Écrits pour L’Anti-Oedipe. Paris: 
Lignes Manifeste, 2004). In fact, the first known appearance of the body without organs (which is 
named after Artaud) is in Deleuze’s work Logique du Sens (1969). Then, it appears in both volumes 
of Capitalisme et Schizophrénie, and, finally, in Francis Bacon: la logique de la sensation (of course, it also 
appears in several essays by Deleuze). We only may speculate about its removal from the plane of 
composition in Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie?, but it immediately reappears in Francis Bacon, the major 
work of Deleuze on Aesthetics. 
6.  Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 168.
7.  “A BwO is made in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only by intensities. Only in-
tensities pass and circulate. […] The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces them in a spatium 
that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is matter that occupies 
space to a given degree - to the degree corresponding to the intensities produced. […] That is 
why we treat the BwO as the full egg before the extension of the organism and the organisation of 
the organs, before the formation of the strata; as the intense egg defined by axes and vectors, gra-
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it’s always about how the desire itself (the plane of the body without organs 
is the plane of consistency of desire) is composed and through which lines 
does the desire flow uninterruptedly, enveloping and enveloped in a con-
tinuum of intensities (we must advert that it happens only in a molecular 
scale, within the intense matter of the unconscious). Two moments are 
defined by Deleuze & Guattari when it comes to making a body without 
organs: the first requires the fabrication of the plane, which usually implies 
an elimination of clichés as well as of all relations subject-object8. There’s 
no Self in the body without organs, only a series of becomings, as the two 
authors would later explain. Again, the masochist’s body without organs 
is populated by a becoming-animal. The second phase happens when the 
intensities start to circulate in the plane of the body without organs, and, 
when a force is captured at a certain degree, to compose a sensation. The 
two moments happen simultaneously, otherwise the fabrication of the body 
without organs would fail or it would be an empty body without organs.
Figure 3
Ground Floor Plan of the “Space of Intimacy,”
project by SAMI Architects for the 14th Portuguese
Representation at the Venice Architecture Biennial, 2014. 
dients and thresholds, by dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and kinematic mo-
vements involving group displacement, by migrations: all independent of accessory forms because 
the organs appear and function here only as pure intensities”, Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 169-170.
8.  “The BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the 
phantasy, and significances and subjectifications as a whole”, Ibidem. This finds its equal in Loos’ 
approach to architecture: remove all ornament, remove all sentiments, remove the Family (as 
institution), the suicide note of the girl in the chest of drawers doesn’t have anything to do with 
the walls (designed by the architect). 
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Francis Bacon also makes a body without organs for himself. In his 
book about Francis Bacon’s work, Deleuze definitely links the body without 
organs to the process of creation of a work of art. The phases are the same 
as described in Mille Plateaux, but, in this book, Deleuze goes further ex-
plaining how a sensation is formed in the body without organs as we start 
to be in the presence of several bodies without organs: Francis Bacon’s 
body without organs, which vanishes away at the very moment the pain-
ting embodies the sensation, but whose trace is left in the bodies (Figures) 
painted, that detain, in their turn, the power to affect us and transform our 
flesh and nerve into that sensation or yet another, allowing us to create a 
body without organs for ourselves.
In architecture, we also find several bodies without organs or traces 
of them as their existence vanishes away at the very moment one has cons-
ciousness of its fabrication. For example, Peter Zumthor, without naming 
it, refers to its effects: “We know all about emotional response from music. 
The first movement of Brahms’s viola sonata, when the viola comes in - just 
two-seconds and we’re there! […] I have no idea why that is so, but it’s like 
that with architecture, too”9. The sonorous wave that affect us, transforms 
our body into a musical plane, planting ears all through it, in our stomach, 
in our lung, in our breast, as, in seconds, we dissolve ourselves (our orga-
nisation) to become a sonorous expressive matter, become birds and the 
cosmos. Zumthor is correct when he says that this happen in architecture 
too. In certain works, our bodies are forced to wait, for example, or to inha-
bit space with such postures or to walk around it following movements that 
awake the flesh and the nerve. We may recall all those postures of the body 
that Adolf Loos imprints in his houses, as if the inhabitants were Beckett’s 
characters or Bacon’s Figures, or the movements Lewerentz obliges the 
body to describe in space or the effects that light, as he composes, have in 
our eyes. In certain works, there is a preparation of the body simultaneou-
sly of elimination of remains and an intensification acting upon the body 
(upon its flesh and nerve), transforming, finally, the lived body into an 
intensive body. As Deleuze remarks: the body without organs is “at the limit 
of the lived body, it’s the intense and intensive body”10. 
However, the inhabitant makes a body without organs for himself or 
herself only if the work of architecture is a work of art that holds a bloc of 
sensations. Usually, when it comes to define architecture as art, and Loos 
himself denied this quality with the exception of monuments and graves, 
some authors immediately state that a building or an architectural space 
9.  Zumthor 2006, 13.
10.  Deleuze 1981, 44. It’s at this time that Deleuze criticises the phenomenological hypothesis as 
“it merely evokes the lived body. But the lived body is still a paltry thing in comparison with a more 
profound and almost unlovable Power [Puissance],” Ibidem. 
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must be used by people, being its main purpose to be inhabited. Never-
theless, what type of inhabiting may occur when a work of architecture, 
beyond functions and types, beyond material structures and techniques, 
holds a bloc of sensations? A work of architecture, that may be consider 
a work of art, must create within it an interval of an intensive body-space. 
It’s interesting that Deleuze defines several art forms by what they create 
that is unique to them. For instance, painting is a bloc of lines and colours, 
cinema is a bloc of image-movement and image-time, music is a bloc of 
sounds… Deleuze doesn’t give any definition of architecture (although he 
does mention that architecture is the first art expression, and art appears 
with the animal when it transforms the territory into a matter of expres-
sion, into a plateau), but, taking into consideration what has been written, 
we may define architecture as a bloc of body-space, where the two terms 
- body and space - which define the interval, in order for architecture to 
become a work of art, must become, in their turn, an intensive body and 
intensive space, both defined by the intensities that populate the interval 
that they define. A lived body that inhabits space must transform itself into 
an intensive body or body without organs, precisely when it inhabits an in-
tensive space, a type of space that is defined by the sensations that it holds 
or creates, thankfully to its matters of expression or aesthetic composition. 
The architect, in a very Loosian definition, must occupy himself or herself 
of this interval. Zumthor, in his turn, denominates this intensive interval of 
atmosphere (or it would be more correct to say that Zumthor’s atmosphe-
re is what fills this interval). 
Loos’ houses are examples of what we call an intensive architecture: 
a type of architecture that holds an interval of an intensive body-space, 
occupied, filled, by sensation11. In these, we witness, almost literally, to this 
interval’s fabrication. First, all the clichés and symbols are removed from 
the plane of composition (it’s curious that Karl Krauss named Loos the 
architect of the tabula rasa): family, power, subjectivity were removed to 
give birth to a space defined only by its pure qualities. Even the program is 
in part eliminated in the sense that it was built up through the “elevation” 
of space and the modulation of volume from which the program would 
naturally fit (if we separate into different levels, we immediately introduce 
a difference in their occupation, and a movement that may be slower or 
faster, or constrained). [Figure 4] Then, we assist to a clear definition of 
the body postures (the feminine and the masculine bodies) in space. And 
11.  “At one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the 
sensation, one through the other, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the same body which, 
being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I experience the 
sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed. This 
was Cézanne’s lesson against the Impressionists: sensation is not in the ‘free’ or disembodied play 
of light and color (impressions); on the contrary, it is in the body, even the body of an apple”, 
Deleuze 1981, 35. 
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contrary to what some authors have been saying, these postures only have 
to do with the placement of the body in the space exactly whenever a force 
is exerted upon the body and a tension or a spasm is produced, coinciding, 
in space, with a maximum of intensity or a threshold, recalling curiously 
Bacon’s Figures. Passing the door, the sensation changes.
Figure 4
The Raumplan of Villa Müller, Adolf Loos, 1930.
Photograph: Susana Ventura, 2014. 
All these imperceptible movements, tensions and spasms of the body 
in Loos’ houses depend solely of the composition of sensation which is 
mastered by the architect. The body enters into the plane of composition 
as a matter of expression, similarly to other elements. The body, its pos-
tures and declinations are part of the code of sensation, implying howe-
ver an experimentation of Loos’ own body and its transformation into a 
body without organs, where he was able to localise the precise limits and 
thresholds of the sensation. Of course, Loos had several artifices to com-
pose sensations, sometimes of pure comfort (like the one that fills and 
swells all around Lina’s bedroom of white furs and plush), other times of 
intimacy, others of pure desire (as in Villa Karma’s bathroom or Josephi-
ne Baker’s house), and all these sensations may even coexist and form a 
sequence which is, in fact, the difference of intensity of a single sensation 
or rhythm in itself (as Deleuze also explains). A sensation of comfort may 
correspond to a degree of intensity of the sensation of intimacy, as in Lina 
Loos’ bedroom, for example.
Considering the sensation of intimacy as we’ve been thinking it, how 
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did Loos compose it in his works of architecture? How did he transformed 
the difference between exterior and interior into a difference of intensity 
wherein each of the inhabitants is glued or merges with the space around 
his or her body? There is a nakedness in these intervals of an intensive bo-
dy-space in Loos’ houses which doesn’t mean that the body is undressed or 
naked. On the contrary, Loos, just like the Easterners, is extremely aware 
of the importance of having several veils to temperate the very difference 
of intensity between private, interior and intimacy, as we find this sequen-
ce, as in the Japanese houses, in Loos’ ones: it’s a variation in intensity 
of a single sensation of intimacy throughout successive boundaries and 
thresholds, regulated by the postures of the body (including accelerations, 
tensions, spasms and speeds, that usually occur within permanence and 
under the body to recall Artaud).
Therefore, there is a clear definition and design of the boundary that 
separates the exterior and public space from the private space. We should 
notice that the private space, in Loos’ houses, does not coincide totally 
with the interior as the social areas, as Beatriz Colomina has noticed, re-
semble a theatre box where characters inhabit space in order to see others, 
be seen or sometimes to become indiscernible, a fleeting silhouette in a 
dimness space. However, this later effect would depend on the light, to whi-
ch Loos always paid much attention (from where it would come in and how 
it would enter into the room, depending also on the time of the day and of 
the room’s materials, a darker wood or a lighter, for instance). We prefer 
an idea shared by Gravagnuolo, who refers to Loos’ houses as Japanese bo-
xes: there is a larger one and inside a smaller one successively, in order to 
control, exactly, the different degrees and the correspondent thresholds in 
the interior. The body, in its turn, is usually placed at the very limit, in the 
boundary, as it happens, for instance, in the woman’s room at Villa Müller 
(one of the best examples of spaces of intimacy in Loos’ houses). Mrs. 
Müller could choose to sit in the small sofa if early in the morning, and the 
light would come in from the side, creating beautiful warm reflects on the 
light wood panels specially chosen because the room is open towards the 
East. She’s very comfortable, seeing who might come from the entrance or 
from the corridor (the one that access to her husband’s room). Or she may 
choose to sit in the sofa placed just below the overture to the main living 
room and, once there, choose if she turns her back to the living room or if 
she prefers to keep an eye on both entries of the room. All these postures 
were clearly rehearsed by Loos himself, as he usually did while the cons-
truction works elapsed, and allow to determine those different degrees of 
intimacy.
The body occupies the boundary or the wall and the wall is a part of 
the body itself. They become indiscernible, as Deleuze would say. The win-
dows, in their turn, are understood as pure light frames (usually they have 
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curtains to veil the exterior), whose main purpose is to mark the various 
places where the inhabitant must be or rest. This rest, in Loos’ houses, ha-
ppens almost always with a person’s back to the window, as many authors 
denoted, but what becomes, in fact, very evident in the Villa Müller, for 
example, is that it requires a fixed position of the body upon itself and 
towards the interior space of the house. In turn, when a person wanders 
through the interior, her or his body are in constant torsion or if one di-
rects her or his gaze towards the exterior, the body describes an unnatural 
position. It is inside the house, in the determined positions, that the body 
may coexist with space in an intimate relationship. 
Finally, we find another Loos’ artifice to create a spatial sensation of 
intimacy in the creation of a multiplicity of surfaces, equivalent to the mul-
tiple veils or boxes, by the use of multiple mirrors or reflecting surfaces. 
We find their use in the houses, but, curiously, it’s in the American Bar, that 
they create mostly a space of intimacy. Here, the use of mirrors is usually 
justified to augment the space, due to its small dimensions, and create an 
effect of infinity. However, due to the chosen mirrors, to the carefully pla-
ced lamps, to the dark panels of wood furniture, Loos creates an effect of 
a sfumato generating an illusion of an intermediate inhabited space - the 
mirror itself - directing our attention towards above, when the intimate 
space is located below where two lovers may meet. The space of intimacy is 
always beyond our compromising attention. [Figure 5] 
Figure 5
American Bar, Adolf Loos, 1908.
Photograph: Susana Ventura, 2014.
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